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MONITORING
REPORT OF THE MEDIA COVERAGE OF
THE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS IN KAZAKSTAN
3.
The Media
3.3.
The Broadcast Media and the Campaign
Aware of their dependence on the presidential
administration for approval, journalists in Kazakstan
must tread a fine line between appearing to cover the
news and not criticising the president. As Viktor
Klimov, director of news programming for the private
Channel 31 stated to an EIM monitor, one needed “the
appearance of fair news coverage for the elections,”
but in reality the station would not have aired any
serious criticism of the incumbent president. At
privately-owned KTK, creative manager Vadim Boraiko said
that the station decided to feature Kasymov on some news
programmes in order to “put some spice into the
campaign.” In fact, Kasymov created a minor
sensation in broadcasts on KTK and even made
international news for some of his more outrageous
antics. One of the most dramatic examples of this
was the incident in which he crushed a wineglass in his
hand as he explained that he was unafraid to tackle
corruption. In addition, KTK broadcast the results
of a survey, showing that Kasymov had a reasonable amount
of support (27 percent) although Nazarbayev was still in
the lead with 40 percent. Yet in terms of election
coverage, “Nazarbayev comes first,” the
creative director explained when interviewed in the final
days of the presidential campaign. The situation at
KTK is particularly uncertain, as even Boraiko was unsure
exactly who had bought the station—as well as the
popular newspaper Karavan—in the recent sale of the
media group. “The president and his press
service don’t pressure the press,” Boraiko
said. “There are economic means by which to
strangle the press . . . The television channel is
private, but the broadcasting system is run by the
state.” Since August 1998, KTK has expanded
its signal and relies on state officials to relay that
signal. “We try to be neutral about the
president,” Boraiko said. “But no one is
in doubt about who will win the election.”
Boraiko said the inclusion of Kazhegeldin in the race
would have made for much more interesting news
stories.
Despite the appearance of Kasymov on KTK and coverage of
the candidates on other stations (see analysis below),
there are two major concerns about the television
coverage in the 1999 Kazakstan presidential
elections. First, President Nazarbayev enjoyed a
high amount of support from television. Naturally,
an incumbent president will enjoy more television
coverage than relatively obscure candidates, but the
coverage still seemed unusually lopsided. Some of
the coverage of Nazarbayev was in the form of paid
advertising, including a series of five 15-minute
programmes entitled The Unknown Nazarbayev shown on the
Khabar in the week before the election. (It should
be noted that the president’s daughter took a leave
of absence from her post as head of Khabar during the
election campaign).
It is interesting to note that Khabar prides itself on
being professional, according to acting head Vladimir
Rerikh, and he criticised the popular KTK station for its
sensationalist news stories. Boraiko, on the other
hand, is proud of the way KTK searches for interesting
and unusual stories, such as Arab sheiks illegally
hunting with falcons with the complicity of the local
police in the suburbs of Almaty, to engage the
viewers. KTK claims to be the most popular station
in the country; on the other hand Khabar provided
viewership statistics to EIM monitors that showed its
main news show Itogi Dni (News of the Day) reaches a
well-educated segment of the population.
In addition, as with the newspaper journalists, there has
been the effect of “self-censorship,”
i.e. journalists feel it safer to support the
current authorities than risk voicing views of the
opposition. KTK’s Boraiko, who noted that the
Kazakstan media is less free than in Russia, but more
free than in Uzbekistan, said a short period of
journalistic freedom and experimentation had ended in
Kazakstan. “There was a small break,” he
said, “And then everyone was ready to become not
free.” Journalists also noted that as the
elections had been unexpectedly brought forward it was
difficult for both candidates and television companies to
plan their coverage well.
However, all four candidates have had access to
television through a 15-minute block allocated to each of
them on Khabar as part of the Law on Elections. In
this single broadcast, the candidates were allowed to
present their material without interference or
interruption. In addition, all candidates
technically were able to buy advertising on stations such
as Khabar and KTK. However, the three contenders to
President Nazarbayev claimed that they were not able to
take full advantage of this opportunity, due to the
relatively high cost of airtime. Nevertheless,
communist candidate Abdildin did choose to buy time on
Khabar during the last week of the campaign, paying the
same price for the time as Nazarbayev, according to
Khabar vice-president and acting head Vladimir
Rerikh. Abdildin reported that he paid 130,000
Tenge (approximately US $1,530) for 45 minutes of time in
two blocks over two nights on Khabar. That would
appear to be an unusually low price, although the regular
advertising rates at Khabar were not available when the
monitors interviewed Rerikh. However, it can be
noted that one minute of advertising time on KTK averaged
US $1,296 and that TAN TV, which reaches only Almaty and
the surrounding area, charged a minimum of US $180 a
minute in January 1999.
While opposition candidates have complained that there
has been limited access to the mass media, television
editors at some networks responded that the candidates
generated little news or failed to provide interesting
film footage for the news. In addition, journalists
pointed out that the race was much less interesting in
terms of a real contest because of the exclusion of
Kazhegeldin and, as a result, merited less coverage than
if a strong opposition candidate had run. There
appeared to be little serious discussion of issues.
An example of television coverage during the election
would be the main news programme on Khabar at 9
p.m. on Friday, the 8th of January. During
the Russian-language section of the news programme, there
were news reports on the campaigns of the opposition
candidates. There was also a report noting their
satisfaction with their treatment by Khabar in relation
to their electoral broadcasts. However, in the same
news programme, Nazarbayev received far more elaborate,
positive coverage, through a report on a troupe of
entertainers touring the country to drum up support for
his candidacy, as well as a report on the premiere of a
film by Mikhailkov in Kazakstan, at which the famous
director voiced his support for Nazarbayev as
president.
According to monitoring by Gallup Asia, there were 691
items concerning the elections broadcast on four national
television networks (Kazakhstan-1, Khabar, KTK and NTK)
in the four weeks before the presidential
elections. These broadcasts included news items,
political advertisements and specials.
Unsurprisingly, the level of coverage increased as the
elections drew near: Half of the items were
broadcast from the 2nd to the 9th of January, the eve of
the elections. The focus was squarely on the
incumbent and front-runner in the elections, as
Nazarbayev garnered 45.9 percent of the elections
coverage, compared with 11 percent for Kasymov, 7.7
percent for Abdildin and 6.2 percent for Gabbasov.
The rest of the coverage was devoted to general news
about the elections, including information from the
Kazakstan Central Election Committee. While it is
typical for the incumbent to receive a large amount of
coverage in election campaigns, it is questionable
whether the voters could have received enough information
to make reasonable judgements about the programmes and
personal qualities of the three other candidates in the
race. Nazarbayev received more than 17 hours of
coverage; in comparison Kasymov received 1 hour and 45
minutes, Abdildin 1 hour and 52 minutes and Gabbasov
about an hour and 21 minutes of airtime. Thus,
Nazarbayev received more than three times as much
national television coverage as the other candidates
combined. The four stations broadcast about 5 hours
and 50 minutes of general election information.
Most of what the Kazakstan electorate saw on national
television was news—and the bulk of it was focused
on Nazarbayev. Out of more than 28 hours of
election coverage on national television, about 17 ½
were devoted to news, about an hour and 45 minutes was
used for advertising and there were about 12 ½ hours of
specials or uncoded programming, according to Gallup
Asia. Both election news items and political
advertising averaged about a minute and a half in
length. Nazarbayev received more than half the news
coverage, while Kasymov received 16 percent, Abdildin 11
percent and Gabbasov roughly 9 percent. About 12
percent of the news coverage was devoted to general
election news. “People aren’t that
interested,” said Alma Aganbaeva, director of
Russian language news programming for the private station
TAN TV in Almaty. “If Kazhegeldin had run, it
would have been interesting.”
In addition to a large amount of coverage, the incumbent
also enjoyed significantly more positive news coverage on
national television than his three opponents.
According to the Gallup Asia analysis, the news coverage
received by Nazarbayev was 62 percent positive and 38
percent neutral, with a single negative mention out of
229 items. It is somewhat extraordinary that an
incumbent president would get only a single negative
mention on the national news in an entire month. In
contrast, six percent of the news items about Kasymov
were negative and just over half (51 percent) were
positive. Abdildin’s coverage was 45 percent
positive, 49 percent neutral and 6 percent negative as
well. Gabbasov had 21 percent positive, 67 percent
neutral and 13 percent negative news coverage on national
television (Percentage figures in this report may add up
to more than 100 due to rounding.)
Nazarbayev was the only candidate to buy a substantial
amount of advertising on national television during the
campaign. Coders found almost two hours (110
minutes) of national television advertising for
Nazarbayev over the course of the campaign. The
Gallup monitoring team found only negligible advertising
for the other presidential candidates on national
television — 79 seconds for Kasymov, 34 seconds for
Abdildin and 9 seconds for Gabbasov. The monitors
found the largest amount of advertising—more than 3
½ hours — to promote the elections and turnout in
general.
In addition to strictly editorial or advertising time,
coders also searched for “specials” on the
candidates, longer programmes that were either the 15
minutes of television free time provided to each
candidate by the Central Election Committee or another
type of presentation of the candidate that fell between a
recognisable advertisement or news report. Each
candidate was given 15 minutes of free time on the Khabar
channel and each used the time—Abdildin and Kasymov
chose to go on air live while Gabbasov provided a
tape. Khabar acting president Vladimir Rerikh
complained in an interview with EIM monitors that the
quality of Gabbasov’s tape was quite poor, but the
station was obligated to show it without editing.
He also noted that Kasymov performed fairly well during
his free-time slot.
There was a discernible difference in the emphasis of the
electoral coverage, particularly in terms of the
treatment of the incumbent (see Chart 2). Three of
the four national television stations monitored devoted
the largest percentage of their coverage to Nazarbayev,
although NTK gave the greatest amount of coverage to
general elections news (38.3 percent) with the coverage
of Nazarbayev very close behind (36.7 percent). Of
the four national stations monitored, Khabar devoted the
largest percentage of coverage (52.7 percent) to the
incumbent president. Coverage was more evenly
distributed on other channels. However, coverage of
Nazarbayev dominated coverage of all other candidates on
all the national television stations that were monitored.
3.4.
Regional Television Campaign
The patterns for regional television coverage were
similar to those found in national coverage.
Nazarbayev received 40.5 percent of the coverage on nine
regional channels, compared with 4.5 percent for Kasymov,
4.7 percent for Abdildin and 3.7 percent for
Gabbasov. Almost half of the more than 25 hours of
total coverage—46.6 percent—was devoted to
general election coverage. About 40 percent of the
coverage was coded as news, 33 percent as advertising and
the rest as specials, other or unknown types. As on
national television, Nazarbayev enjoyed significantly
more positive news coverage than the other three
candidates: 76.5 percent of the news coverage of
Nazarbayev was positive, while 22.4 percent was neutral
and only 1.1 percent was negative (2 stories). On
the other hand, only 32.4 percent of the stories about
Kasymov were positive, 24.3 percent of the stories about
Abdildin were positive and 20.7 percent of the news
coverage of Gabbasov was positive. In addition,
Kasymov and Gabbasov attracted a relatively large amount
of negative coverage, 27 percent and 20.7 percent
respectively. As the opposition candidates said
they were unable to afford television advertising in any
significant amount, it is not surprisingly that there is
no advertising for them on the nine regional television
stations monitored for this report. However, the
monitors did find 118 advertisements as well as 29
special or other programmes for Nazarbayev, all of them
with either a positive or neutral slant.
It is significant to note that if the two Almaty stations
(Channel 31 and Rakhat) are excluded from the regional
study, the emphasis on positive news about Nazarbayev
becomes even stronger. In the more narrow analysis
of the stations outside of the largest city, Nazarbayev
received almost 60 percent of the coverage on seven
regional channels, compared with 1.3 percent for Kasymov,
2.8 percent for Abdildin and 1.7 percent for Gabbasov on
these seven channels. In addition, the news about
Nazarbayev was overall more positive than when the sample
included the Almaty broadcasters. On the seven
stations outside the major city, Nazarbayev enjoyed
significantly more positive news coverage than the other
three candidates: 81.7 percent of the news coverage
of Nazarbayev were positive, while 18.3 percent were
neutral and there were no negative stories
reported. On the other hand, only 55.6 percent of
the stories about Kasymov was positive, 31.3 percent of
the stories about Abdildin was positive and 30 percent of
the news coverage of Gabbasov was positive.
However, the total amount of coverage for the three minor
candidates was so small on these seven stations—just
9 stories for Kasymov, 16 for Abdildin and 10 for
Gabbasov—it is therefore difficult to draw any
significant conclusions about the type of coverage.
This is evidence that that viewers outside the major city
had even less access to information about presidential
candidates than viewers in Almaty.
There are discernible differences among patterns of
election coverage on the nine regional channels that were
monitored for this report. Many of the regional
stations focused their coverage on general election news
rather than reports on specific candidates: It
accounted for 77.1 percent on KVTV, 64.5 percent on
OKTV, 51.4 percent on SK TRK and 57 percent on
Tsesna. However, the Almaty stations, Channel 31
and Rakhat, had more coverage of the candidates and less
on the general elections. The regional stations
Otyrar, Variant and VKTV has so little election
coverage—a total of 44 stories during the monitoring
period—that it is difficult to gauge their coverage
in percentage terms. Most of the coverage of
candidates on regional television was for Nazarbayev,
coverage ranging from a high of 44.4 percent on
Nazarbayev on SK TRK to a low of 18.6 percent on KVTV
(which focused primarily on general news about the
elections). Disturbingly, there was little to no
coverage of the opposition candidates in some areas,
making it very difficult for many regional viewers to
gain important information during the campaign.
OKTV carried no coverage of any opposition candidate,
while Otyrar had no coverage of Abdildin and KVTV, SK TRK
and VKTV had no coverage of Gabbasov. While
Gabbasov was arguably a very marginal candidate in the
race, he did merit at least some mention in the campaign
although he eventually won only 0.75 percent of the vote
in the presidential contest.
3.5.
The Print Media and the Campaign
Although there are more opportunities to hear the voices
of the opposition in newspapers, even the largest
newspapers have quite modest circulation figures and the
reach of the opposition press is tiny in comparison with
television or mainstream newspapers. According to a
survey of 40 experts commissioned by the Independent
Information Agency1 in Almaty last year, most newspapers
support the current regime in Kazakhstan. The
survey found that 14 publications—including
Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, Verchernyi Almaty, Novoe
Pokolenie and all but one of the Kazakh-language
publications still in operation —had a “fully
positive” orientation toward the Nazarbayev
administration. The experts rated Karavan, Panorama
and four other papers as having a medium level of support
for the authorities. Vremya Po Grinvichu/The Globe
was assessed as having a slight positive orientation
toward the authorities, while 451 po Farengeitu was
assessed as having a slight positive orientation toward
the opposition. Both XXI Vek and the now-defunct
Dat were ranked as having a medium orientation toward the
opposition. Both these papers, it should be noted,
have received financial backing and support from
Kazhegeldin. With the closure of Dat, all of the
Kazakh-language newspapers had a medium to strong
orientation to the government at the time of the
presidential elections.
The monitoring project analysed 24 publications, from the
opposition weekly 451 po Farengeitu to the
Russian-language official government publication,
Kazakhstanskaya Pravda. The bulk of these
publications are printed in Russian. The lone
opposition newspaper in Kazakh, Dat (Let Me Speak), was
forced out of business by an unusually large fine before
the presidential elections. The broadcast media
trend of strong support for Nazarbayev—with a fair
amount of general elections coverage and minimal coverage
of opposition candidates—was mirrored in the print
media. However, there were stronger differences in
the patterns of coverage among the publications,
suggesting that Kazakstan’s newspapers have managed
to retain a degree of media freedom no longer found in
the country’s television sector.
In some cases, newspapers consider themselves
“organs” of the state and continue to function
much the same way as in the Soviet era. For
example, Kazakhstanskaya Pravda was dedicated to
supporting the incumbent president during the election
campaign, according to section head Kaleeva. The
paper would not publicise opposition candidates
“under any circumstances,” she said.
However, the government paper was prepared to provide the
proper space under the law to the opposition candidates,
although she said that this had still not been arranged
as of the 5th of January. Kaleeva said that the
journalists at the paper understood the need to support
the president and his administration, although there were
occasionally internal meetings to remind the staff of
this obligation. There are plans to privatise 65
percent of the newspaper, with 35 percent to remain in
the hands of the current government owner, the Ministry
of Information and Public Accord. At Panorama, a
relatively popular economic weekly with a distribution of
about 18,000 copies, chief editor Lera Tsoy said that the
privately owned paper focused mainly on how the elections
might affect investors. Monitors did not talk to
editors at Karavan although it is included in the
analysis below.
As noted above, the largest newspapers in Kazakstan are
Karavan and Argumenty i Fakti, with weekly sales of about
250,000. On the other hand, the opposition
newspaper XXI Vek has a print run of 15,000 a week and
struggles with distribution because it is shut out of the
state distribution network for publications, according to
editor in chief Bigeldy Gabdullin. The opposition
newspaper 451 po Farengeitu officially claims 5,000,
although founder Sergei Duvanov thinks it might now be
closer to 10,000 or even 15,000. Interestingly,
editor of the now defunct opposition newspaper Dat
claimed that his distribution had reached 50,000 by the
time it went out of business, making it by far the
largest opposition newspaper in the country.
Although it is not possible to verify this figure, many
editors at other publications and media analysts noted
that Dat had enormous popularity, particularly because it
was the only Kazakh language source to promote opposition
to President Nazarbayev and his administration.
There is significant evidence of harassment and even
violence against opposition newspapers in
Kazakhstan. Dat was launched on the 10th of April
1998 and published extensive information on the financial
dealings of the Nazarbayev family, some of the material
drawn from Russian and other foreign sources. The
paper, founded in part by Kazhegeldin, had its computers
confiscated by the tax police in July 1998 after the
publication of a story about Nazarbayev’s alleged
wealth, according to Dat’s editor Sharip
Kurakbaev. Part of the coverage included
comparisons of the Nazarbayev family with the Suharto
clan in Indonesia. In addition, the paper lost a
suit for slander on a matter not related to its coverage
of the Nazarbayev family. The newspaper was fined
the unusually large sum of US $400,000 and was forced
into bankruptcy. Dat published its last issue in
early December 1998. During its existence, Dat
vendors often were harassed by the police, according to
Kurakbaev. The editor told an EIM monitor that if
Dat had still been publishing during the 1999
presidential elections, it would have supported an
opposition candidate.
XXI Vek (21st Century) publishes views from a range of
political viewpoints and also has received support from
Kazhegeldin, according to chief editor Bigeldy
Gabdullin. The paper ran a story discussing the
financial dealings of the Nazarbayev family on 9
September 1998. After the appearance of this
article, the printing company used by XXI Vek declined to
publish any further issues. In addition, XXI Vek
was excluded from Kazakstan’s publication
distribution system. On the 26th of September 1998,
a fire bomb was thrown into the offices of the newspaper,
although none of the staff were injured. XXI Vek
has now lost the bulk of its advertisers and the editor
reports that businesses that chose to advertise in its
paper have received visits from the tax police. Dat
editor Kurakbaev also reported that advertisers had
problems with the tax police.
Another paper that regularly prints opposition views, 451
po Farengeitu (451 Degrees Fahrenheit) has largely
avoided problems by operating as a confederation of
journalists rather than as a registered business,
according to its representatives. A Russian/English
language paper, Vremya po Grinvichu/The Globe, was forced
to publish in Kyrgyzstan after it was unable to find a
printing company that would print the paper in
Kazakstan. The explanation for these difficulties
given by Vremya po Grinvichu chief editor Nurlan Ablyazov
linked the paper’s coverage of Kazakstan politics to
its temporary inability to print in the country.
Recently, it has been able to find a publisher in
Kazakstan once again. Significantly, opposition
newspapers have a difficult time becoming part of the
official distribution system for publications in
Kazakstan and typically must rely on street vendors to
distribute their papers.
While the editor of Dat felt it was appropriate to
support the opposition openly, others in the
“opposition” press stressed the need for
objectivity. Indeed, the coding by Gallup Asia
shows that the opposition press covered all the
candidates during the election campaign. However,
there were two problems in covering the presidential
elections. First, due to the strong position of the
incumbent and lack of viable opposition to his candidacy,
there was relatively little news value in the
election. In addition, many journalists speak of
constraints due to the formidable problems faced by any
newspaper willing to publish negative news about
Nazarbayev. Many journalists still feel the need
for self-censorship. For example, the editor of XXI
Century, despite the fact he did not hesitate to continue
to publish his newspaper after his office was fire
bombed, noted that even he has a “small internal
censor.”
Most of the items coded were for news—and most of
the news focused on either Nazarbayev or the elections in
general. The incumbent president received 52.7
percent of the editorial coverage, while his opponents
received just a fraction of this amount—6.3 percent
for Kasymov, 7.7 percent for Abdildin and 4.7 percent for
Gabbasov. Kazhegeldin, with his exclusion from the
race making international news in the autumn, received
4.5 percent of the coverage during the campaign.
Only 13 of the 961 items coded were advertisements,
echoing the statements by many editors that their
publications had not been approached by candidates for
advertisements as well as statements by opposition
candidates that they could not afford any significant
advertising. There were no political advertisements
for the opposition candidates in either the national or
the regional publications that were monitored for this
report. There were seven political advertisements
for Nazarbayev—five in Kazakhstanskaya Pravda
and one each in Novoe Pokolenie and Yuzhnyi
Kazakhstan. The only other advertisements were for
the elections in general, according to Gallup Asia.
There are distinctive differences between the
“state” media and those that considered
themselves independent from the government. In the
state-oriented publications, there was a strong emphasis
on both the incumbent president and the elections in
general. For example, Kazakstanskaya Pravda, which
is published by the administration, devoted 56.8 percent
of its elections coverage to Nazarbayev and 27 percent of
its coverage to the elections in general. Karavan,
which is owned by the same group as KTK television,
printed 60.6 percent of its coverage on Nazarbayev and
22.7 percent on the elections in general.
Significantly, there was absolutely no news about
Nazarbayev’s former rival in the race, Kazhegeldin,
in Karavan. This would tend to support allegations
that Karavan, along with its sister television station,
had become pro-administration since its sale to an
undisclosed owner.
In contrast, 451 po Farengeitu discussed Nazarbayev in
just 26.3 percent of its coverage and the elections in
only 7.9 percent—suggesting that the newspaper was
much less interested in promoting general turnout or
perhaps expected its readership to be interested in more
specific news about the opponents to the incumbent
president. In fact, the newspaper wrote almost as
much about Kazhegeldin (23.7 percent of its coverage) as
it did about the president and devoted more space to the
opponents in the race as well (see Chart 7). Vremya
no Grinvichu also published more news about the
opposition—a total of 37.4 percent of its coverage
as opposed to 29.3 percent of its coverage on
Nazarbayev. In addition, 12 percent of the coverage
in Vremya Po Grinvichu was about Kazhegeldin. The
paper with the heaviest coverage of Nazarbayev was
Industrial’naya Karaganda with 63.5 percent of its
election coverage devoted to the President.
While newspaper readers had access to more information on
opposition candidates and even on Nazarbayev rival
Kazhegeldin, the newspaper coverage was not noted for its
acerbity. Only 65 of the 948 news items coded were
considered “negative” in nature and they were
spread fairly evenly among the candidates. Vremya
Po Grinvichu had five negative news items about
Nazarbayev, which was the largest number of any one
publication. The largest number of negative items
(16) was for Abdildin, the communist candidate, perhaps
reflecting fears that communism still represents a threat
to the current regime in Kazakhstan. Virtually all
of the 269 items that were rated positive in orientation
were about Nazarbayev. There were 247 positive
mentions of the incumbent in news items, including 67 in
Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, 43 in Industrial’naya
Karaganda and 32 in Akmolinskaya Pravda. There also
were seven positive mentions of the president in Vremya
Po Grinvichu, suggesting that the publication offered a
fair range of opinions on Nazarbayev.
As with television coverage of the elections, there were
differences between the national coverage and that
provided by the regions (see Chart 8). In general,
regional newspapers were even more sympathetic to
Nazarbayev. While national newspapers gave 46.7
percent of their news coverage to Nazarbayev, 8.7 percent
to Kasymov, 9.3 percent to Abdildin and 5.9 percent to
Gabbasov, regional newspapers gave more coverage to
Nazarbayev and less to his opponents. The 16
regional newspapers in this study gave 59.3 percent news
coverage to the incumbent president, 3.7 percent to
Kasymov, 5.9 percent to Abdildin and 3.5 percent to
Gabbasov. This suggests that as with television,
regional journalists speak with more enthusiastic voices
for the presidential administration than their colleagues
on national newspapers. Certainly the fact that all
of the opposition newspapers are considered
“national” (although effectively their reach
may not be far beyond Almaty) has an impact on this
finding.
3.6.
The Media and the Candidates
All of the candidates received the time allocated to them
on state television and radio according to the provisions
of the Law on Elections. However, two of the
candidates, Kasymov and Abdildin, told EIM monitors that
they were particularly concerned that they had not had
fair access to the media in general. Communist
candidate Serikbolsyn Abdildin requested the opportunity
to have televised debates with the other candidates, but
was refused on the grounds that there was too little time
to organise such events. By the same token, Khabar
acting head Rerikh said that Abdildin made his requests
late and that the station had gone out of its way to
provide him with paid time in prime time with very little
notice for the last week of the campaign.
Abdildin also complained that it was extremely difficult
to get space in newspapers. Although some of his
articles were published in Kazakhstanskaya Pravda and
Yegemen Kazakhstan (which were paid for by his campaign
team, in addition to those organised through the Central
Electoral Commission) he stated that most commercial
newspapers declined to carry material relating to the
Communist Party programme or its activities. Both
Abdildin and Kasymov said that some defamatory material
was published about them and complained that they were
not given the opportunity to reply to these critical
stories in print. Both these opposition candidates
felt that in fact, all the media, both print and
electronic, were working directly or indirectly to
promote the campaign of the incumbent president.
Abdildin gave as an example of such bias, the screening
of an anti-communist documentary entitled The Ghost of
Communism in juxtaposition with the promotional series on
the president’s past entitled The Unknown
Nazarbayev.
The director of Nazarbayev’s campaign headquarters
in Almaty, Tokamykhomed S. Sadykov, said his
campaign was satisfied with the coverage for the
president in the mass media. In addition,
opposition candidate Engels Gabbasov is on record as
stating that he was entirely satisfied with his access to
the media.
4.
Conclusions
It is clear that the media, particularly television, were
biased toward Nazarbayev during the campaign. Not
only did the incumbent receive a disproportionately large
amount of time, even given that he was the current state
executive, but it was more positive than the coverage
meted out to the other candidates. The coverage of
the other candidates was so small, especially in regional
media outlets, that it would have been very difficult for
voters to have sufficient information to make informed
electoral choices based on the programmes or even the
personalities of the opposition candidates. As many
journalists and analysts noted, there was little news
value in the presidential campaign. As the only
serious contenders had been eliminated, leaving just
three relatively weak opponents to the president, there
was little interest either editorially or, apparently, on
the part of the public.
Plurality of opinion in the media in Kazakstan has
arguably been declining since 1996, with the beginning of
the tender process for broadcasting licenses that
resulted in the closure of a series of privately-owned
media companies. In addition, there have been
escalating problems over the past year for the opposition
press. Support amongst the media for the government
may in some cases be genuine, but the tendency to hold
internal meetings (such as the case of Kazakhstanskaya
Pravda) to remind staff of where their loyalties should
lie, indicates a level of government interference which
is detrimental to the development of a free press.
The monitors noted no violations of the electoral law in
respect to the media. Khabar provided the
candidates with the free time allocated to them under the
law’s provisions, and with additional paid time when
requested. However the law itself contains very few
stipulations, and the monitors feel it is inappropriate
that there should be no difference made in law between
entitlements to media access in parliamentary elections
and entitlements to access in presidential
elections.
The Kazakstan presidential elections did not provide
voters with a realistic choice of candidates. In
this circumstance, the task of the media in covering the
elections was particularly difficult. Firstly,
there was little real news to cover once the primary
contender to Nazarbayev could not register to run.
Secondly, the three opposition candidates had little time
to organise media campaigns themselves because the
elections had been moved forward. Nevertheless, it
is the obligation of the media to set the agenda and
inform voters to the highest degree possible for national
elections.
Most media outlets chose not to challenge or seriously
question some of the obvious flaws in the process,
notably the abrupt changes in the electoral law. In
particular, television stations did not offer a serious
study of the changes in the electoral law and
system. Those that chose to do so, such as small
opposition newspapers, found themselves facing formidable
problems. There is a culture among most of the
media in Kazakstan to avoid confrontation with the
president and his administration. As a result,
their readers and viewers do not always receive balanced
information. In the long run, this creates a
serious barrier to the further democratisation of the
country.
Faced with his first contested election, President
Nursultan Nazarbayev chose to exercise his influence to
limit opposition voices, criticism or personal attacks as
much as possible. While apparently not wishing to
return to the Soviet style of obvious censorship and
complete state ownership of the media, Nazarbayev has
deployed several effective measures to control the media
while maintaining a quasi-market for privately owned
television stations and newspapers. These methods
of control include:
- Introducing
laws, such as the law on national security which
gives the Procurator General and the Committee on
National Security sweeping rights to close down
media outlets—without trial—for
violation of the vague and broad notion of
“national security.” Journalists
in Kazakstan are aware that this law—and the
law on language use in broadcasts — can be
used against any media outlet that supports
opposition to the incumbent president.
- Manipulating
private broadcasters through the tender system,
which forced stations to bid in an expensive
auction to purchase their existing frequencies,
as well as required them to pass a board showing
their support for the president. With
threats of future tender systems, private
broadcasters are aware that they are able to
exist only with the approval of the
government. In addition, the tender system
eliminated many independent, experienced
broadcasters who could have criticised the
electoral process.
- Deployment
of government resources into the nationwide
Khabar channel, which is run by the
president’s daughter and supports the
administration.
- Unfair
treatment of opposition newspapers, particularly
the unusually large fine that sent the
Kazakh-language opposition newspaper Dat into
bankruptcy. Also, the government clearly
uses its tax police to punish and harass
opposition newspapers, according to their
editors.
There have been some sinister, isolated acts of violence
against journalists, including the beating of
Kazhegeldin’s press secretary and the fire-bombing
of an opposition newspaper. No-one, including the
editor of XXI Vek, can identify who initiated or carried
out these acts. However, there have been legal acts
by the government in the recent past that have served
even better to intimidate the vast majority of print and
broadcast journalists into supporting the administration
and limiting opposition views. As one journalist
noted above, Kazakstan now has the appearance of
journalistic freedom—privately-owned media, a
guarantee of media freedom in the Constitution, a certain
range of opinions within the press—but it is
“decorative” rather than real. In fact,
journalists have few options but to support the president
and avoid controversial subjects, such as the departure
of ethnic Russians or the unpopular removal of the
capital to Astana, if they want to avoid encountering
some of the formidable obstacles to publication or
broadcast that are listed above. The irony of the
situation is that Nazarbayev’s heavy-handed control
of the media was probably not necessary for him to win
the elections in January 1999. Surveys indicated
that Nazarbayev, who has led the country since Soviet
times, was by far the most popular choice to be
president.
By tipping the scales in his favour, Nazarbayev has
institutionalised a lack of freedom in the media.
After a start towards becoming an established part of
civil society in Kazakstan, the media are now further
away from the position of the fourth estate than they
were in the early nineties. It is certainly
reasonable for an incumbent to fight to stay in power,
and only to be expected. However, events since
1996, specifically the tender process which eliminated
much of the independent broadcast media and the
heightened pressure on opposition newspapers, indicate a
reverse in the media’s fortunes and hence a
lessening of their capacity to be objective and
informative. As head of the government, Nazarbayev
must ultimately take responsibility for this state of
affairs. The authorities have made it increasingly
difficult for alternative political candidates and groups
to appear in recent years, and concurrently created
obstacles to the media’s coverage of alternative
politics. These tactics combine to indicate a
worrying trajectory away from more democratic development
and a distancing from international conventions on human
rights and freedom of speech which were earlier better
heeded.
It is important to note the achievements of the
government and the media in the early nineties, as it
marked a turning point in Kazakstan’s rejection of
the past and attempt to move forward to a different type
of government. Recent events do not indicate a
return to the past, so much as a realignment of
priorities which have done serious harm to media
development and to the development of civil society per
se. The current authorities in Kazakstan are
forming policy around an increasingly authoritarian
agenda, with the consequence of more strict control over
the media. There are nevertheless still significant
attempts by independent organisations and independent
media to set a different agenda. However, pressure
for change, both internally and externally, is at a
minimum. Ultimately, the media will be dependent on
whether such pressure becomes a greater priority for the
development of Kazak society than current circumstances
allow.
5.
Recommendations
The monitors identified a number of circumstances which
detrimentally affect the media in Kazakstan.
Outside of the realm of financial independence, there are
legal questions to be addressed which could improve the
situation for the media and a number of professional
issues which are of lingering importance. The
monitors are nevertheless aware of the fundamental
changes in policy required for any such improvements to
be implemented. Some of these changes, however,
especially those regarding the relationship of political
parties and candidates to the media and vice versa, and
the level of professionalism inherent within the media at
the moment, are absolutely necessary and can certainly be
achieved allowing current circumstances. Others may
be more problematic at the moment, but must at some stage
be addressed openly.
In this spirit, the monitors and the European Institute
for the Media would make the following recommendations:
The immediate clarification of Laws of Kazakstan which
can lead to the indiscriminatory closure of any given
media company. The Constitution of the Republic of
Kazakstan is quite specific on the issue of freedom of
speech and the abolishment of censorship and the laws
which in any way appear to contradict these articles
cannot be left open to such wide interpretation.
Specifically, the Law on National Security and the Law on
the Kazak Language require in depth explanation.
Although there was some verbal reassurance from the
authorities that the law requiring 50% of all broadcasts
to be made in Kazak only refers to programmes actually
produced by the company involved, verbal reassurances are
insufficient. If the law was implemented as it
stands, it is doubtful whether any of Kazakstan’s
television stations would remain in business at all.
The abolishment of the dubious institution of the Loyalty
Commission for the tender process for broadcasting
frequencies. A prior requirement of loyalty to the
authorities during the process for acquiring a license to
broadcast is undemocratic and contrary to the
Constitution of the Republic of Kazakstan.
An end to the harassment of newspapers or broadcasters
which support political opposition to the
president. By appearing to tolerate this practice,
the authorities leave themselves open to the charge of
interfering with the development of democracy in their
own country, thereby contravening International
Conventions which they have signed.
A change in the electoral law to allow adequate time and
space to be allocated to presidential candidates to
present their programmes during an election period.
The current allocation makes no distinction between
municipal, parliamentary or presidential elections, which
is clearly an inappropriate distribution of available
resources and detrimental to the chances of alternative
candidates to the incumbent, who can naturally hope to
achieve more media coverage while carrying out official
duties. In addition, the government should make
practical moves to force local officials to cooperate
with opposition candidates, assuring them receipt of
adequate space and fair treatment as they campaign in the
provinces.
An attempt to improve the level of professionalism in
journalism, particularly in the area of election
reporting. This could be affected through workshops
and meetings between election campaign officers and those
responsible for election reporting within the media, in
order to clarify the type of information the media
requires. The development of a dialogue between
press officers and the media is of paramount importance
in deciding what is of media interest and how information
should be packaged. In addition, the media should
set out clearly what its objectives in covering election
campaigns and particular individuals in advance should
be.
Note 1:
It should be noted that this agency is run from the same
office as the opposition newspaper 45 Po Farengeitu.
Reprinted
with Permission
Copyright
© 1999 European Commission
For the
complete report, please contact:
The
European Institute for the Media
Kaistrasse
13, 40221, Düsseldorf, Germany
Tel:
49 211 901040
Fax:
49 211 9010456
Email:
madp@eim.de
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