Post-Soviet Media Law & Policy Newsletter


Issue 48-49     Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law     September 15, 1998 

Russia

REORGANIZATION OF VGTRK

CRACKDOWN ON PIRACY OTHER MEDIA NEWS CHECHNYA

REORGANIZATION OF VGTRK

I.  Russia—private TV companies cry foul.

    The heads of a number of Russian private TV companies have protested at the advantages given to the state-controlled Russia TV by the recent reorganization of the state broadcasting company, VGTRK.  Among other things, VGTRK will enjoy tax breaks and exemptions, and it will run—and charge for the use of—the regional transmission centres used by its rivals.  Russian commentators see this as part of the run-up to the presidential election in the year 2000.  The following is an editorial analysis by BBC Monitoring’s Foreign Media Unit:
    On 10th August the heads of five national and 20 local TV stations sent an open letter to President Yeltsin protesting at the “unprecedented advantages” given to Russia TV in the recent reorganization of the state broadcasting company, the VGTRK.
    The letter claimed that the government order establishing the new status of VGTRK was in violation of the constitution, which forbids monopolies and unfair competition, and gave VGTRK an unfair advantage of being able to dictate conditions for the use of regional transmission centres, which are to be transferred to its control.  In addition the company is to enjoy a number of tax breaks and customs exemptions.
    Concern about the new set-up has been expressed in various quarters in recent months and focuses on two main avenues:  commercial and political.  The charter establishing it states that it is “a state producer and distributor of TV and radio programmes,” yet at the same time it will control the transmission centres on which its competitors are almost totally reliant, giving it a virtual monopoly on signal distribution and the possibility of realizing large profits from the charges it makes for the use of its facilities.
    Moreover, fears have been expressed in the press about the threat to freedom of information posed by a situation in which the management of the new unified set-up could quickly pull the plug if their political masters demanded it.
    Some commentators have seen the unfavourable coverage of the government carried on the private or semi-private channels as one of the spurs behind the shake-up at VGTRK, whose new boss, Mikhail Shvydkoy, has announced an overhaul of the company’s programming, with more time devoted to current affairs.  What is undeniable is that all the big media players have their eyes on the presidential election in June 2000.
    The widespread media backing given to Boris Yeltsin enabled him to defeat his rivals in the 1996 campaign.  But the year 2000 could well be different, with influential sections of the media backing competing candidates.  Whether Yeltsin decides to run again or announces a preferred successor, there are likely to be rivals who either already have a strong media presence—for example Moscow Mayor Yuriy Luzhkov with his TV Centre consortium—or powerful backers, such as the retired general Aleksandr Lebed, now governor of Krasnoyarsk region.
    The sudden reappointment of Viktor Chernomyrdin as prime minister on 23rd August and Yeltsin’s virtual endorsement of him as his successor may render all these changes irrelevant.  However, despite the proliferation of private media and of means of delivery, if the going gets tough for Yeltsin or his chosen candidate, there are ways in which the power of the state over the media can still be exercised.  Here are some questions which may be answered in the coming months:
    Will the government do about charges for the use of transmission centres and auctions of licences for radio and TV frequencies?  Private companies have complained that the proposed structure discourages against broadcasts to less-populated regions, where expenses are high and profits low.
    How will the marriage of federal and regional broadcasters turn out?  Regional TV stations have been promised a three-and-a-half hour slot for local programming.
    The FSTR (federal licensing and regulatory body) is currently cracking down on TV copyright violators—for example channels showing pirated copies of Western films.  Might the FSTR, which has lost some of its functions to the new VGTRK, decide to extend enforcement of regulations within its remit to national rivals to Russia TV?
    Will the government assert itself as the majority shareholder in Russian Public TV, ORT?  Although the state holds 51 per cent of the shares in ORT, the channel with the widest national reach, the channel is seen as being effectively controlled by business magnate Boris Berezovskiy, who has in the past expressed his support for Aleksandr Lebed.

BBC Monitoring Research, August 26, 1998

II.  Change of mind on powers of state media holding.

    The government decree establishing the restructuring of the state broadcasting company VGTRK underwent a number of changes before it was issued at the end of July, according to a report in the Russian newspaper ‘Nezavisimaya Gazeta’.  The state-owned Space Communications company was removed from its control and plans to give it 860m dollars in foreign loans were withdrawn.  The report says that this followed lobbying from commercial interests opposed to VGTRK having control over such a large budget.  In addition, the report says, the delay in issuing the decree enabled regional governors to remove much of the assets of regional TV and radio companies from their books.  The following is the text of the report, headlined :  “Television supermonopolist, the largest bank and a new oligarch:  they were almost spawned by a government decision derailed by the VGTRK’s rivals and the country’s president” ; subheadings inserted editorially:
    [Prime minister, until 23rd August] Sergey Kiriyenko almost got himself into a new scandal.  The day before  [10th August] the president himself showed his disapproval.  In response to an appeal from the heads of 30 television and radio companies, he said that he would not permit the creation of privileged conditions for the mass media, including electronic.  This was Boris Yeltsin’s reaction to the government decree granting the VGTRK [All-Russia State Television and Radio Company] holding company a score of tax and customs breaks and securing its monopoly position in the television market.  The president noted that “all mass media enjoy equal rights and opportunities for competition” and therefore the government “must in its activities be guided by the postulates fixed in the constitution of the Russian Federation.”
    Actually, the scandal started to flare up as far back as the beginning of July.  The new oligarch—the master of Russian television—was almost born in front of the stunned public.  The “ birth certificate” had already been signed by the prime minister himself when certain external circumstances prevented it from coming out and being legally put into force.
Two decrees
    About a month ago the government signed the decree “On Forming a Production-Technological Complex of State-Owned Electronic Mass Media.”  Essentially, this was a code of rules for the VGTRK holding’s operations.  This document was not released and did not acquire the status of a decree.  Instead, another decree under the same title was signed on 27th July.  The two documents are substantially different in several principal points.
    By itself, the very fact of the existence of two “identical” decrees signed by the prime minister is unique and demonstrates the apparent chaos reigning in the government.  But this is not the point right now.  Something else is more important:  one only has to analyse the texts of the two documents to see the enormous amount of money and property that was at stake, and the influential forces that were fighting for these pieces of state property.
Giant TV monopoly
    From the first decree, it follows that the prime minister virtually sanctioned the creation of a giant television monopoly.  Moreover, by signing this document, the head of the government laid a foundation for the subsequent privatization of the VGTRK holding—de facto, if not de jure.  The head of the new empire, possessing a huge property and colossal political opportunities, would in practice slip out of government control.  Especially considering that it would not be a potential privatizer paying for control over the VGTRK but, on the contrary, it would the state’s duty to award it benefits for carrying out the operation.
    So, what was the new oligarch to rule?  First, the Russia [RTR] and Kultura television channels and the Russia’s Radio radio station.  Second, the main television and radio broadcasting centre (the GTsRT, that is, generally speaking, the Ostankino Tower), the state enterprise Space Communications (that is, all state-owned transmission satellites), and the main control centre for radio broadcast networks and mainline radio communications (GTsURS).  Third, practically all the regional radio and television relay centres (RTPTs), radio centres (RTs), and other organizations that were to be reorganized into VGTRK branches.  Fourth, a huge number of regional state-owned television and radio companies (GTRK), which were meant to become VGTRK subsidiaries.
    It should also be remembered that two months earlier the RIA Novosti news agency was attached to the VGTRK, changing its name to RIA Vesti.  In addition to all the other things, RIA Vesti’s value lies in its properties abroad, spread out all over the world.
Budgetary aid
    The future oligarch also was to receive substantial monetary aid from the state.  In addition to its continuing budget financing, next year it was to receive 860m dollars in foreign loans.  Plus, it was to be “ forgiven” all its old debts to the budget and granted customs and tax breaks.
    In addition, the prime minister wished to give the holding all the profits from leasing out VGTRK property:  “Profits earned as a result of leasing to outside organizations the material-technical base and other property of enterprises that comprise the integrated production-technological complex” remains at VGTRK enterprises’ disposal.  This proposal created a blueprint for a future conflict of interest between the VGTRK as a state holding company and the VGTRK as a purely commercial enterprise.  Why should the company toil to carry out the government’s will in creating a unified television and radio space when it would be easier to lease out its information capacities?  The holding would have monopoly status and its private rivals would have to resort to its services.  As for advertising revenue, since neither decree mentions it, one would assume that it continues to remain at the holding’s disposal.  According to ‘ Nezavisimaya Gazeta’ information, the holding also will collect revenue from regional advertising as well.
Plans for a bank
    Naturally, the VGTRK holding’s monetary flows would be expected to increase dramatically and require special management.  It would be silly, after all, to give such a juicy morsel away to an outside banker.  That is why the text of the first decree contained the prudent phrase that “starting from 1st January 1999, the Federal Television and Radio Broadcasting Service of Russia shall finance and subsidize the VGTRK and its subsidiaries from the federal budget via the VGTRK.”  Translated into laymen’s terms, this means that one of the holding’s enterprises was to manage hundreds of millions in budget dollars.  According to ‘Nezavisimaya Gazeta’ information, the plan was to create, after the first decree was put into force, a so-called RTR-Bank, which would concentrate the VGTRK’s money in its accounts.  This was not envisaged as an ordinary cash box—the plan was to build all over Russia a network of RTR-Bank branches that would de facto duplicate the VGTRK’s numerous subsidiaries.
    It is obvious that a bank with this kind of monetary flow would immediately make it to the list of Russia’s top 20 commercial banks.  Thus, the VGTRK holding project went outside the scope of the mass media market and encroached on the sphere of the oligarch bankers’ direct interests.  That is, had the VGTRK holding been set up in compliance with the first decree, this would have changed not only the political-information but also the economic configuration of society.
    As always happens in Russian reality, information about the first decree leaked out to interested persons.  This immediately resulted in a rush of well-wishers anxious to explain to Sergey Kiriyenko the consequences of the document he had signed.  The prime minister saw the light.  The first decree was shelved, and urgent work began on the preparation of a second, cardinally revised document.
Revised decree
    The new decree, published on 27th July, no longer contains the most odious point:  giving the VGTRK 860m dollars in budget money in 1999 from foreign loan proceeds.  Also, the state enterprise Space Communications—basically, an enterprise of strategic importance for the country—disappeared from the list VGTRK of subsidiaries.  A new oligarch failed to emerge.
    But the main consequence of scuttling the first document was not even that.  In the time between the signing of the first and second decrees, the regional bosses transferred everything of value (which had been purchased with local budget funds) from the books of local television and radio companies.  According to experts, as a result, the VGTRK holding has inherited a pile of “rusted junk” and it still does not have the capability to fully control state television broadcasting in the regions.  In this environment, the VGTRK has only one way to fulfil the task set for it—to create a united information space—and that is finding a common language with the governors.  And this problem cannot be solved by government decrees.
    So the idea of creating a television superholding has fizzled out.  And on top of that, the government still slipped for the second time on the same banana peel and retained the points on tax and customs breaks.  Which, naturally, caused an outbreak of discontent among the heads of the 30 nonstate television and radio companies, who saw in the decree a violation of the principles of fair competition.  Their voice was heard by the president, who made it unequivocally clear that the government will have to correct its mistake.  Which means that the fate of the second decree—and consequently, the VGTRK holding itself—is hanging by a thread.

‘Nezavisimaya Gazeta,’ Moscow, August 13, 1998

III.  Article on special treatment for state media company.

    The reorganization of the All-Russian State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company, VGTRK, into a unified state media company has saved it from bankruptcy, but only at a heavy cost to the taxpayer, according to an article in the Russian newspaper ‘Obshchaya Gazeta’.  The article says that the financial concessions given to the company have made it the equivalent of a broadcasting “offshore zone” but it has yet to formulate a clear broadcasting policy or indicate how it would deal with a conflict of public and state interest.  The following is the text of the report:
    Mikhail Shvydkoy is being given the same status as Rem Vyakhirev.  In a government decree dated 27th July of this year, the state finally acknowledged that while Gazprom is the most important support of the throne in the economic sphere, in the sphere of telecommunications it is the VGTRK [All-Russian State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company].  Belonging to the caste of untouchables signifies a complete pardon for the VGTRK’s colossal debt.  The television workers owe half of 1.942m dollars to telecommunications workers and half to programme producers, who, in despair of receiving their hard-earned money for more than six months, won a number of law suits in capital courts.  The almost poverty-stricken state television and radio structure was unable to find the money, as a result of which bailiffs sequestered motor vehicles and were preparing to seize all VGTRK property.
    It was saved from bankruptcy only by the intervention of the president and the premier, who suddenly realized that under conditions of a tough information policy of the public ORT [Russian Public Television] and the private NTV [Independent Television], the image of the authorities and their actions—both inside the country and abroad—had fallen intolerably.  The economy of resources turned into a painful blow to the self-esteem of the authorities; therefore, it was decided to take the path of least resistance.  The VGTRK was declared a unique offshore zone in which privileged rules of the game operate:  the granting of a three-year deferment to pay the main debt to the treasury, postponement of the settlement of penalties and fines for seven years, the company’s inclusion on the list of enterprises recommended for Western investments, and exemption for five years from payment of customs duties and taxes, and of other payments to the federal budget with respect to imported technological equipment that has no domestic counterparts.  But in the end our pockets, the taxpayers’ pockets, were picked—99 per cent of the expenditure to maintain the huge media holding company, consisting of the television channels Russia and Kultura, Radio Russia, 92 GTRKs [state television and radio companies] throughout Russia, the RIA-Vesti agency, Soyuztelefilm, Sovteleksport, and in addition two television towers, was included in the 1999 budget.
    However, it was decided to consider the Ostankino and Shukhov towers not branches of the VGTRK, but only subsidiary enterprises—a subject of particular anxiety for the entire nonstate TV by virtue of their strategic significance for all broadcasting television companies—that is to say, institutions that are legal entities which, apparently, according to the idea of the developers of the decree, should indicate the telecommunications workers’ independence from the managers of state television who could try to use such a powerful weapon in the fight against competitors.
    “In general, no-one previously thought about the fact that the Ministry of Communications belonged to the state, which owned both the Ostankino and Shukhov towers,” Shvydkoy himself tried to put the public at ease at his last news conference.  “The button that makes it possible to turn off channels in our faces belongs to the government as before.”
    If Mikhail Yefimovich [Shvydkoy] is ordered to turn off one or another objectionable channel, he has a powerful tool for such an event—he would immediately resign.  And thereby, in all probability, he would frighten the authorities to such an extent that they would forget even to think about something like this.
    When we say that the government is bad, it must not be forgotten that in the final analysis it is the government and not someone else that for many is the principal philanthropist and benefactor and the last hope in this life.  The drama of the miners, pickets, and strikes being shown in abundance on nonstate channels is that they do not comprehend how easy it is to manipulate them.
    Mr Shvydkoy hinted mildly that the interests of the VGTRK are not simply the interests of one separately taken state corporation, but—guess again!—the interests of those television viewers who are worried about the country.  In the meantime, the Bolsheviks should not be disturbed by the absence on the second channel of a clearly formulated state policy.  There will be all of this—but by autumn.  Or by winter.  But there will be.  The country’s authorities with a human face will be shown, without the confused articulation and the miners.
    “I am an optimist, and I became one when we established the Kultura channel.  In a few months and without money.  And in this case we simply have no other way out.  Something has to be done.”
    The decision is absolutely correct, but for some reason the logo of “ Vesti” always comes to mind—three white, blue, and red horses galloping off somewhere.  Russia, where are you galloping?  Give us an answer.  It does not answer.

‘Obshchaya Gazeta,’ Moscow, August 6 – 12, 1998

IV.  Yeltsin says all media have equal rights.

    President Boris Yeltsin, on vacation in his Valdai country residence in Central Russia, received Valentin Yumashev, in charge of the presidential staff, to debate current social and political developments in Russia and prospects for autumn, reports a spokesman of the presidential press service.
    Prominent on the agenda was a recent appeal to the president by managers of several Russian-based television and radio companies.   In this context, Mr.  Yeltsin stressed that he was clinging to his previous stances on the legal bases of mass media activities.
    Russian laws rule out a preferential status for electronic and any other mass media.  Irrespective of property forms, they are all entitled to equal rights and similar terms of competition.  The federal government is to firmly adhere to these constitutional premises in its policies toward the media, pointed out President Yeltsin.

RIA news agency, Moscow, August 11, 1998

V.  Paper sees new state media company as “TV Godfather.”

    [On 10th August], the heads of the major national TV channels and regional TV companies (ORT [Russian Public Television], NTV [Independent Television], Ren-TV, TNT, Moscow TV-6, the National Association of TV Broadcasters, and 23 regional companies) sent an appeal to Russian President Boris Yeltsin.  In their opinion, Government Decree No 844 on concessions for the VGTRK [All-Russia State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company] state media holding company (for details see ‘Segodnya’ No 167 of 1st August and No 171 of 4th August) violates the constitution, in particular the provisions stating that monopolization of the market and unscrupulous competition are impermissible.
    Generally speaking, it would still be possible to come to terms with the granting of concessions to the VGTRK and its subsidiary regional state TV companies; on one condition—that state TV fulfils its public role.  But the VGTRK is now a regular channel involved in placing advertisements and other commercial activities.  The company has almost entirely gone over to showing Western films.  This hardly implies support for domestic producers.  On the other hand, state TV is breaking all records for soap operas.  For example, VGTRK chief Mikhail Shvydkoy solemnly promised TV viewers to keep “Santa Barbara” on the air.  This is, of course, laudable but it certainly does not appear to be a reason for granting concessions.  It emerges that the company will only receive concessions as a result of its state form of ownership.  Here we can see a violation of Article 8 of the constitution, according to which all forms of ownership enjoy equal protection.
    But the point is not actually that the VGTRK has been granted unprecedented customs and tax concessions in violation of the constitution.  The main thing is that the VGTRK now has control over transmission and can from now on “pull the plug” at the necessary moment.  For insufficient loyalty, say.  And in spite of the numerous statements by the present VGTRK chief saying that he will never press the “button,” it remains a fact that from now on this option has been enshrined in the government decision.  With this freedom of speech ends.
    Apart from this, the following amusing situation arises:  Transmitters used by all TV companies to transmit their signals are now owned by the VGTRK.  What competition can there be when from now on all TV channels will be forced to pay. . . .  [newspaper ellipsis] another TV channel for airtime—the VGTRK, which, incidentally, can set broadcasting tariffs for its competitors?  What emerges is that the government, through its decree, has to all intents and purposes appointed a “TV Godfather” whom all TV entrepreneurs will henceforward have to pay for airtime.
    TV broadcasters find it hard to believe that all these issues can be resolved in court.  Therefore they have resorted to an extreme measure and appealed to the president “as a consistent defender of freedom of speech.”  They are asking him to “instruct the government . . . [newspaper ellipsis] to guarantee the same economic conditions for all TV and radio companies, irrespective of their form of ownership.”  However, the chances of their being heard are not great.  Unless perhaps the constitution’s guarantor does not want to quarrel with nonstate TV companies over one company—the VGTRK.

“VGTRK appointed ‘Godfather’.  Private TV chiefs protest emergence of ‘Godfather’ for electronic mass media,” ‘Segodnya,’ Moscow, August 11, 1998

VI.  TV heads protest “advantages” given to Russian TV.

    Below is the English text of the letter delivered [on 10th August] to [Russian President Boris] Yeltsin’s office, protesting the new advantages and powers being given to Russian TV:
President of the Russian Federation Boris N. Yeltsin:
    Respected Boris Nikolaevich! On behalf of national Russian television channels as well as local television stations working together with the major TV networks of Russia, we appeal to you as the guarantor of the Russian constitution.
    We believe that governmental order No 844 of 27th July, 1998, which gives unprecedented advantages to the VGTRK [All-Russian State TV and Radio Company] holding company, does not conform to articles 8 and 34 of the Russian constitution, which forbid monopolies and unfair competition and guarantee equal conditions of business operations to all organizations regardless of their form of ownership.
    All non-governmental TV and radio companies are being put into a position of dependence on VGTRK, which has the ability to dictate unilaterally the conditions for use of the regional transmission centres and thus is getting an unfair advantage over its competitors.
    In the same order, the government is giving VGTRK and its subsidiary companies significant, one-sided tax and customs benefits, giving them major economic advantages, which also violates the Russian constitution.
    Knowing you as a steadfast defender of freedom of speech in our country, and in the interest of guaranteeing the constitutional rights of the citizens of Russia to free access to information, we appeal to you with the request to instruct the government to act urgently to guarantee equal economic conditions for the operation of all the radio and TV companies of Russia, regardless of their form of ownership, including lowering the price on the natural monopoly in the area of transmission services.

Signed,
K. Ponomareva, general director, ORT
O. Dobrodeyev, general director, NTV
I. Lesnevskaya, president, Ren-TV
S. Svortsov, general director, TNT
S. Neretina, vice-president, TV-6 Moscow
E. Zlotnikova, executive director, NAT
M. Aslamazyan, executive director, Internews Russia
and 20 local televisions stations

Internews press release, Moscow, August 10, 1998

VII.  ORT boss criticizes state broadcasting company ruling.

    [No dateline as received] The Russian government is creating a monopoly holder in the television and radio broadcasting sphere with its 27th July resolution, granting privileges to the VGTRK [All-Russian State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company] holding, Kseniya Ponomareva, the director of the ORT [Russian Public TV] television company, said on Ekho Moskvy radio.
    In her opinion, “companies will virtually have to pay money to their competitors.”   Moreover, the resolution does not comply with the constitution because the rights of other companies, in particular ORT and NTV [Independent Television], are being infringed.
    “The situation in which the broadcasting centres are becoming branches of the VGTRK is absolutely absurd,” she said.
    Ponomareva added that all the country’s television and radio companies, irrespective of their form of ownership, should operate under the same economic conditions.
    “We understand that the state cannot fully finance the VGTRK so it has been granted conditions under which it can survive without state funding.”
    She recalled that federal companies like ORT and NTV survive on advertising revenue alone, whereas the VGTRK receives revenue from advertisements, public funds, tax breaks and customs payments.  The government has also promised the company credit.

Ekho Moskvy news agency, Moscow, August 10, 1998

VIII.  Division of power between federal media bodies.

Text of report headlined “Who owns the TV switch?  The reorganization of the All-Russia State Radio and Television Company eliminates a number of functions of the Federal Television and Radio Broadcasting Service,” published on the Russian newspaper ‘Segodnya’ web site:
    The announcement of the revocation of the broadcasting licence of the Izhevsk television company Alva for copyright violation was greeted with “great satisfaction” by the public:  at last the pirates will be driven into a corner.  In fact, the revocation of the broadcasting licence by the Federal Television and Radio Broadcasting Service [FSTR] creates a precedent.  However, the use of such a mechanism could turn into an instrument to apply administrative pressure on regional television and radio companies:  under the existing practice of “honouring copyrights in Russia,” it will not be difficult to find violations on the part of any television and radio company operating in Russia.  On the other hand, licence revocation is the last way of influencing television broadcasters available to the FSTR.
    A recent government decree on the All-Russia State Radio and Television Company [VGTRK] (Segodnya published an article on the decree in issue No 167 dated 1st August) not only provides a legislative description of the numerous benefits for the holding company, but also solidifies its virtual monopoly on the broadcasting signals of other companies since ownership of the transmitters is transferred to the holding company.  Therefore, the FSTR is set to lose the majority of its functions.  This automatically raises the question of reorganization of the federal service and the need for staff reductions.  It all looks like an ordinary interagency conflict, although the issue is:  who will be granted the opportunity to dictate conditions to nongovernment television broadcasters?
    In this regard, the underlying reasons for the decision to reorganize the VGTRK should be noted.  As soon as the year 2000 elections appeared on the horizon and the issue of the willingness of the owners of private channels to support the “party in power” became unclear, [Deputy PM] Boris Nemtsov decided it was possible to rely only on state television.  Therefore, it was proposed to structure state television after the model of private media holding companies.  It was perceived that on consolidation of the state enterprise into a unified holding company, the state property would start generating profits.  Combining purely commercial activities with the public functions of state TV will clearly be a very difficult task; practically impossible.  It seems that even now the VGTRK is actively trying to avoid such functions.  Thus, even if the holding company is not planning on discriminating against other broadcasters by imposing tariffs, under the existing conditions television companies lose any interest in less-populated regions:  broadcasting expenses are high, and profitability is zero.  But a redistribution of power has occurred in addition to the social consequences:  presently the VGTRK controls the broadcasting “switch,” the FSTR the licence switch.

‘Segodnya’ web site, Moscow, August 6, 1998

IX.  VGTRK to enjoy range of perks.

    The state television and radio broadcasting company, VGTRK, which was established by a presidential decree, is to enjoy a range of privileges, according to a government order that came out [on 31st July].
[Correspondent]     The old VGRTK is no more, and the new one is not yet.  The government has given three months for the technical, legal and financial subtleties of the single united state broadcasting system to be sorted out.  This is a job not only for the VGTRK management but for numerous ministries as well.
 They have to extend privileges and perks for the state corporation.  That means deferring tax arrears for three years, penalties and fines due on those arrears for seven years, and customs and taxes on imported equipment for five years.  The plan is buy equipment using foreign loans, which will be included into the state borrowing programme.  The document [government order] distributed to the media  today does not say how much those loans will be worth, but the sum of 850m dollars figures in government internal memos.
[VGTRK Chairman Mikhail Shvydkoy]     These are substantial concessions.  And they have been extended to all structures in which the state has an interest.  Nobody is hiding the fact that the state has an interest in this holding company.
[Correspondent]     Our sources in the government see no conflict between the perks for VGTRK and senior officials’ talk of toughening up fiscal policy.  Nor does the State Tax Service see any conflict.
[Russian Federation State Tax Service Head Boris Fedorov]     Most media organizations are clearly unable to pay taxes or come up with large sums of money at the moment, because they’re in difficulties.  So we don’t object to certain privileges, and we’ve told the government that.
[Correspondent]     But observers reckon that the consequent losses in state revenue will have to be recouped from all the other broadcasting companies that have no relation to VGTRK.
[Shvydkoy]     They think we could, for example, start pricing our communications services in such a way as to infringe on their interests.  They think we’d be quicker to pull the plug on Russian Public TV [ORT] and NTV [Independent Television] if we were told to.  But I’d quit rather than pull the plug.  Someone else would have to do it.
[Correspondent]     According to the government order, VGTRK will be financed from the federal budget.  The company management regards that as unrealistic and will be banking on advertising revenues.
[ITAR-TASS news agency said on 3rd August that a total of 99 state TV and radio broadcasting companies, as well as other organizations, were being transformed into federal state unitary enterprises which would be VGTRK affiliates.
    The agency added:  “The appointments of heads of regional affiliates are made by the VGTRK on agreement with the Federal Television and Radio Broadcasting Service and the executive authorities in the parts of the Russian Federation on whose territory they will be based.  The government has also agreed with the proposal by the VGTRK to set up the following main federal unitary affiliates with the right to economic self-management:  the Russia TV and Kultura TV state television companies, as well as the Radio Russia state radio broadcasting company.”]

ITAR-TASS news agency (World Service), Moscow, August 3, 1998

X.  Decree on state TV-radio company adopted.

    The government decree on the well-known presidential edict No 511 on forming a unified production-technological complex of state electronic mass media on the basis of the VGTRK [All-Russian State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company] was officially disseminated [on 30th July].  The new company charter was “ appended” to the decree, as well as five lists of various enterprises which have become dependent on the VGTRK holding to one degree or another.
    According to information received by ‘Russkiy Telegraf,’ the decree itself was practically completed within the time specified by the president—in the first 10 days of July.  However, time was spent on coordinating the final text of the charter which, as it ultimately turned out, granted the VGTRK very broad, if not unlimited, powers and authorities.  At the same time, all the fears and apprehensions expressed by various forces (the State Duma, Federation Council, the local authorities, private broadcasters, and even by the most active part of state broadcasters and communications specialists) over the course of several months regarding the creation of a super-holding which in fact establishes a monopoly on the broadcasting of television and radio signals, were left without attention.  The initially planned conciliatory commission with the participation of interested parties was never created.  Within the government, the comment made to ‘Russkiy Telegraf’ was:  “Everyone sent us lists of candidacies, but they should have sent specific proposals.”
“Compromise” with some regional broadcasters
    The plan of the state holding company’s ideologists worked.  Judging by the lists, the holding in fact includes everyone who was planned initially—even the Krasnoyarsk GTRK [State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company], which was the most stubborn of all.
    Then again, a compromise had to be reached with some of the most active and independent enterprises, as for example GTRK Kuzbass or GTRK Tatarstan.
    The former was promised that it would retain its full eight hours of local broadcasting, instead of the three and a half hours of local “ windows” approved for everyone else.
    For the latter, as ‘Telegraf’ already wrote, the entire company was generally left intact, with a new state channel to be created in Tatarstan “for the holding company.”
    In turn, the status of the kray and oblast television and radio broadcasting centres, which had lost their juridical autonomy, remained the same:  they will continue to be subsidiaries of the holding company, as planned.
    Even with a cursory glance at the new company charter, we may note that it is written very skilfully.
 For example, the VGTRK is now a “commercial organization, created for implementing the functions of a state producer and distributor of television and radio programmes.”
    Thus, it turns out that the company is somehow already not a state company.  Its founder is the government of the Russian Federation.  According to the data on 1st January, 1998, the statutory fund, formed at the expense of the value of the fixed capital, is computed at exactly 695,221,794 roubles.
New holding’s vast powers
    As for the company’s rights, it is easier to say what is not within its powers.  For example, to fly into space or to transfer its office to the Kremlin.  And even that is debatable.  Otherwise, the holding can do anything:  create any commercial or subsidiary enterprises, formulate funds, institute mass media (including printed mass media), lease its property, appoint and dismiss managers of its enterprises.  In general, the degree of intervention in the activity of its “ subsidiaries” is rather great.
    The local administrations are not even mentioned in the text of the charter.  Only in the government decree is it stated that the appointment of managers of local GTRKs must nevertheless be coordinated with the agencies of executive authority of subjects of the federation.
    The best testimony to the might of the VGTRK is Section 26, Chapter IV of the charter, which states that the company “exercises other rights and assumes other responsibilities in implementing the specified types of activity.”
    The head of the company, as we might expect, is its chairman (currently Mikhail Shvydkoy), who, quite understandably, is appointed and dismissed by the president of Russia.
    After that, there are some innovations.  The chairman has deputies (how many is not specified, but for the present these are the two first deputies Mikhail Lesin and Eduard Gindileyev), among whom he distributes responsibilities and to whom he has the right to delegate part of his powers and authorities . . . .

“Commercial organization with state functions; government decree on VGTRK holding company adopted,” ‘Russkiy Telegraf,’ Moscow, July 31, 1998



CRACKDOWN ON PIRACY

I.  Crackdown on pirate TV operators faces problems.

    Federal defenders of intellectual property rights are looking with a stern eye at the television broadcasting community in search of offenders.  According to Mikhail Seslavinskiy, head of the Federal Television and Broadcasting Service of Russia (FSTR), in September his agency will begin to actively crack down on Moscow cable channels that violate copyrights.
    The point in question is broadcasting films without the copyright holders’ permission.  The monitoring of airwaves will be carried out by the FSTR’s trusted partner—the Interregional Copyright Protection Agency (MAAP).  So far, however, according to the agency’s chairman of the board, Lev Vildavskiy, his organization does not possess the technical capabilities to fully monitor even Moscow’s airwaves.  The proposed blueprint for action is simple:  the FSTR will use compromising materials recorded by the MAAP to force the culprits to stop unlawful practices and provide material restitution to the injured party.  The highest measure of punishment is revocation of the broadcasting licence.
    The plan looks attractive, but brings up several questions.  The first is the sheer quantity of the channels violating regulations.  Aleksandr Lavrov, chairman of the Foundation for Protection of Intellectual Property, believes that there is not a single channel, including nationwide broadcasters, that does not routinely violate film companies’ copyrights.  According to Yuriy Berbikov, deputy chairman of the Moscow Mayoralty’s Telecommunications Committee, more than 60 cable channels broadcast in Moscow—some of them on a regular basis but many only from time to time.  Of these, channels with regular broadcasting schedules operate in strict compliance with the law, while small studios without a regular schedule account for the lion’s share of violations.  At the same time, according to his information, there is a perceptible number of cable channels coming on the air that do not have a broadcasting licence at all.
    Monitoring the broadcasts of every television studio, however, would require a permanently functioning cumbersome snoop service, which the capital does not have.  The opinion in the telecommunications and mass media committee is that currently the city cannot afford it.  Thus, at this point nobody fully monitors the content of city studios’ broadcasts.  And there is no organization that has the technical capabilities required to ensure blanket monitoring of television broadcasts in the city in the foreseeable future.  In this situation, in Yuriy Berbikov’s opinion, the only means of persuasion that can be used against unscrupulous television operators would be show trials or revocation of broadcasting licences.  Thus, for now television pirates are offered, in a sense, the chance to play “Russian roulette” with the authorities:  Maybe you will get caught, maybe you will not.

“Cable television pirates face show trials:  capital cable channels the target of the FSTR’s watchful eye,” ‘Segodnya’ web site, Moscow, August 7, 1998

II.  Clampdown on TV copyright violators.

    There has been a sensation in the world of television:  a television channel has had its licence revoked, i.e.  its right to broadcast.  The Izhevsk television company Alva TV has paid for its thieving tendencies:  it was showing pirate copies of American films and programmes, and foreign ones in general.
    Most Russian television companies simply cannot afford to buy the rights to show good foreign films, and viewers as a rule don’t think about how legal the pictures on their screen are.
    This is why some small regional cable companies recently were not ashamed to show demonstration copies with rolling text in English giving a telephone number in America for reporting copyright infringements.
    When the interregional copyright agency in June proved at the central commission for television and radio broadcasting that the Izhevsk television company Alva had shown The Godfather series illegally, few believed that specific action would follow.
    The agency this year has registered 51 cases of the illegal broadcasting of films on local channels, but experts believe the real amount of infringements could be 20 times higher.
    Alva’s management refuses to believe that it has paid for copyright infringement, and sees a political undertone to the Federal Radio and Television Service’s [FSTR] action.
[Vasiliy Shatalov, general director of Izhevsk television company Alva] Our television company’s case is an ordinary regional fight between two political forces, in particular in Udmurtia, and the media of course are taking part in this—well, they are not taking part, they are being dragged into it.  We are no better or worse than other television companies.  This is happening in all regions now.
[Correspondent]     Alva is preparing to protest against the FSTR’s decision in court, and is accusing the copyright agency of forging material on the illegal showing of “The Godfather.”  Meanwhile, the FSTR denies any political motivations and warns that the Izhevsk television company will not be the only victim of the attack on television pirates.
[Mikhail Seslavinskiy, head of FTSR]      In September the monitoring we carry out with public organizations in the Russian regions will be severely tightened.  We will contact the copyright owners, we will make complaints, we will issue warnings without a second thought about infringing intellectual property and copyright legislation in all Russian regions, including Moscow, because cable studios in Moscow sometimes commit these sins.  Unfortunately no serious work to monitor cable television channels in Moscow has yet been undertaken.  This will be done.

Ren TV, Moscow, August 8, 1998

III.  Izhevsk TV station closed for copyright violations.

    The Izhevsk-based Alva television company’s licence was revoked by order of Federal Television and Radio Broadcasting Service (FSTR) head Mikhail Seslavinsky on 31st July.  The company violated the Media Law, regulations on the use of its licence and the Copyright Law, he told a briefing in Moscow [on 4th August].   Official warnings were sent to Alva in February and June 1997.  Warnings have been sent to about 30 television companies over the last 12 months, Seslavinsky said.
    What is important is that this punishment has been meted out for offences against the Copyright Law, in particular for unauthorized showing of well-known feature films made by Paramount Pictures and Twentieth Century Fox Corporation, he said.  In particular, Paramount Pictures estimated its losses from an illegal showing of its movie “ The Godfather” at 300,000 roubles, or 48,400 dollars.
    Nearly 2,500 licences for television broadcasting have been issued over the last five years, but 30 per cent of the licensees did not start operations within the three months allowed.  About 10 licences will be revoked and the unused frequencies auctioned in the fall, Seslavinsky said.  The Inter-regional Copyright Agency, established on the initiative of the FSTR, has discovered 51 cases of illegally showing feature films on regional TV channels in, 1998.  “The actual number measures at least in the hundreds,” Seslavinsky said.

Interfax news agency, Moscow, August 4, 1998



OTHER MEDIA NEWS

I.  Plan for new “Russian Regions” TV channel.

    ‘Nezavisimaya Gazeta’ has given a lot of attention to the information that has emerged concerning the fact that the Federation Council is thinking about establishing its own television channel.  Almost none of the officials of the upper chamber of parliament to whom our correspondent turned for explanation could confirm or deny these rumours, and only Anatoliy Kostyukovich, deputy director of the Federation Council Committee for Science and Culture, reported that the senate actually had such plans.  There is talk of creating a “ Russian Regions” channel.  Its supervisory and founding councils, which were joined by a group of members of the Federation Council, have already been formed.  Some time ago they filed an application to obtain a licence for one of the UHF channels that broadcast to Moscow and the oblast.
    However, the outcome of the matter is still not clear, primarily because of the problem of financing.  As explained by Leonid Kravchenko, editor in chief of the recently started ‘Parlamentskaya Gazeta,’ who is also general director of the “Russian Regions” television channel, the channel has already been established juridically, but it is not functioning inasmuch as it does not have its own carrier.  Therefore, the Federation Council is hoping to attract wealthy cofounders to the enterprise—given successful progress, it will be possible as a consequence to think about an expansion of the geographical broadcasting range.
    Despite the fact that the fate of the “Russian Regions” channel remains in doubt, its concept has already been created.  At present, remote areas come under the lens of the television camera only in the event of a sensation, most often criminal sensations.  But the viewer knows practically nothing about the real state of affairs in other places.  According to the idea of the general director of “Russian Regions,” one of the most important functions of the new channel should be “protective”—Mr Kravchenko admitted to our ‘Nezavisimaya Gazeta’ correspondent that he would like to return to that path he trod under socialism, working mainly as editor in chief of the newspaper ‘Trud,’ especially since in our day ordinary citizens need protection more than ever before.

‘Nezavisimaya Gazeta,’ Moscow, August 21, 1998

II.  Moscow mayor Luzhkov expands his media interests.

    Yuriy Luzhkov’s rapidly growing media empire, whose prospects ‘ Kommersant Daily’ described last week, lacked only a major advertising agency.  That gap has been filled:  the Moscow “Sistema Joint-Stock Financial Corporation” holding company has bought the Maxima advertising agency.  The documents will be definitively signed in two days’ time.  The inclusion of a powerful advertising structure in the mass media system under the Moscow mayor’s control will put Luzhkov’s empire among the leaders in the country’s information market.
Luzhkov “already a media magnate”
    About a year ago the mass media over which the Moscow mayor had influence looked like children’s toys compared to the empires of Gusinskiy and Berezovskiy and even the more modest Gazprom and Unexim structures.
    The first signal was the appearance of TV Centre [TV Tsentr].  The consortium of the same name, apart from the TV channel itself, now has a TV channel operating on VHF, the TV Centre- Stolitsa cable TV channel and the Meteor TV satellite project.  To maintain the Metropolis holding company created this February, which includes the newspapers ‘Rossiya,’ ‘Kultura,’ ‘Literaturnaya Gazeta’ and ‘Metro,’ the Sistema joint-stock financial corporation that owns them intends to spend 20m dollars a year, not counting expenditure on planned large-scale projects, which are so far being kept secret.
    Lev Gushchin, who heads Metropolis, now recognizes only the Most group’s empire as a rival to Sistema:  “We have a chance of creating the country’s first balanced holding company.  It is geared to broader influence than the Most media holding company.  And, forgive me, I see no other holding companies.  The Unexim holding is increasingly moving into business and influencing public opinion is being ignored.  Gazprom is constantly stating it does not care about it.  Berezovskiy has either got cold feet or the time is not right.  So I cannot see anyone else.”
    If we add to this the real prospect of controlling the publishing giant Moskovskaya Pravda publishing and printing complex, then Yuriy Luzhkov may already boldly be called a media magnate.  Without any doubt, by the 2000 elections the pro-Luzhkov mass media could play on an equal footing with all the others and perhaps even more persuasively.
Advertising agency a “natural step”
    After the recent acquisitions and reshuffles in Luzhkov’s media business, a step like the purchase of an established advertising agency was an entirely natural step.  After all, someone must sell advertising in the mass media under the mayor’s control.  So far advertising has not been among the priorities of the Sistema joint-stock finance corporation, although the more than 100 enterprises of which this holding company is co-owner include several small advertising agencies—Atis, Reklama-fond and others.  According to Sistema’s vice-president, Vyacheslav Kopyev, the Maxima agency will play the part of a media structure which will amalgamate all Sistema’s advertising capacities into a single entity . . . .

“Luzhkov’s media holding company growing,” ‘Kommersant Daily,’ Moscow, August 12, 1998

III.  Defence Ministry wants new TV channel.

    The last TV broadcasting licence to be issued under the current system is due to be allocated soon, for Channel 29 in Moscow, and the Russian Ministry of Defence is a strong contender to win the battle for it.  The head of the ministry’s broadcasting studio says that if it gains the licence, it will provide “television for men,” some of it provided from its unique access to military archives.  However, the channel would only have enough money to operate for a few months, after which it would have to seek more, either from the ministry’s budget or from advertisers.  The following is the text of a report headlined “Men’s channel:  Ministry of Defence will show women a real man” published on the Russian newspaper ‘Kommersant-Daily’ web site; subheadings as published:
    A new television channel is going on the air in Moscow this autumn.  One of the main contenders for it is the Ministry of Defence.  Among the competition are the Federation Council, the Moscow Patriarchy, and Rolan Bykov’s “Children’s Project.”  This is the last channel to be given away practically for free, so the fight for it will be quite bitter.  Minister of Defence Igor Sergeyev has sent a letter to Sergey Kiriyenko asking him to “assist” in issuing the broadcasting licence to the Ministry of Defence.  Svetlana Smetanina has the details.
One cannot serve the motherland without television
    “The readiness to loyally serve the fatherland and provide objective coverage of the activities of the president as the supreme commander are inconceivable without the use of the capabilities of television,” the minister of defence writes in his letter.  It turns out in the process that the channel the Ministry of Defence is claiming will be broadcasting in Moscow.  Apparently, the situation with the readiness to loyally serve the fatherland is particularly bad in the capital.  But there is also another, more prosaic, reason that makes the military the chief contender for the channel.
    It turns out that it is the Ministry of Defence that is giving away to new broadcasting channels some of the frequencies it owned until recently.  The military’s logic is simple and understandable:  if we give away what used to belong to us, we must get something for it.  “ Until recently, the Ministry of Defence was giving away frequencies for free,” says Igor Serebryakov, head of the Russian Ministry of Defence central television and radio broadcasting studio.  “Many people made good money reselling these frequencies.  The Ministry of Defence should get something from this—either money or a channel.”
    Goskomsvyaz [State Committee on Communications], however, disagrees with this point.  “It has indeed been historically true that in our country, defence and security interests always commanded priority in the use of frequencies,” says Valeriy Byshovets, deputy chief of the Gossvyaznadzor [State Agency for Communications Oversight] electronic communications administration, “and therefore, when the question comes up of assigning frequencies to some or other organization, working it out with the Ministry of Defence is a very laborious process—it takes months.”
    This situation will change very soon, however.  On 1st October the new statute of the State Commission on Radio Frequencies will go into effect, which will revoke all military priorities in the utilization of frequencies (‘Kommersant’ reported on this in June).  After that, Goskomsvyaz will no longer have to beg the Ministry of Defence.  The military will be obliged to make unused frequencies available to the communications industry at its request.
    Understandably, the Ministry of Defence must hurry to obtain the coveted television broadcasting licence before October.  There is another serious reason for the haste, however.
Great October television revolution
    Also in October, the Federal Radio and Television Broadcasting Service of Russia (FSTR) will put into effect new rules for issuing broadcasting licences, putting them up for bids.  The licensing statute currently in effect says nothing about bids.  Currently licences are issued on an ad hoc basis, so to speak:  a certain commission, composed of bureaucrats and public representatives, is convened, and they decide whether or not to issue a licence.
    There is only one way to protect oneself from such subjectivism—put licence issuing on a financial footing.  Indeed, it is strange to forgo such a source of fees from various people’s desire to have their own television.  Beginning in October one will have to pay substantially more than the current symbolic 30 times the minimum wage for a licence.  According to ‘Kommersant’s information, the figure will be in the hundreds of thousands of dollars.  It remains unknown at this point, however, whether this will be a fixed price or whether the idea of [Deputy PM] Boris Nemtsov—who, as ‘Kommersant’ has already reported, has proposed that licences be sold at auctions—will win.
    Under any circumstances, Channel 29, the subject of this current battle, will be the last one for which a licence will be issued almost for nothing.
Channel everybody needs
    Naturally, this situation is creating quite a lot of agitation around Channel 29.  “All of a sudden everybody wants this channel,” puzzled Goskomsvyaz employees told us.  There is nothing surprising in this, though.  Available frequencies are few, and there is a surplus of those wishing to have their own channel.  There are already at least 11 contenders for the new channel, all of which are quite respectable organizations—in addition to the Ministry of Defence, there is the Federation Council, the Moscow Patriarchy, and Rolan Bykov’s “ Children’s Project.”  According to a source in Goskomsvyaz, the “ Children’s Project” has paid for all preparatory work for the channel.  Under current rules, however, this does not convey any advantages in obtaining a licence.
    The idea of creating a special channel for children has long been floating in the bowels of the government and the FSTR.  “We would like to see a channel with an original concept, the kind we have not yet had,” says FSTR deputy head Dmitriy Zasluyev.  “There is a channel called Culture,” but there is no family channel.”
    Actually, from the standpoint of originality, the Ministry of Defence would put any channel, let alone a children’s one, to shame.  “We will be doing television for men,” says Igor Serebryakov.  In reality, however, it turns out that it will be more for women:  “We want to show that our women make a mistake emigrating abroad in search of good men.  They exist in Russia, too.”  Igor Serebryakov did not elaborate on how exactly they will show “good men,” only saying that this will be the task for the channel’s artistic director—actor and director Andrey Rostotskiy of “Peter’s Youth” and “Flying Hussars Squadron” film fame.
    All in all, the military studio’s management does not foresee any difficulty filling the future channel (12 hours of daily broadcasting, at least).  Among potential attractions are the military archives holding unique footage of military action—for instance, the taking of Pearl Harbour.  “Western companies are offering big money for these archives,” says Serebryakov, “but they are not for sale.”
    On the other hand, the military archives alone, unique as they may be, are not going to keep the viewer glued to the television.  This is where the Ministry of Defence studio has another card up its sleeve.  They are planning to fill the future channel’s air time—with the help of their current rivals for the licence.  “We will work with the patriarchy and use their programmes, as well as with the ‘Children’s Project,’“ says Igor Serebryakov.  “They can even become our shareholders if they want.”
    The question of money is very acute, of course, and at this point concerns the studio’s management far more than the programming question.  “We have enough money to operate for three-four months,” says Igor Serebryakov.  Let us explain that for a regional channel, a month of operations means a minimum of 500,000 dollars.  And what next, when the money runs out?  In Serebryakov’s own words, he “would rather not take the money from the ministry’s budget.”  Apparently, this option is indeed under discussion.
    The studio’s management is counting, however, on the fact that very soon “everybody will see what a good channel we have and will come to us.”  “Everybody” means, of course, advertisers.  The channel’s future owners would like to succeed in profit-making, too, not just in “ raising readiness to loyally serve the Fatherland.”  How one will go with the other, the military itself is not yet sure.  As Serebryakov confessed, the management does not yet have a unified opinion about advertising Pampers and Snickers on the men’s channel.

‘Kommersant-Daily’ web site, Moscow, August 7, 1998



CHECHNYA

I.  Chechnya resumes relaying Russian TV on 28th July.

    The relaying of broadcasts by Russian television companies NTV, ORT [Russian Public TV] and RTR [Russia TV channel], banned earlier by the military commandant in connection with the state of emergency on Chechen territory, resumed in Chechnya at 1300 Moscow time [0900 gmt] [on 28th July].
    The ITAR-TASS correspondent was told at the press service of the Chechen president that the ban had been lifted automatically in view of the expiry of the state of emergency regulations.

ITAR-TASS news agency (World Service), Moscow, July 28, 1998

II.  Chechnya relaxes TV ban.

    Leadership of the Chechen Republic decided to let Russian RTR [Russia TV] and ORT [Russian Public TV] companies to resume partial broadcasting in the republic beginning from [25th July].  However, according to press secretary of the Chechen President Mayarbek Vachagayev, only several non-political programme are to be allowed for broadcasting.
    The decision of Chechen leaders to resume some broadcasting by Russian TV companies was taken with regard to interests of Russian-language population, which is actually separated from the outer world.  [On 23rd July], military commandant of the Chechen Republic decreed to cease broadcasting by Russian mass media over the republic’s territory, since the Chechen leadership found their interpretation of what is happening in the republic “ preconceived, distorted and harmful.”
    On [24th July] all TV channels in Chechnya including private ones were shut.  The only state-run channel begins broadcasting after 6 p.m.  in Chechen language.  According to Vachagayev, Russian mass media can fully resume broadcasting in Chechnya only after their leadership promise to truly cover events in the republic and offer their official apologies to Chechen people.
    Vachagayev also blamed Russian mass media correspondents accredited in Chechnya for betrayal of national interests and venality.  Vachagayev also threatens to deprive foreign correspondents of their accreditation if they do not stop carrying out orders by their agencies.

RIA news agency, Moscow, July 25, 1998

III.  Chechen action “unconstitutional.”

    The ending of relays of federal TV broadcasts in the Chechen Republic violates the constitutional right of citizens in this republic to receive full, reliable and speedy information, the first deputy chairman of the All-Russian State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company [VGTRK] and chairman of the board of RIA-Vesti, Eduard Gindileyev, stressed in an interview with an ITAR-TASS correspondent [on 24th July].
    Gindileyev noted that a unified information sector is an inalienable part of a unified state.  Eduard Gindileyev recalled that the most dismal episodes in the history of Russia and other countries had begun with attempts to disconnect federal TV channels.
    The first deputy chairman of the VGTRK also said that for purely technical reasons the authorities in the Chechen Republic could not “ pull the plug” fully on Channel 2 [RTV].  Some districts of the republic receive their signal from Stavropol and Krasnodar Territories, so residents of these districts will still be able to watch RTR [alternative name for VGTRK] programmes, admittedly with a poorer picture.
    As we know, the order to terminate ORT [Russian Public TV] and RTR relays in Chechnya from 24th July was issued by Chechnya’s military commandant, Brig-Gen Aslambek Ismailov.  The press service of the commandant’s office claimed the order was motivated by the fact that the two leading Russian TV companies were, allegedly, “covering recent events in the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria in an unobjective way and broadcasting unverified and distorted information” and that “ this was having a negative impact on the sociopolitical situation in the republic.”

ITAR-TASS news agency (World Service), Moscow, July 24, 1998

ORT head reacts to TV ban.

    We received news from Chechnya [on 24th July] that the people there will not be watching the Russian television channels ORT [Russian Public TV], RTV [Russia TV] and NTV [Independent Television].  The military commander of the Republic of Chechnya has issued an instruction stopping the transmission of these channels.  The instruction states that the ORT and RTV television companies do not provide objective coverage of the events in the republic and sometimes distort it.  But a bit later we learnt that this decision was taken by Shamil Basayev.
    The general director of ORT, Ksenia Ponomareva, comments:
[Ponomareva]      First, Chechnya switched off non-state Chechen television companies, then Russian television companies.  There is only one left on the air—the Chechen state television company.  It is absolutely clear that all talk of a lack of objectivity is just for public opinion.  In actual fact, the authorities are trying to cut sources of information not under their control.  Only a totalitarian government can do this in an emergency situation, but even it should understand that this might appear a rational measure, but only if it is not imposed for a long time—otherwise you lose the people’s trust.  And this will disappear faster if innocent people who are nothing to do with this battle are affected.  We have still not received any guarantees of safety for Russian television correspondents working in Chechnya, nor any official explanation as to what exactly was considered not objective.

Russian Public TV, Moscow, July 24, 1998

V.  Chechen independent broadcasters listed.

    All private television and radio companies ceased operation in Chechnya as of [22nd July]—they have bowed to a directive of Aslanbek Ismail, the military commander of the republic.  Fearing provocative statements and appeals, the recently appointed commander decided to begin restoring order in the republic with the electronic media.  Six independent [TV] channels and two radio stations were broadcasting in Groznyy recently, and each district of Ichkeria [Republic of Chechnya] had its own television studio.  If they violate Ismailov’s order, they will lose their licence and equipment.  Now residents will have to content themselves with ORT [Russian Public TV] and RTR [Russia TV] and the local “Ichkeria” channel, which operates in the evenings on a Russian television frequency.
    On the one hand, the Chechen television channels are entirely innocuous:  the majority of them contain no political programmes and show mainly feature films and concerts—whatever they can acquire.  The Kavkaz channel, which is owned by Movladi Ugudov, the Chechen minister of foreign affairs, is an exception.  It puts out political news and periodically comments on this event or the other.
    On the other, any inhabitant of the republic could appear on practically each private channel.  Pay up, and television time was yours . . . .
    The chances are that the closure of the commercial channels will lead to yet further clashes.  The Chechen leadership has already had sorry experience of the closure of private television companies—after Salman Raduyev’s channel was prohibited from broadcasting and equipment was taken away, the terrorist came to demand airtime from the “Ichkeria” state-owned company.  Raduyev’s supporters seized the Groznyy television centre, and during the armed clash Lechi Khultygov, head of the national security service, and Vakha Dzhafarov, chief of staff of Raduyev’s army, were killed.
    But Groznyy believes that there will be no such conflicts now since neither Udugov nor Akhmed Zakayev, minister of culture, press and information, who could influence certain TV channels and radio stations, will agree to clashes.
    Aslanbek Ismailov’s directive has not affected the press—newspapers and journals will appear in the usual way.  But the management of the publications has been warned that they will be closed down if they publish statements that the official authorities find objectionable.

“Chechnya is waging war on radio and television:  the press has been warned also,” ‘Russkiy Telegraf,’ Moscow, July 23, 1998