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TV STATIONS

I.  VGTRK reform detailed. 

         The process of reforming state television, which was undertaken a year ago under an edict of the president of Russia, seems to be entering the home stretch.  [On 27th April] , Channel 2 [Russia TV channel] will officially be transformed into the Federal State Unitary Enterprise Television Channel Rossiya.  The RTR [Russian Television and Radio, part of All-Russia State TV and Radio Company] aside, all the structures included in the VGTRK [All-Russia State Television and Radio Company] holding will undergo changes in line with the law.  Today there are over 100 of them, and all of them will receive the status of independent legal entities. . . .  
         However, the All-Russia State Television and Radio Company, the holder of the broadcasting licence, will still retain the functions of a primary contractor and manager. . .  
         According to new staff allocations, the state channel will employ 650 people, which is almost half the company’s current staffing. . . .  
         According to the plan, only two creative associations will remain:  special projects (although broadcasts of all sorts may be included here if necessary) and children’s or youth programming. . . .  
         The equipment of the television centre in Shabolovka Street will now be granted for use to outside producers as a form of payment (full or partial) for programme production.  
         By comparison:  ORT [Public Russian Television] spends around 7m dollars a month on production and purchase of programmes, because it is dependent on producers.  Channel 2 spends at least a third of that amount—around 2m dollars. . . .  
         All external producers will have offices in Shabolovka Street.  The programme content, topics and invited guests will be controlled by the Main Editorial Office of the Electronic Mass Media, Russian Television.  That is what the new subdepartment of the VGTRK management company is called.  It is curious that its editorial director is also Aleksandr Akopov [Akopov is director-general of Russia TV channel]. . . .  
         At present, the Federal State Unitary Enterprise VGTRK is the largest media-holding company in Russia.  What is a unitary enterprise?  
         A unitary enterprise is considered to be a commercial organization which has not been granted the right to own the property secured for it by its owner.  The property of a unitary enterprise is indivisible and cannot be distributed via investments (shares, stakes), including among the workers of the enterprise.  
         Only state and municipal enterprises may be formed as unitary enterprises. 

‘Vremya MN’ web site, Moscow, April 27, 1999 

II.  Moscow mayor set to take over TV Centre. 

         By 15th May, Oleg Tolkachev and Sergey Yastrzhembskiy, deputy prime ministers of the Moscow government, along with TV Centre Director Vladimir Yevtushenkov, are supposed to “take measures and draft a decree” on transforming the television company from a public joint-stock company into a state-owned joint-stock company.  
         By the same date, Yastrzhembskiy has been instructed to formulate a political strategy of the third channel conforming to the position of [Moscow mayor] Yuriy Luzhkov’s Fatherland movement.   The former presidential press secretary has been made responsible for the management of the TV Centre by his current chief—the mayor of the capital.  
         Your ‘Izvestiya’ correspondent has learnt about all this from the minutes of a meeting held by Luzhkov.  It discussed issues relating to the improvement of the television company’s operation as mapped out in the documents that are being circulated “for official use only” at the mayor’s office.  And from conversations with sources at the Moscow government, it has emerged that the chief of the Media-Most holding company, Vladimir Gusinskiy, is displaying a strategic interest in TV Centre.  Considering that Sergey Yastrzhembskiy is called Gusinskiy’s man, the information does not seem to be groundless. 

‘Izvestiya,’ Moscow, April 23, 1999 

III.  ORT hopes to pay off part of its debt. 

         Russian Public TV [ORT] director-general Igor Shabdurasulov is pleased with [the 20th April] decision by the Moscow court of arbitration to postpone until 10th June 1999 the hearing of the insolvency case against the Russian Public TV joint-stock company.  
         “The application [to postpone the hearing] was made by ORT, so we are naturally pleased that it was accepted and that the court postponed the hearing until June,” Igor Shabdurasulov has told ITAR-TASS.   In the intervening period, he noted, “we hope to resolve the issue of repaying our debts, or at least the debts we owed when the lawsuit was brought against us.”  
         The ORT director-general recalled that the bulk of the company’s debt to its creditors had already been repaid, thanks in part to a 100m-dollar state loan.  ORT has received four instalments of the loan since January 1999.  The fifth and final instalment is to be disbursed on 29th April.  
         “At the same time, one should bear in mind that we shall not be able to repay all the debts owed by the company,” Igor Shabdurasulov noted.  “Even though we have cut the TV company’s expenses by 40 per cent compared with the pre-crisis period [i.e. before August 1998], there has also been a drop in revenues from commercial enterprises, including those from advertising,” he explained.  The director-general said current revenue could not offset expenditure on the company’s day-to-day operation.  Moreover, Shabdurasulov added, one also has to take into account increased charges for communication services.  

ITAR-TASS news agency (World Service), Moscow, April 20, 1999 

IV.  Russia cancels mogul arrest warrant. 

         Prosecutors cancelled an arrest warrant for business tycoon Boris Berezovsky [on 14th April] because he promised to return to Russia to face inquiries on money laundering charges, news reports said. 
         Berezovsky said he plans to fight charges that he was behind the illegal transfer of $250 million from Aeroflot to the Swiss company, Andava.  He was in France when a warrant was issued for his arrest. 
         Berezovsky, who is believed to have close ties to President Yeltsin, has said the charges against him are part of a political vendetta and claimed Prime Minister Primakov conjured up the charges to disgrace him. 
         Berezovsky has been losing clout in a prolonged battle with Primakov.  The turf war apparently led to Berezovsky’s ouster as the executive secretary of an alliance of former Soviet republics. 
         Many Russian analysts suggested that the warrant for Berezovsky’s arrest was an attempt to keep the mogul from returning home and testifying against senior government officials who allegedly had a stake in his business deals. 

EJC Media News, April 15, 1999 

V.  Berezovskiy arrest warrant linked to ORT battle. 

         The information wars between media empires have faded into the past, and it seems that the media empires themselves are fading into the past.  Last week saw the opening of the hunting season for the owners of factories, newspapers and ships, that is, the oligarchs.  
         The Prosecutor-General’s Office issued arrest warrants for two former oligarchs:  Boris Berezovskiy and Aleksandr Smolenskiy.  
         Berezovskiy, at a Paris news conference, said his difficulties were mainly due to the struggle for Russian Public TV.  
[Correspondent]         A year ago, the oligarchs’ situation seemed permanent and their media empires built for centuries ahead.  But there would be practically no place for the state if Russia’s information space was divided like that, and the authorities could not of course agree to that.  
[Aleksandr Kortunov, president of Moscow Public Science Foundation]         I think the government could lose control over the regions, control over the electorate, but the media are the one thing that the government, and the presidential administration, let’s not forget, still influence fairly seriously.  
[Correspondent]         Maybe it is pure coincidence, but both Berezovskiy and Smolenskiy were very active in privatizing Russian Public TV.  Berezovskiy has until very recently been considered essentially Russian Public TV’s owner.  The recent information assault on Prime Minister [Yevgeniy] Primakov on Channel One has also been linked exclusively to Berezovskiy.  
         Now the ex-CIS executive secretary [Berezovskiy] is answering accusations against him from the luxurious Hotel Crillon in Paris.  He says everything happening to him is also linked to the battle for control of the media. . . .  
         Berezovskiy’s fate remains unclear for the moment, but all things considered the main bastion of his media empire has already fallen and others are on the verge of surrender.  
         Only a month ago, ‘Nezavisimaya Gazeta’ [newspaper controlled by Berezovskiy] was in the vanguard of the information assault against the government, but now it is reacting surprisingly neutrally to the latest scandal involving Berezovskiy.  
[Vitaliy Tretyakov, editor in chief of ‘Nezavisimaya Gazeta’]         The disappearance from the political arena of the oligarchy that owns the media is not a loss that will lead to the loss of freedom of the press.  The media will remain one way or another.  
[Correspondent]         Tretyakov said the main thing is to ensure the media don’t return to total state control, but he said this is not a threat, at least in the near future.  

Ren TV, Moscow, April 11, 1999 

VI.  NTV breaks the news on ethnic cleansing. 

         Russian television news began coverage of ethnic cleansing in Kosova on 4 April, when NTV’s “Itogi” showed pictures of Kosovar Albanians being forced from their homes by Yugoslav soldiers.  In addition, “Itogi’s” anchorman Yevgenii Kiselev disclosed that the reports of Russian journalists in Serbia were subjected to military censorship.  NTV chief editor Vladimir Kulistikov explained the shift by pointing to simple economics, telling the “Moscow Times” on 6 April that the network has finally found the money to send its ace reporter, Pavel Lobkov, to Macedonia to get a first-hand report from ethnic-Albanian refugees.  Analysts expect the rest of Russia’s TV networks to follow NTV’s lead, and Yevgenii Volk of the Heritage Foundation told the daily that the change in media coverage was an indication that the Russian government would eventually soften its stance against NATO.—JAC 

RFE/RL Newsline, April 6, 1999 

VII.  Government tightens financial grip on ORT. 

         It was announced at a session of the collegium of state representatives to ORT [Russian Public Television] that the government intended to control the financial activities of the Russian Public Television joint-stock company.  The weakening of Boris Berezovskiy’s leverage on the first channel remains the main objective of the White House.  Viktoriya Arutyunova and Natalya Samoylova have details. . . .  
         Right before the session, ORT General Director Igor Shabdurasulov received a letter from Mikhail Seslavinskiy, chairman of the Federal Service for Television and Radio Broadcasting, which explained that the ORT, which had gone into receivership, had no right to set up any structures without coordination with all the company shareholders. . . .  The collegium resolved that ORT had no right to sign an agreement for exclusive advertising services with a company that has not been approved by all the shareholders of the first channel. . . .  
         The ORT leadership currently insists that the company’s financial situation is bad and that Vneshekonombank’s credit [to the tune of 100m dollars] cannot be repaid within a year. . . .  There is no surplus today, for ORT’s expenditure is approximately twice as high as what it receives from commercials.  If the current economic situation does not fundamentally change, ORT’s chances of freeing itself from the noose of its debts and of starting to receive tangible profits will progressively worsen.  
         Having said that, the upcoming elections and the likely profits as a result are the main cause of the current heightened attention to ORT’ s finances.  Whoever is able to achieve maximum leverage on the channel will play the first fiddle in media policy. . . .  
         At this point the government has only one real possibility of controlling the ORT.  If the television channel violates the rules of the game set up by the White House, the government may deprive Russian Public Television of its broadcasting licence.  To do so, however, the government will have to introduce substantial amendments to the legislation.  Otherwise it will be unable to strip ORT of its licence, which has been extended till the end of the year 2000.  

‘Kommersant,’ Moscow, March 25, 1999 

 

Last Updated: 11/20/99

 

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