|
|
|
MEDIA INSTITUTES AND FOREIGN AID Since the end of World War II, Brussels, Strasbourg, Washington, and many others (including private donors) have disbursed generous amounts of aid in attempts to achieve a variety of foreign policy goals, ranging from political influence to establishment of democracy and economic development. The record of foreign assistance has always been criticised, but more recently a new wave of publications have openly questioned the use of aid for foreign policy purposes, using the collapse of the Russian economy as the leitmotiv. One of the most eminent contributors to the debate has been Janine Wedel of the George Washington University who takes a hard, behind-the-scenes look at aid efforts in Central Europe, Russia and Ukraine in her book Collision and Collusion.1 Her main argument is that while professing to support simply economic reform, U.S. policies have consolidated political and economic power in the hands of one clique. She recommends, inter alia, that “[t]he United States must accept that the future shape of Russia must and will be determined by the Russian people and adhere to its basic principles such as participatory democracy and the rule of law.” The book and its arguments clearly touches upon the efficiency and the effectiveness of financial and technical aid to transitional societies, which is the underlying topic of this debate about the role of media institutes and organisations funded by foreign aid. In comparison with economic reform where market indicators can be used to measure the impact of financial aid, foreign assistance to media institutes is far more complicated to evaluate, mainly because it relates to complex and problematic (from a methodological perspective) terms and concepts such as civil society and democracy. Indeed, since the lack of civil society was part of the very essence of the all-pervasive communist state, creating such a society and supporting organisations independent of the state—or nongovernmental organisations (NGOs)—have been seen by donors as the connective tissue of democratic political culture. Free and independent media are within this mindset perceived as the cornerstones of democracy and public sphere. Therefore, financial and technical support to the media and related projects are mainly serving civil society, governance and democracy goals. Whether governments ought to be in the business of creating civil societies, as Catherine Fitzpatrick questions, depends indeed upon the existence or absence of domestic entities that can be supported. In the framework of financial aid in particular, the shift from channelling assistance to governments, as had been the case well into the eighties, to offering it to local NGOs has been justified not simply as the inevitable prudential response to states misusing aid, but as a way of building civil society. Civil society is paradoxically often seen as both an improved funnel for aid and an important prerequisite for the end of aid altogether. Numerous scholars have identified a correlation between the existence of free and independent media (again problematic in defining what that means) and the level of political participation; yet, little effort has been made to examine the relationship between technical aid, media development, and democracy. The whole field is rather characterised by its vagueness. As Eric Johnson correctly states in his contribution: “there’s not always a linear positive correlation . . . because there are many factors affecting the ability of an independent media sector to get created and flourished.” Catherine Fitzpatrick and Eric Johnson list some of these variables: economic and market conditions, legal framework and reliable enforcement mechanism, professionalism among media practitioners, etc. It is clear from the debates that the vagueness of this correlation encourages a whole range of agendas and issues to be considered such as how can media projects effectively strengthen democracy and civil society? How to deliver funds? How to measure progress? Indeed, the discussion until now has been focussed around these three tools that donors have to their disposal: projects, funds, and timelines. Concluding as William Dunkerley does by stating that there is a negative correlation between financial or technical aid and the creation of a free and independent is a dangerous conclusion. Media programmes in the name of civil society and democracy have been important and will become even more important in the future. However it is clear that their success will largely depend upon the lessons learned until now. Further research is needed, but one can already consult the existing literature on the aid industry in general. One interesting publication is Civil Society and the Aid Industry, edited by Alison van Rooy.2 It concludes by listing the mistakes that have been made identified during an extensive analysis of aid programmes to strengthen civil society. These can easily be applied to this discussion about media aid. Three areas of mistakes were cited: simplification, instrumentalism, and operationalisation. Simplification is cited because donor activity around “civil society strengthening” is frequently based on thin justifications for action. Assumptions on the universal desirability of certain organisations, systems and norms are hardly tested. As a panacea for social and political ills, civil society has come to the rescue of difficult dilemmas such as how to encourage democracy, how to reduce the State, etc. It is clear that aid to the media play an important role to solve these dilemmas but creates new dilemmas such as how to encourage independence, how to develop a legal framework that enables free media, how to encourage professionalism, etc. Instrumentalism relates to the assumption that one need only the use of CS organisations (such as media institutes) as instruments on the way to bigger political and economic goals and objectives in the spheres of democratisation, human rights and good governance. The installation of those entities justifies then some donors’ exit strategies, as has happened in several CEEC countries. Related issues are the relationships between recipient organisations and foreign donors (and integrity questions) and the choice of particular organisations for support (urban and central, rather than rural and regional). Finally, the operationalisation mistake refers to the “paradox” that good thinking does not always translate into good practice. As already expressed above, it is difficult to turn “civil society strengthening and democracy enhancement” into “logical framework analyses,” the standard aid agency planning process that turns an idea into a project. Illustrations of failures of operationalisation are according to A. van Rooy: donor emphasis is often on time-fixed projects rather than processes, donors often fund the most familiar organisations, rather than the most functionally important, donors often fund organisations in their own likeness, etc. All these mistakes are of course understandable to a certain extent but should be used as lessons for the future. What donors understand about the processes of social change comes often from their own domestic experiences and institutions. It is obvious that more assessments and continuous monitoring needs to take place. It is also clear that this information should partly be generated via local sources. Let us hope that this debate will be perceived as a call for action and research in order to increase our understanding and improve current and technical aid programmes in the media field. Stefaan G.
Verhulst Notes: 1. Janine R. Wedel,
Collision and Collusion: The Strange Case of
Western Aid to Eastern Europe 1989-1998 (1998). |
Last Updated: 11/20/99 |
|
© 1999 Post-Soviet Media Law &
Policy Newsletter |
