The Constitution provides for freedom of speech and the press. This right was partially respected in the Federation and in the western Republika Srpska, but less so in the eastern RS. Within the Federation, press freedom is more severely restricted in Croat-majority areas. Some progress has been made in establishing independent media in the Federation (though only in Bosniak-majority areas) and in the Republika Srpska, particularly in Banja Luka. Party-controlled media—particularly Croatian State Radio and Television—are the only electronic media available to the vast majority of citizens in Croat-majority areas of the Federation.
Some opposition and independent newspapers operate in the Muslim-majority areas of the Federation and in the Republika Srpska, principally in Banja Luka. Oslobodjenje and Vecernje Novine are the leading independent dailies, and Dani and Slobodna Bosna the most influential independent magazines in the Federation. Dani and Slobodna Bosna are the most influential independent magazines in the Federation. One of the few independent magazines in the RS is Reporter, a first-rate weekly published by a former foreign correspondent of the independent weekly Vreme. Also in the RS, the Social-Liberal Party publishes an opposition magazine, Novi Prelom, and the Social Democratic Party publishes a daily paper. Both of these publications take an opposition line, and are consistently supportive of the Dayton Accords.
It is difficult for independent and opposition media in the RS to gain access to the kiosk distribution system. The same is true of some areas of the Federation. Distribution is particularly problematic in Croat-controlled regions. In Sarajevo, however, independent print media access to distribution systems is readily available. Some independent media in the two entities, for example, Dani and Reporter, assist in the distribution of each others’ publications in their respective entities.
The dominant nationalist political parties continue to exercise strong control over the most influential media, i.e., television and radio. Federation state television (TVBiH) faithfully serves the interests of the SDA. TVBiH gives preferential coverage to SDA leaders and greatly limits reports on the opposition. Its broadcasts are often biased, but rarely of an inflammatory nationalist nature. Croat politicians in the Federation have complained about TVBiH coverage and argued against the Muslim ethnic homogeneity of its staff. However, TVBiH does employ journalists from minority ethnic groups, though their numbers are small and their influence inconsequential.
Croat-controlled areas in Bosnia-Herzegovina are covered by Croatian state television HTV. Its news programs and editorials frequently criticize the Dayton Accords. HTV weather maps show the Federation as part of Croatia, and coverage of Bosnian events often leaves the impression that the scene pictured was actually in Croatia. The HTV station in Mostar refused to issue an OSCE-mandated apology for inaccurate and inflammatory broadcasting, resulting in the resignation of the editor (in an attempt to avoid more radical measures by the Office of the High Representative).
Until the SFOR acted on an OHR request to end offensive broadcasts by RS government-run Serb Radio-Television (SRT), SRT followed the SDS line, with frequently inaccurate and inflammatory reporting. SRT sought to undercut the Dayton Accords by covering events in the Federation in the “international” portion of the news. After the SFOR actions in Prijedor against persons indicted for war crimes, the SRT broadcasts endorsed violent actions against representatives of the international community. The SRT backed off only when the SFOR and the OHR threatened retaliatory actions. Following RS President Plavsic’s break with the Pale leadership, the SRT affiliate in Banja Luka began to broadcast its own programming, giving a favorable slant to Plavsic’s activities. The High Representative has developed a plan for restructuring the SRT. In the interim, only the SRT station in Banja Luka is authorized to continue broadcasting.
Radio broadcasting in the Muslim-majority areas of the Federation— particularly in Sarajevo, Zenica, and Tuzla—is diverse, and opposition viewpoints are reflected in the news programs of independent broadcasters. Independent or opposition radio stations broadcast in the Republika Srpska—particularly in Banja Luka—but they tend to skirt most significant political issues for fear of retaliation by the SDS. Nezavisni Radio and Nesavisna Televizija (NTV) report a wide variety of political opinions. Local radio stations broadcast in Croat-majority areas, but they are usually highly nationalistic. Opposition viewpoints are not tolerated.
The television Open Broadcast Network — with affiliates in Sarajevo, Mostar, Zenica, and Tuzla and a correspondents’ bureau in Banja Luka — reports independent news and public affairs programming under the sponsorship of the international donor community. The Network has been plagued by poor management at its Sarajevo hub and problems with affiliate relations. The OBN fares extremely poorly in the competition for viewers with party-controlled media in the two entities. The quality of the network’s programming is below local standards. In August the OBN launched a major effort to expand its broadcast range and improve programming quality. The Banja Luka OBN bureau has facilities to broadcast network programs but not to broadcast programs directly in the way affiliates in the Federation do. There are plans to convert the OBN affiliate in Banja Luka (ATV) into a full-fledged OBN affiliate. There is no Bosnian Croat participation in the OBN.
Foreign journalists representing recognized media were able to travel freely to most areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bosnian journalists from the Federation were able to travel to the Republika Srpska only under the escort of accredited diplomatic personnel. Journalists from the Republika Srpska travel to the Federation only under the same conditions, although there have been no incidents of abuse of Republika Srpska journalists in the Federation. Federation journalists have been beaten and verbally harassed in the RS. Bosniak journalists were harassed in West Mostar on several occasions. International journalists also have been harassed on several occasions in the RS.
Academic freedom was constrained. In the Federation,
Serbs and Croats complained that SDA party members receive special treatment
in appointments and promotions. Officials of the “Cultural Community
of Herceg Bosna” ensure that Croats dominate the University of (West) Mostar.
The Constitution provides for freedom of thought and expression, specifically including freedom of the press and other media of communication, speech and public expression, and free establishment of institutions of public communication. In practice, government influence on the media through state ownership of most print and broadcast outlets limits these freedoms. Government intimidation through the courts and other bodies, including administrative and regulatory bodies, also induced self-censorship. Journalists were reluctant to criticize the Government in public forums for fear of harassment, job loss, intimidation, criminal prosecution, or being branded as disloyal. The Government maintained an unofficial campaign of harassment of the independent media throughout the year.
Individuals may criticize the Government, although not always without reprisal. In August the Government brought charges against a leading human rights activist and a prominent politician for press statements, allegedly in violation of the Criminal Code for “dissemination of false information.” The Government alleged that these statements had been made with the express purpose of inciting political instability in the country, notwithstanding the fact that the same and similar statements had been made by these individuals—with no ensuing public disorder—several years previously and that similar sentiments were expressed by others.
In addition to the possible use of criminal prosecution against its critics, the Government enjoys a virtual monopoly on print media distribution. Fees of 20 percent of gross sales (payable in advance), plus slow payment of proceeds from the distributor to the publication, caused acute cash flow problems that forced one publication, the independent journal Arkzin, to change from weekly to monthly issuance. Journals and newspapers also complained that they had little control over where their publications were sent, with large quantities at times being sent to remote villages, leaving the bigger, urban markets under-supplied.
Despite continued domestic and international protests, the Government took no steps to revise articles of the Penal Code that authorize the criminal prosecution of journalists who insult the honor or dignity of the president, prime minister, the speaker of parliament, or the chief justices of either the Supreme Court or the Constitutional Court, as well as those who publish “state secrets.” The three largest weekly newspapers-Globus, Nacional, and the Feral Tribune-face multiple libel suits under these provisions, many of which were brought by members of the Government or of the President’s family. Although the municipal court found the Feral Tribune innocent of one of the numerous libel charges in 1996, the prosecutor appealed the case. The criminal trial of Globus journalist Davor Butkovic began in December for libel against the Prime Minister. Butkovic is charged with criminal liability for citing a report by a foreign company in an article that alleged corruption in the Cabinet. Administrative proceedings continued against the independent radio station Radio 101, which was threatened again with closure when the commercial court demanded that it increase its operating capital to the equivalent of several hundred thousand dollars in order to renew its license. The ownership structure of the station complicated the situation: 75 percent is owned by employees and 25 percent by the city of Zagreb. Radio 101 was also informed that it must pay both its licensing fees and deposit the increased operating capital in advance of receiving its permanent license. Legal proceedings continued throughout the year, and the problem of financial capital at the station remained severe. In a positive development, after another lengthy battle with administrative authorities, Radio 101 was awarded a second transmitter, allowing the station to expand its coverage significantly in the Zagreb area.
Both public and private radio and television broadcasting coexist, although the Government controls all national broadcasting. Opposition figures and human rights activists uniformly charge that state-run outlets have a strong progovernment bias. International observers also noted the continued role of the state-run media in stirring up public opinion on sensitive issues, such as the return of ethnic Serb displaced persons. For example, in July and August, several widely-read progovernment papers ran ugly and misleading articles, clearly designed to stir up public fear and anger against the return of ethnic Serbs and against those international organizations that assist them.
Regulations governing access to the state-owned broadcast media and editorial policies of the boards controlling the outlets restrict the ability of opposition parties to criticize government policies and, in the most visible example, prevented any semblance of free media access during the April and June electoral campaigns (see Section 3). Croatian State Radio and Television (HRT) broadcasts on three national television channels and three national radio channels. Technically under the supervision of the Parliament, the HRT is, in practice, run by the ruling HDZ party, and its head is a leading member of the HDZ. Many members of the Telecommunications Board (which regulates licensing) are also senior HDZ officials. The HRT unfailingly devotes its main news coverage to uncritical reports on the activities of the President and the Government and is virtually an organ of the executive branch. Reporting and commentary faithfully reflect the views of the Government, and little, if any, broadcast time is given for dissenting views. While local radio and television outlets exist throughout the country, they largely lack their own news and public affairs programs. A notable exception is the newly launched TV Mreza, which has begun fairly objective, if somewhat limited, news production. Most radio stations, however, repeat the HRT news, while some rebroadcast Voice of America and the British Broadcasting Corporation news programs.
On October 23 broadcast media journalists established an Association of Electronic Media Journalists in the Croatian Journalists Association and issued a manifesto with 21 points in which they called for professional and open electronic media. The “Forum 21” members, 13 of whom work for state radio and television, came under immediate pressure and threats from the HDZ and the state-run media to curtail these outside activities.
The lack of media freedom, in particular in the electronic media, was a major component in the OSCE’s judgment that the process leading up to the presidential election in June was “fundamentally flawed” and did not meet minimum standards for a meaningful and democratic election in line with OSCE norms. A similar conclusion was made about the parliamentary upper house and local elections in April. Throughout the year’s election campaigns, the ruling party and its candidates enjoyed an immense advantage in media exposure and news coverage from the state-owned electronic media, the HRT. For example, during the final days of the presidential campaign, the main daily news program provided approximately 8 to 12 times more coverage of the ruling candidate than of the 2 other candidates combined. Independent analysts also concluded that state-owned media downplayed coverage of events of significance to opposition candidates, including the violent attack on one presidential candidate in June. The coverage devoted to President Tudjman on the evening news program during one key election campaign period (from May 28 to June 7) was 300 times greater than that given to the eventual second place candidate. Finally, the OSCE report itself was completely underplayed by the media, with the main government news program devoting a mere three-line statement to its release, while the independent news program had no coverage of the release at all. The next day, the state-run media disingenuously reported that the OSCE report characterized the Croatian elections as “free” but left out the remainder of the sentence, which continued “but not fair.”
Foreign newspapers and journals, including some Serbian periodicals, were available throughout the country.
While academic freedom is generally respected, academicians
were reluctant to speak out on political issues, and there was an increasing
tendency by the ruling HDZ party to use its influence in academia.
For example, in a public exchange of letters, President Tudjman accused
the then President of the Academy of Arts and Science, Ivan Supek, of plotting
Tudjman’s assassination after Supek made public statements critical of
presidential policies.
The Constitution provides for freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally respects these rights in practice.
Several daily newspapers are published in Skopje, as well as numerous weekly or periodical political and other publications. Most towns and municipalities have local papers. Government-subsidized newspapers in the Albanian and Turkish languages are published and distributed nationally by the leading news publishing house. Some other newspapers and magazines are subsidized by the Government. Several privately-owned publications have a wide distribution throughout the country; some are considered to be oriented towards opposition political parties. The media that remain partially state owned are government oriented but do report opposition press conferences and statements and in general provide coverage of the major opposition parties.
After privatization, the leading newspaper publisher is still partially government owned and controls one of only two modern, high-speed printing facilities in the country, as well as most newspaper kiosks. Opposition parties allege that government control and manipulation of the media prevent them from getting their message across. The introduction of competition in the print media resulted in increased investigative reporting in the country and a livelier tone, particularly in regard to several financial and investment scandals during the year. Competition also resulted in price reduction and increased circulation.
Distributors of foreign newspapers and magazines must obtain permission of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. In 1997 all such requests were approved. Foreign newspapers, including those from neighboring countries, are available throughout the country.
There were several incidents in which journalists were threatened or attacked by the targets of their criticism. In one incident, four individuals were charged with misdemeanor offenses after they confronted and threatened the manager of a private television station.
There are dozens of small commercial radio and television broadcasters throughout the country. A new law on broadcasting was passed in April, creating a Broadcasting Council to issue licenses and bring some order to the currently crowded airwaves. The broadcast law directs that broadcast fees collected through individual electric bills subsidize both state-run Macedonian radio and television and the maintenance of infrastructure for other public and commercial broadcasting. There is concern that new broadcast license fees may price small and medium sized stations out of the market. Individual satellite dishes are unregulated and plentiful throughout the country. Cable television is growing.
Individuals and opposition political groups may criticize the Government publicly without reprisal. The media do not appear to practice self-censorship due to fear of government reprisal. The Government does not censor books and other publications, nor does it censor films.
The Government respects academic freedom. Because
higher education is not available in the Albanian language except for teacher
training, some ethnic Albanians claim that they do not have complete academic
freedom. They want to see the unauthorized Tetovo university gain
legal status so that they can study in their mother tongue (see Section
5).
Federal law provides for freedom of speech and of the press, but in practice the Government strongly influences much of the media. In July several weeks before the Serbian elections, the Milosevic regime temporarily closed scores of private radio and television stations throughout Serbia. The FRY Ministry of Transport and Telecommunications, which controls broadcast frequencies, worked in concert with the criminal and financial police to pressure independent media outlets that had not been able to regularize their legal status. Many broadcasters applied for frequencies but were left in a state of limbo by the regime. Serbia’s broadcast laws remain murky, and licenses are not issued in any fashion that can remotely be described as transparent.
While the regime harassed the independent media, an HLC study showed that the Government violated the agreement on the presentation of political parties, signed before the election season. During the campaign season in August, state-controlled Radio and Television Serbia (RTS) openly campaigned for Milosevic’s ruling coalition. According to HLC monitoring, all the other political parties received only one-quarter of the broadcast time allocated for political parties, while the RTS regularly opened the evening news broadcasts with campaign promotion pieces for the regime.
The regime lost one of its most important media outlets when it was forced to reverse the theft of the Belgrade municipal elections in February and consent to the naming of Democratic Party Leader Zoran Djindic as the city’s mayor. Control of Belgrade’s Studio B radio went from the regime to the opposition, and the management immediately started broadcasting generally balanced news programming. The regime, however, reversed the setback when the Zajedno coalition of the political opposition fell apart. Studio B’s independent management was dismissed a week after the first round of Serbian elections on September 21, and the news board’s commitment to journalistic independence is suspect at best. In effect, Studio B is now under SPO censorship.
The most striking example of media bias came in reaction to the mass demonstrations from November 1996 to February 1997 that followed widespread government theft of the municipal elections. The government-controlled media downplayed the size of crowds, sometimes ignoring demonstrations altogether—despite numbers of demonstrators in the tens of thousands. When state-run television did cover demonstrations, it was in an effort to label protesters as “hooligans” and “traitors” determined to destroy Serbia.
The same media tack was used when ethnic Albanian students staged a peaceful protest march in Pristina on October 1 only to be accused by the state-controlled media of instigating violence in a clash that saw police move in with truncheons, tear gas, and water cannons. The state-controlled media, moreover, took advantage of the protests to accuse the Belgrade opposition of being in league with “Albanian separatists.”
Economic pressure was the usual weapon of the regime against the free press. For example, state-owned enterprises were dissuaded from advertising in independent media. One of Serbia’s leading opposition papers, Nasa Borba, had its bank accounts blocked by the regime. Although no longer the persistent problem it was during the period of sanctions, the availability of newsprint continued to pose difficulties, especially for the independent media. Also, while the state-controlled press obtained newsprint at subsidized prices, independent publications paid substantially higher market prices.
Academic freedom exists in a limited fashion.
Many leading academicians are active members of the political opposition
and human rights groups, and the espousal of antiregime positions would
likely limit their advancement. At the prestigious University of
Belgrade, half the membership of the governing council that controls the
university is appointed by the regime and half by the various faculties.
The Constitution provides for freedom of thought, speech, public association, the press, and other forms of public communication and expression. Lingering self-censorship and some indirect political pressures continue to influence the media.
The press is now a vigorous institution emerging from its more restricted past. The media span the political spectrum. The major media do not represent a broad range of ethnic interests, although there is an Italian-language television channel as well as a newspaper available to the ethnic Italian minority who live on the Adriatic Coast. Hungarian radio programming is common in the northeast where there are about 8,500 ethnic Hungarians. Bosnian refugees and the Albanian community have newsletters in their own languages.
Four major daily and several weekly newspapers are published. Two major daily newspapers with overtly partisan stances ceased publication due to a level of readership insufficient to support their costs of operation. The major print media are supported through private investment and advertising, although the national broadcaster, RTV Slovenia, enjoys government subsidies, as do cultural publications and book publishing. There are seven television channels, four of which are independent private stations. Numerous foreign broadcasts are available via satellite and cable. All major towns have radio stations and cable television. Numerous business and academic publications are available. Foreign newspapers, magazines, and journals are widely available.
In theory and practice, the media enjoy full freedom in their journalistic pursuits. However, for over 40 years Slovenia was ruled by an authoritarian Communist political system, and reporting about domestic politics may be influenced to some degree by self-censorship and indirect political pressures.
The election law requires the media to offer free space and time to political parties at election time. Television networks routinely give public figures and opinion makers from across the political spectrum access via a broad range of public interest programming.
The Constitution provides for autonomy and freedom
for universities and other institutions of higher education. There
are two universities, each with numerous affiliated research and study
institutions. Academic freedom is respected, and centers of higher
education are lively and intellectually stimulating.
The State Department’s report on the state of the media in the former Yugoslavia is surprisingly accurate and critical. My only criticism and comments are as follows:
Bosnia-Hercegovina
The report accurately portrays the state of the media in Serb, Bosniak, and Croat areas throughout the country. However, it fails to mention the United States government’s involvement in shaping the state of the Bosnian media. In the sixth paragraph, the State Department’s report states that SRT broadcasts “endorsed violent actions against representatives of the international community,” and that “SRT backed off only when SFOR and the OHR threatened retaliatory actions.” It further states that “[f]ollowing RS President Plavsic’s break with the Pale leadership, the SRT affiliate in Banja Luka began to broadcast its own programming,” and that “in the interim, only the SRT station in Banja Luka is authorized to continue broadcasting.” There is no mention of SFOR jamming SRT Pale’s broadcasting, nor seizing its television transmission towers and turning them towards Banja Luka. The “international community,” under the direction of the United States, shut down the nationalist Serb television. Although the end-result in fact did create a more pluralistic media environment, the tactics used were protested by press freedom groups and are worthy of mentioning in a human rights report.
Additionally, I would add that the State Department’s analysis on academic freedom is severely understated. In the Bosniak-controlled parts of the Federation, Serbs and Croats were systematically purged from state jobs and are overtly discriminated against in academic institutions. In Croat-controlled sections, there are few minorities left, and certainly few within the academia. Croats do more than dominate the University of West Mostar. They ensure that no minorities enter the university either as faculty or as students.
Croatia
I have no significant criticism. The State Department’s report seems comprehensive and detailed.
The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
The report is critical, but I would add that the Macedonian government still has considerable influence over the distribution of newspapers and that journalists still encounter difficulties getting information from government sources. There is also more than just concern about the licensing law. Independent radio stations say they simply cannot afford to continue broadcasting if they must pay such high licensing fees. Lastly, the report’s analysis on academic freedom is severely understated. The significant Albanian minority in Macedonia, which amounts to about one-third of the population, is not entitled to study in their native language. Classes in Albanian are not offered at university in Skopje and the government has steadfastly denied the Albanians of the right to create their own university, stating doing so is tantamount to secession. Albanians who attempted to create a university of their own have been beaten and jailed by the government authorities.
Serbia and Montenegro
The State Department’s report is accurate and comprehensive. However, I would add that the Yugoslav government has consistently denied visas necessary to enter the country to foreign journalists. Moreover, Serbian opposition journalists have been more than just harassed. There have been consistent reports of police beating opposition journalists. In terms of academic freedom, there is no mention in the report about the Albanian population in Kosovo, the southern-most province in Serbia. Although Albanians comprise 90 percent of the population, they are not entitled to study in their native language at the state institutions and have therefore created an underground university system.
Stacy Sullivan
Media Studies Center