The Constitution provides for freedom of speech and the press; however, while the Government generally respects freedom of speech, it continues to place some significant restrictions on freedom of the press. Publications present a variety of views, and the opposition press regularly criticizes government policies and leaders, including the President, including on sensitive issues such as the Nagorno Karabakh peace process. However, the range of subjects considered sensitive for national security is relatively large. Although there is no official censorship, the Government circulates an informal list of “forbidden subjects” and journalists practice some self-censorship to avoid problems with authorities. Because of past episodes of retribution by powerful ministers or businessmen, including beatings, detention and financial pressure, journalists are cautious in reporting on major corruption or national security issues.
Newspapers operate with extremely limited resources, and few are completely independent of patronage from economic or political interest groups or individuals. Total newspaper circulation is small, about one copy per hundred persons. State-owned companies have a monopoly on newspaper printing and distribution facilities, and most newspapers are permanently in debt to the printers. The State retains, through its ownership of the printing and distribution network, the potential to shut or otherwise pressure newspapers that take too strident an opposition position. The Government disbanded the Ministry of Information at the end of 1996, a move widely welcomed by the nongovernment media; however, the Government then partly recreated the ministry as a department of the Prime Minister’s office in early 1997. In December a new board of directors was created for the state television, news agency, and press distribution company, made up of three representatives each from the President’s office, the Government, and Parliament. The declared aim of the board is to supervise these agencies’ transformation into commercial enterprises, albeit with the State retaining controlling interest in the near term.
In June three employees of Noyan Tapan news agency were summoned to the Ministry of Interior and National Security and pressured unsuccessfully over several hours to reveal the source of information for an article containing details of confidential negotiating documents regarding Nagorno Karabakh. The editor of Yerevanyan Orer was seriously beaten by unidentified attackers in March after refusing to delete a newspaper article from the computer. ARF-affiliated media, which the Government shut down in 1994, remained closed, but a new ARF-linked newspaper began publication and another newspaper, published abroad, resumed public sale.
The two most widely visible television channels belong to state television, and tend to present a positive view of officials and their activities. However, television coverage of opposition protests of the Government’s Karabakh policy from October through December demonstrated some tendency toward greater balance. Most radio stations are now private. The opening of more nongovernmental television and radio outlets has encouraged greater freedom of expression and somewhat broader news coverage. There are now 6 independent radio stations and 8 independent television stations operating in Yerevan, and 1 independent radio and 13 independent television stations in the regions. Opposition parties and politicians received adequate news coverage and access on these channels. Legislation has not yet been passed to regulate the current arbitrary and nontransparent process of license issuance, although at year’s end a draft broadcasting law on this subject was circulating in the legislature.
The few international newspapers and magazines imported are not censored. Middle and upper class citizens have access to international satellite and cable television from abroad. Internet and electronic mail have substantially increased the amount of foreign and domestic information available.
The Government partially respects academic freedom.
Over 50 private institutions of higher education have been established
since independence in 1991. The Ministry of Education must approve
the curriculum of all schools that grant degrees recognized by the State,
seriously limiting the freedom of individual schools and teachers in their
choice of textbooks and course material.
The State Department’s Country report on the Republic of Armenia (RA) surveys the media situation in a few paragraphs but does so with a selectivity and finesse that convey a mood of stuttering optimism. Some details in the 1997 report have been only cursorily outlined and deserve greater review.
The precarious status of the current government in Yerevan colors most local opinion about Armenian media. The face of the Armenian government has changed dramatically in the last six months, following the February 8th resignation of President Levon Ter-Petrossyan, and in light of the recent election of Prime Minister and former Karabakh leader, Robert Kocharyan. Most media outlets have reacted positively to the media-friendly nature of Kocharyan; however, journalists wait with bated-breath for the new administration’s position on revised versions of the Law on Mass Media and the Law on TV and radio which now stagnate in committee at the Armenian National Assembly (parliament). The Permanent Commission on Science, Education, Culture and Youth (the perennially apathetic body assigned to deal with mass media issues and the group guilty for pushing through the hollow and now-obsolete 1991 Press Law) have been criticized for their stonewalling on this media legislation. Yet their pretended outreach to NGOs and to the independent media have been well-publicized during the latter part of 1997, and deputies have demonstrated their supposed interest in mass media by attending press conferences and media round-tables. But since the recent changes in the Armenian government, and with the subsequent collapse of the ruling party, most parliamentarians scurry about to secure a place for themselves in whichever political faction is believed to possess the most leverage. Therefore, not much has been accomplished by the RA government, or by the National Assembly, in the sphere of media legislation since December 1997.
As for the obstacles facing the printed press and their running debts to the state printing houses and distributors, not much has changed in this sector either. One bright spot on the horizon marks the April 1998 announcement of a competition coordinated by the Eurasia Foundation Yerevan office. Eurasia has awarded a private publisher (GIND, owner of the Molorak newspaper) with a low-interest loan for the purchase of a second-hand professional printing press worth up to $400,000. This private printing press will break the State monopoly over newspaper publishing in Armenia and make the independents less vulnerable to government pressure. However, the existence of the state-controlled distribution system and of the tax duties applied to imported printing ink continue, and the media community regards each of these as repressive instruments. Both the local media entities and the international community continue to voice their dissatisfaction about these issues to the RA government, namely to the Prime Minister’s office of Information and Book Publishing, now headed by former RA Foreign Minister and US Citizen, Mr. Raffi Hovanessian.
The newly-assigned boards of directors of the state TV (Channels 1 and 2), of the state news agency (Armenpress), and of the state press distribution company (Haimamul), got off to a sluggish start in December with the resignation of Armenpress director, Tigran Hakopian, and Garick Chookaszian, director of the Office of Information and Book Publishing. The reasons for both directors’ departure stem from complaints issued by the employees of the state media enterprises who disagreed with the terms of privatization. These disputes imposed significant delays on the privatization process at the close of 1997.
As of February 1998, state TV Channel 1, state radio, and Armenpress are each overseen by 5-person advisory boards with members newly appointed by the Kocharyan, during his tenure as Prime Minister and Acting President. These boards are made up of governmental officials and independent media representatives chosen to shepherd the transformation of the national media structures into joint stock companies in which the Armenian government owes a minimum 51% interest. The 100% privatization of both NORK TV (Armenian Channel 2) and the Haimamul distribution agency is expected to occur by the end of May 1998.
There are at least two draft versions of a TV and radio law awaiting review by the parliament; however, the half-life of either draft is diminishing due to the lack of consensus over several provisions in the text, not to mention the inchoate status of the government TV privatization. However, the arbitrary and capricious licensing policy of the Armenian government continues to hamper the activity of local non-governmental broadcasters. The Electro-Communications Inspectorate, the department within the Ministry of Communications that oversees the issue of broadcast licenses, continues its “shake-down” policies. Several FM and UHF stations have complained of unsolicited requests from Inspectorate engineers who visit on a quarterly basis for “technical site checks.” If engineers are not provided with remuneration, then they threaten the stations with closure.
The Armenian Electro-Communications Inspectorate does not have an established installation procedure, no testing standards, nor do they have a published fee scale. (It remains suspect whether they even have the sufficient equipment to test transmission signals.) Furthermore, the registration and import of transmission equipment follows no particular standard or precedent; each broadcast license application is treated on a case-by-case basis. Moreover, the Inspectorate insists upon expensive yet extraneous documentation to satisfy its certification procedures.
Only after numerous visits to the Inspectorate (and several hundred dollars later) is the chief engineer, Mr. Babken Barseghian, willing to inform the awarded station of the actual frequency on which to operate the transmitter. This policy puts the station in an inconvenient position, since they must first to order equipment from abroad (the local market does not yet offer such selection) and then have the device tuned to the assigned frequency prior to shipment from the country of origin. The station must then obtain a letter from the Inspectorate addressed to RA Customs to allow the cargo to clear through the border.
In addition to the numerous logistical pitfalls that accompany broadcast start-up, the Inspectorate keeps every broadcast applicant in total suspense regarding the status of his/her application for an average of several months. Moreover, the entire broadcasting community remains unaware of the actual number of VHF, UHF, and FM channels available in the country. The frequency listing in Armenia is neither published nor made available to the broadcast community. The debate and scurrilous rumor perpetuated by the Ministry of Communications about whether Russia, Turkey, Iran, Georgia, or Azerbaijan have monopolized the frequency spectrum and left Armenia with slim-pickings will not be brought to light until the RA government adopts a transparent broadcast law and licensing policy. If not, the Ministry of Communications will continue to wield its leverage over the non-governmental broadcasting sector, and its unfair and unprofessional operations will carry-on unabated in the legal vacuum that plagues Armenia.
Dan Bolger
Internews Armenia
The Constitution provides for freedom of speech and the press, and specifically outlaws press censorship; however, the Government often did not respect these rights in practice. The Government practiced censorship and created an atmosphere in which journalists exercised self-censorship. However, prominent politicians criticized the Government publicly without reprisal.
While the press debated a wide variety of sensitive topics, censorship limited the public’s ability to be informed about and discuss political issues. Most newspapers are printed in the Government’s publishing house. They must submit their copy to a government censor. The Government’s near monopoly of publishing facilities enabled it to exert indirect pressure over the press by controlling the price of newsprint, a critical matter given the precarious finances of most opposition newspapers. Censorship continued at approximately 1996 levels. Although in September the Government officially abolished censorship of military topics, censorship of political topics continued. The Ministry of Information can legally close a newspaper for 1 month for violating censorship rules. Censors deleted portions of newspaper articles or entire articles. Journalists often exercise self-censorship. Two major opposition newspapers claimed that 74 and 84 of their issues, respectively, had encountered censorship. The Government banned three issues of smaller opposition newspapers. In addition the Ministry of Information withdrew permission to publish from a newspaper after its first issue appeared, citing the newspaper’s “opposition tendency” and never granted it permission to publish. Police on one occasion in September beat two journalists; one of them was hospitalized. At the end of the year, two journalists had been beaten; no investigation conducted into the beating of the journalists. No journalists were detained or imprisoned. However, several journalists were prevented from visiting former president Elchibey (see Section 2.d.). Foreign journalist Irena Lasota, editor of a quarterly journal, was searched and questioned by armed forces personnel after interviewing former president Elchibey in July.
The investigation of the 1996 beating of a journalist continued, but no charges were brought.
Despite government censorship, the independent and opposition press continued to play an active, influential role in politics. Articles critical of government policy and high government figures (with the exception of President Aliyev) appeared routinely in the opposition and independent print media. Newspapers began to discuss censorship itself. Newspapers were able to publish articles opposing government views in sensitive areas such as Azerbaijan’s relations with Russia and Iran and Nagorno-Karabakh peace negotiations. Newspapers also exposed government shortcomings in economic reform, corruption in high government offices, and conflicts within the presidential administration and the President’s political party.
A large number of newspapers continued to publish. One reliable source put the number of registered newspapers at 375, and the number actually publishing at nearly 100. These included independent newspapers and newspapers with links to major and minor opposition parties. Government-run kiosks and independent news distributors distributed opposition and independent newspapers.
The Government, however, tightly controlled most radio and television, the source of information for most of the population. Opposition parties had virtually no access to the official electronic media. There is a limited range of private television stations, and some of them are accessible only to those local residents who own modern, foreign-produced television sets. Independent radio, the choice of the overwhelming majority of listeners, is almost entirely entertainment oriented. Independent television and radio broadcasters are reluctant to air controversial political topics due to fear of government retaliation.
The Ministry of Justice continued to deny registration to nine independent television stations, five of which are kept from broadcasting. Eight independent television stations continue to operate in Baku and other regions. Several foreign television stations and radio programs are rebroadcast locally through Azerbaijani facilities and are seen and heard in most parts of the country. There are no restrictions on reception of foreign stations via satellite.
Appointments to government-controlled academic positions
are heavily dependent on political connections. Nevertheless, several
professors with tenure are active in opposition parties. There were
no complaints of violation of academic freedom or of censorship of books
or academic journals.
The section of the report on the “Freedom of Speech and Press” in Azerbaijan describes the situation in the country very accurately. I would, however, like to make a few additional remarks.
The report states that, “[d]espite government censorship, the independent and opposition press continued to play an active, influential role in politics.” While this is true, it is worth noting that most of the press is published in Baku and covers almost entirely events and processes in the capital. Its influence on decisions on the local level is therefore rather limited. In addition, there is so far no efficient distribution system that would allow for a timely arrival of newspapers in cities and regions outside Baku.
The report also mentions the role of the Ministry of Justice in hindering the work of non-governmental broadcasters. It does, however, not mention the general inadequacy of the legal framework regulating the licensing of TV stations. Azerbaijan does not have a law “On Broadcasting,” and the law “On the Mass Media” does not cover the non-governmental broadcast media. It does, for instance, not provide direction for licensing broadcasting frequencies. As a consequence, the Ministry of Communications bases its work in this field almost entirely on “internal regulations,” and the licensing process is not very transparent. Stations are unable to obtain licenses, and as long as they broadcast without licenses, they are particularly vulnerable to pressure from local governments and the central government.
Andrea Stallknecht
Internews Azerbaijan
The Constitution provides for freedom of speech, as well as the freedom to receive, retain, and disseminate information, but the Government restricts these rights in practice. The executive branch continued its suppression of freedom of speech through a decree limiting citizens’ right to express their opinions. Although the Constitution prohibits monopoly of mass media, the Government also continued to severely restrict the right to a free press through near-monopolies on the means of production and on national level broadcast media, and by denying accreditation to journalists critical of the regime. The Government also kept up economic pressure on the independent media by pressuring advertisers to withdraw advertisements and evicting newspapers from their offices. Employees at state-run enterprises are discouraged from subscribing to independent journals.
In December 1995, on instructions from President Lukashenko, the state publishing house refused to renew printing contracts with the four leading independent newspapers, which prompted them to publish in Lithuania. Although the state publishing house has since offered to publish these independent newspapers, they continue to use firms in Lithuania.
In January 1996 the President signed a decree ordering that all editors-in-chief of state-supported newspapers would henceforth be official state employees and would become members of the appropriate level Government council. Another decree granted the Ministry of Press authority to assign graduates of state-supported journalism schools to work in state-owned media organizations as a means of payment for their schooling. These decrees remain in effect.
A presidential decree (number 5), issued in March prohibits a range of broadly defined activities and limits freedom of expression. For example, the decree prohibits individuals from carrying placards or flags bearing emblems that are not officially registered with the State, as well as “emblems, symbols, and posters whose content is intended to harm the State and public order, rights, and legal interests of the citizens.” The decree also bans activities that are “humiliating to the dignity and honor of the executive persons of State bodies.”
Following the spring demonstrations, there were credible reports that individuals were detained and fined for violations of the decree’s provisions against displaying unregistered symbols. The decree effectively bans the display of the white-red-white flag that was the first independence-era national flag. Police detained several soccer fans carrying the white-red-white flag after a June match. In addition, at least one man was arrested for carrying a European Union flag at an antigovernment rally.
In March the State Committee for the Press suspended the issuance of licenses, pending amendments to the laws governing the issuance of permits both for publishing and for purchasing printing equipment. Since the promulgation of the new law in July, there were no reports that licenses were denied.
In March the Council of Ministers issued a decree (number 218)that prohibited and restricted the movement of goods across the customs border. The decree specifically prohibits the import and export of printed, audio, and video materials or other news media containing information that could damage the economic and political interests of the country. Although it has not been widely enforced, the decree targets, among others, those independent newspapers that publish in Lithuania. Even prior to the decree’s entry into force, members of the State Security Committee confiscated the independent newspaper Belarusian Business News at the Lithuanian border; following an inspection, the authorities allowed the newspaper to be delivered to Minsk. On March 25 border guards detained for several hours the editor of the independent newspaper Narodnaya Volya, who was returning to Belarus from Lithuania with the day’s edition of the newspaper.
In March security personnel at the Belarusian-Lithuanian border prevented a crew from the Russian television network NTV from taking a videotape into Lithuania for transmission to Moscow (earlier the state broadcasting facility banned the crew from transmitting the video material from Minsk).
Independent newspapers are widely available in Minsk, but outside of the capital most towns carry only the local newspapers (some of which are independent). The publisher of a leading independent newspaper received a grant from a foreign organization to establish an alternative, private distribution system so that independent publications do not have to rely on the state.
Russian television stations rely on the Belarusian Television and Radio (B-TR) broadcasting facility to transmit material to Moscow. On several occasions, B-TR refused to transmit video material for Russian television stations. According to NTV, in March a representative of the presidential administration instructed crews from Russian television networks in Minsk not to transmit footage of opposition marches and rallies. Subsequently, the day after a demonstration, security guards denied the Russian television crews access to the B-TR facility. NTV also claims that a B-TR internal instruction requires B-TR officials to preview material before it is transmitted abroad. It is unclear if this is done in practice.
A July Council of Ministers decree nullified the accreditation of all correspondents and required all foreign media correspondents to apply for reaccreditation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; the application form for accreditation requests biographic information, as well as a record of the applicant’s journalistic activity. Journalists who are residents of Belarus are also required to register with the state tax authorities. The results of the decree are still unclear, although at year’s end it does not appear that the Government has used the decree as a tool to exclude certain journalists.
The Defamation Law makes no distinction between private and public persons for the purposes of lawsuits for defamation of character. A public figure who has been criticized for poor performance in office may ask the public prosecutor to sue the newspaper that printed the criticism.
The nationalist poet Slavomir Adamovich was detained in April 1996 for publishing a poem titled “To Kill a President,” and was originally charged with inciting a terrorist act. In June the court convicted him of insulting a state official, although nowhere in the poem does Adamovich name any specific president. In addition, the court also convicted him for attempting to cross a state border (he attempted to flee the country when released pending trial). The court ruled that the time Adamovich served in pretrial detention constituted fulfillment of his sentence.
In September the State initiated an investigation against Central Election Commission Chairman Victor Gonchar, charging that Gonchar defamed the President in his report on Lukashenko’s (and the Government’s) violations of the 1994 Constitution during the 1996 referendum.
In February the upper house of the acting legislature denied reporters for Radio Liberty, Reuters, the Latvian newspapers Belaursian Business News and Free News Plus access to a press conference, despite the fact that the journalists were properly accredited.
Grodno municipal authorities, who work directly for the President under his “vertikal” (from the top down) power structure, canceled a lease agreement with the independent newspaper “Pagonya” in April, evicting the newspaper from its office. As compensation the municipal authorities offered to move the newspaper to a dilapidated space with no plumbing or communications connections.
On several occasions in the spring, police beat and detained journalists covering antigovernment demonstrations (see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.). At an April 2 unauthorized demonstration to protest the signing of a union treaty with Russia, riot police beat several journalists, three of them severely, according to a report by the human rights group Article 19. Journalists also reported on several occasions that police destroyed or confiscated their photographs and video material. In some cases, police charged journalists covering demonstrations with violating public order.
In October two unidentified men abducted Oleg Babenin, a correspondent for the independent newspaper Imya, and took him outside Minsk, where they beat him. They warned Babenin to cease his critical articles about the authorities. In November the editor of Imya received a warning that satirical collages appearing in several issues of the newspaper defamed the president, and the newspaper could be stripped of its license. At year’s end, Imya’s attorney continued to appeal the charges, but the newspaper ceased printing the collages due to fear of further reprisals.
Also in November, the state Press Committee issued two warnings to the largest independent newspaper, Svaboda, alleging that several articles violated the law by aiming to incite social unrest. After 15 minutes of deliberation, the Supreme Economic Court in December ruled to close Svaboda. At year’s end, an appeal was pending.
In December unknown assailants attacked film director Yuriy Khashchevatsky in his studio. The attack is credibly believed to be in response to Khashchevatsky film, An Ordinary President, a critical, satirical portrait of President Lukashenko. The Government has banned the film; in January human rights monitors reported that militia broke into a private cable company studio in Grodno and detained the cameraman after the film was aired.
In December customs officers at the Belarusian-Polish border confiscated materials documenting human rights violations from Viktor Ivashkevich, the editor of the Free Trade Union newspaper, Rabochy. Ivashkevich intended to present the materials at a press conference in Warsaw.
Belarusian Television and Radio maintained its monopoly as the only nationwide television station. Its news programs regularly featured reporting biased in favor of the Government, and refused to provide an outlet for opposing viewpoints. Local, independent television stations operated in some areas, and were relatively unimpeded in reporting on local news. However, some of these stations reported that they were under pressure not to report on national level issues, or were subject to censorship.
The Government did not reopen Radio 101.2, the sole Belarusian language independent station that authorities shut down in 1996. President Lukashenko offered to transfer Radio 101.2 to a government-subsidized presidential youth organization, the Belarusian Patriotic Union of Youth (BPUY), but the group had not taken over the frequency at year’s end.
In March the Ministry of Foreign Affairs followed through on earlier threats by stripping Russian Television Network NTV correspondent Alexandr Stupnikov of his accreditation. An outspoken critic of the President, Stupnikov was accused by the Government of “tendentious” reporting and expelled 4 days after losing his accreditation. (see Section 5).
In July the Ministry of Foreign Affairs revoked the accreditation of Pavel Sheremet, a Belarusian citizen and bureau chief for the Russian public television network (ORT) in Minsk, following his critical commentary on the Government’s expenditures for the July 3-5 National Day and Minsk’s 930th anniversary celebrations. The Government also accused Sheremet of having a history of tendentious reporting. On July 22, the authorities detained Sheremet and three other ORT employees who were attempting to film an unguarded section of the Belarusian-Lithuanian border. After paying a fine, the four were released. On July 26, they were again detained, this time charged with illegally attempting to cross the border. The Government accused ORT managers of engineering a provocation. In August the authorities detained four other ORT employees for attempting to film in the same area as Sheremet. Following confessions by two of the men (which both later said were coerced) and Russian Government intervention, all but Sheremet were released by September 5. The authorities released Sheremet in October, after Russian President Yeltsin exerted pressure on Lukashenko. Sheremet and Zavadsky went on trial in December and were still on trial at year’s end.
In March the Government expelled a foreign diplomat who had been monitoring a public protest for allegedly taking part in an antigovernment rally.
The observance of academic freedom is mixed. University students and academics are free to pursue virtually any course of study or research. However, once a course of study is chosen, state university students must follow a prescribed curriculum.
Throughout the year, the Government harassed students engaged in antigovernment activities, such as demonstrations. There were reports that state universities expelled students for their political activities. The pro-presidential, government-funded youth organization, the Belarusian Patriotic Union of Youth, served as the regime’s watchdog against antigovernment activities. Moreover, there are reports that members of the BPUY received preferential treatment at state schools.
In April the Council of Ministers issued a decree effective as of the 1997-98 academic year requiring students who receive free university education from the State to accept jobs assigned by the Government upon graduation.
The Government continued to close schools that teach in the Belarusian language. According to the Belarusian League for Human Rights, there are now less than half the number of schools teaching in the Belarusian language than in 1991. In August a Grodno court ruled that although Belarusian and Russian languages are granted equal status as state languages by the Constitution, the school system is not obligated to provide education in the Belarusian language.
In August the Government agreed to allow the Belarusian
Humanities Lyceum (the only Belarusian language high school in Minsk) to
continue occupying its current premise for another year, following protests
by parents angry at a plan by the presidential administration to take over
the building.
The Government respects constitutional provisions providing for freedom of speech and the press. The media routinely do probing and thorough investigative reporting. Foreign newspapers and magazines are widely available. All newsprint, printing, and distribution facilities are now private companies. There are four major national Estonian language and three Russian language dailies, in addition to important weeklies. In a widely reported case, a well-known journalist was tried and convicted for insulting the spouse of a prominent politician in a newspaper interview and received a fine. The sentence was upheld by all levels of the judiciary.
State broadcast media, including one nationwide television channel, continue to receive large subsidies, and the State has assured that these subsidies will continue. There are several major independent television and radio stations. Several Russian language programs, mostly Estonian produced, are broadcast over state and private television channels. Russian state television and Ostankino programs are widely available via cable.
Academic freedom is respected.
The Constitution and the 1991 press law provide for freedom of the press; however, although the independent press was increasingly active, the Government constrained some press freedoms. According to journalists, security and law enforcement authorities attempted to intimidate the press through public comments and private admonitions. In May security forces beat journalists who were reporting on a rally of Gamsakhordia supporters (see Section 2.b.). There is no law providing public access to government information, and government officials are sometimes unwilling to answer press inquiries. Journalists lack effective legal protection, and this circumstance hinders investigative journalism.
Some 200 independent newspapers operate, and the press increasingly serves as a check on government, frequently criticizing the performance of high-level officials. However, no independent newspapers have a national audience, although several have emerged as serious and reputable sources of information. The Government finances and controls two newspapers and a radio and television network, which have a national audience and reflect official viewpoints. Most persons continue to get their news from television. The Government’s monopoly on broadcast news was broken when Rustavi-2, the Tbilisi member station of the fledgling independent television network, TNG, successfully resisted government attempts to shut it down. The Ministry of Communications revoked the station’s license in 1996 and awarded its broadcast channel to a company with strong ties to government officials. Rustavi-2 eventually appealed the revocation to the Supreme Court, which directed the lower court to reverse its decision and restore Rustavi-2’s broadcast license. The station resumed broadcasting in May and again displayed independence in news and programming.
The Government’s near monopoly on printing and distribution was broken with the establishment of privately owned alternatives. However, distribution remained a vulnerable area. The mayor of Kutaisi, Temur Shashiashvili, issued a decree to establish a single distributor in Kutaisi for newspapers and magazines, reportedly with the intent of limiting press criticism. Independent newspapers and television stations continued to be harassed by state tax authorities.
Academic freedom is widely respected.
The information presented in the report is more or less accurate. Below are some items which would be helpful to strengthen the text, providing more detail and clarity.
There are two draft laws pending approval in the parliament—the Law on Freedom of Information and the Law on Broadcasting. The outcome of the debate on these draft laws will be important in the future of journalists’ access to public information held by the state organs, and of their liability for releasing information about public officials which is now, in most cases, forbidden. The law is also expected to clarify the process of registration of TV and radio stations, and distribution of frequencies.
The report does not mention that there are 31 independent TV stations working in Georgia.
It might also be helpful to note that the degree of censorship in the regions depends on local administrations, which range from highly authoritarian (Batumi) to authoritarian (Kutaisi) to mainly open (Tbilisi), with varying degrees in between. The censorship is mostly self-imposed. Although news does not have to be reviewed before airing by any officials, it can bring pressure after the fact if a government figure is criticized.
About ten commercial FM radio stations emerged in the last two years in Georgia. They mostly have entertainment programs, and only few of them cover news. These stations mainly operate in Tbilisi, covering the Capital city and adjacent regions. Some of them even do not cover Tbilisi entirely.
Doug Campbell
Internews Georgia
The Constitution and the 1991 Press Law provide for freedom of the press, and the Government generally tolerates independent media. The Government continued to own and control most printing and distribution facilities and to subsidize periodicals, including many that were supposedly independent. The potential for government control and instances of official pressure resulted in widespread media self-censorship. The key subject considered to be “off limits” by journalists was personal criticism of the President and government officials.
In February the editor and staff of the weekly newspaper Economika Segodnya were questioned at length about an article in the newspaper that quoted an opposition leader criticizing the President. The newspaper had previously been cited by the government mass media agency for not including in its masthead all the information required by government regulation. The newspaper was warned that one more citation would result in the suspension of its business license.
There were two cases in northern Kazakhstan in which local administration censorship offices accused independent stations of violating local laws after they had aired programs that were objectionable to the Government. No further action was taken against either station.
Despite such official heavy-handedness, the press was generally permitted to criticize government decisions. Official corruption remained an acceptable topic for critical coverage. Many journalists criticize the Parliament as being without power and subject to the President’s control.
In January the press reported that the Government closed the independent daily newspaper, Karavan Blitz, which was very critical of the Prime Minister. However, the newspaper’s owner announced that he had ceased publication because the newspaper was not profitable. The owner also publishes the weekly tabloid-style Caravan, the most popular newspaper in the country, which routinely criticizes the Government and offers political views and commentary.
Most political opposition groups freely issued their own publications. There are several independent newspapers that reflect opposition views, particularly Delovaya Nedelya (Business Week) and Twenty-first Century. However, in June the Government closed the Communist Party’s national newspaper when it applied for reregistration, alleging that the newspaper had violated the Constitution by calling for the violent overthrow of the social system. It is unclear whether this charge was accurate. The newspaper responded that it had only discussed the reform of the social system and attempted to sue the National Agency on Press and Mass Media for about $26,667 (2,000,000 tenge). However, the courts refused to hear the case and the newspaper remains closed.
There are 31 independent radio and television stations. Eleven of these are in Almaty. In November 1996, there were 57 independent stations in the country; eight were in Almaty. Of the 26 stations that went out of business in 1997, half closed due to the frequencies auctions. The other 13 went bankrupt before the auctions began or joined forces with other broadcasting companies to compete in the auctions. There are only two government-owned combined radio and television companies. However, they represent five channels and are the only stations that can broadcast nationwide. Regional governments own several frequencies; however, independent broadcasters have arranged with local administrations to use the majority of these. The Government controls nearly all broadcasting transmission facilities. About 40 percent of newspapers are government-owned. All daily newspapers are government-run. There are also a large number of newspapers that are produced by government ministries, for example, Kazakhstan Science, published by the Ministry of Science. However, many newspapers receive a government subsidy. All Kazakh language newspapers receive a government subsidy, although most would call themselves independents. Therefore, including newspapers that receive subsidies, about 80 percent of newspapers are government-run. Each major population center has at least one independent weekly newspaper. There are seven major independent newspapers in Almaty. An Association of Independent Electronic Media of Central Asia (ANESMI) exists, but it is fractured and weak.
An auction of television and radio frequencies convinced many human rights activists and some media outlets that the Government sought to harass and even eliminate independent media. The Government denied any intent to limit free speech and asserted that it was acting in its own fiscal interest. The Government had announced the tender for frequencies in Almaty in December 1996. Prior to the frequencies auction, there was no formal process for obtaining a frequency. Some stations simply assumed ownership at no cost; others obtained frequencies through the good offices of local officials, often accomplished through bribery. The majority of independent media outlets in Almaty participated in the auction. Some joined with other broadcasting companies or commercial backers to raise the necessary capital. Others protested the auction vehemently, but still participated. The results of the Almaty frequencies auction were announced in January. Two television/radio companies and one radio company (which carried the Voice of America) lost the auction and were removed from the airwaves. The two television/radio companies that lost the auction were the most vocal critics of the Government in the media. However, there was no change in the total number of independent Almaty television stations. Two new stations replaced the two losers. In radio there was a net increase of one independent broadcaster. Some of the new stations established as a result of the frequencies auction offer political news and commentary and criticism of the Government; others do not.
The situation was very different in the subsequent frequencies auction for the provinces (oblasts). Few broadcasters could meet the minimum bid required by the Government. In addition the Government announced that no frequencies would be awarded in areas in which there were not at least two bidders. In April the Government awarded three television and five radio frequencies in seven cities. Many of the losing stations claimed that the winners received frequencies because they promised to be loyal to the Government. At the end of the auction, ANEMSI declared that no real independent media existed in Kazakhstan. In fact only a small number of stations lost their frequencies in the auctions, although many were forced to find commercial backers and to relinquish financial control over their stations. Although many of the commercial backers have ties or connections to the Government, there are few reports of broadcasters being pressured by commercial backers in order to please the Government. One station reported that it was pressured by one of its owners not to broadcast information about an unauthorized demonstration in order to ensure that the local administration did not close the station and cut off advertising revenues. Commercial backers are more likely to pressure stations to air more high-profit programs such as westerns, rather than low-profit offerings of news and political commentary. The total number of independent stations operating decreased, however, many stations ceased broadcasting before the auctions began. Others elected not to participate in the auctions and closed voluntarily.
Overall, the tender process was flawed. The rules were complex and sometimes contradictory. Although the tender award committee was eventually expanded to include a mass media representative, the process was not transparent. According to government officials, the minimum bid was based on a cost formulation used for frequencies in Australia. Bids varied based on the power of the station and other technical parameters, but the commonly used figure for Almaty was $126,000. This approach priced many independents out of the market, especially in the provinces where advertising revenue is low. The Government also did not require its television and radio companies to compete in the auction and reserved the highest quality and the most desirable frequencies for them.
In March ANESMI filed an inquiry with the Prosecutor General regarding the legality of the frequencies auctions. The Prosecutor’s Office ruled that the law upon which the auction was based was unconstitutional. The Prosecutor asked the Prime Minister for a response to the ruling, but none was given. The Prosecutor’s Office did not directly address the legality of the auctions themselves. There was no further action taken on the ANESMI protest. According to the law, if the Government does not respond to a prosecutor’s ruling, the Prosecutor General’s office can take the Government to court. In this case, the Prosecutor General’s officer took no further action. None of the losing stations went to court to protest the loss of their frequencies. Most believed that it was too expensive and not worthwhile to try. There is no procedure in the law to appeal the loss of a tender.
Some members of the independent media alleged that the January murder of a foreign expert providing technical assistance to the independent media during the debate over the frequencies auctions was part of a political campaign against the independent media. However, the murderers were arrested and convicted in June and evidence presented during the trial confirmed that the motive for the murder was robbery.
The Constitution provides for the protection of the dignity of the President and the law against insulting the President and other officials remained on the books. Although no cases of insulting the President or other officials were reported in the press, the Kazakhstan International Bureau on Human Rights alleged that there were numerous cases of individuals arrested for insulting local officials. The bureau reported that in September, three youths in Uralsk, Ainur Kurmanov, Sergey Kolokolov, and Vasya Nikolayev, were arrested and charged under five separate statutes of the new Criminal Code for writing antipresidential graffiti on the walls of a building in May. Conviction could carry a prison sentence of 3 to 8 years. The youths originally were arrested and charged with the minor offense of hooliganism (a crime that no longer exists under the Criminal Code passed in June), and released. However, in accordance with a June decree reiterating the importance of protecting the honor and dignity of the President, the Government ordered Uralsk authorities to arrest the youths and take them into custody. The case remains open. Two of the youths are in custody; one is not being held because he is a minor. The case was scheduled to go to trial on December 22, however, one of the defendants, Ainur Kurmanov, who was on a 23-day hunger strike to protest his imprisonment, was too ill to stand trial. The court postponed the trial until January 19, 1998. Prominent opposition leaders, including Yuriy Vinkov of the Labor Movement, a Communist parliamentary deputy from Uralsk, Valeriy Zemliyanov, and the cochairmen of the Azamat political movement, are supporting the youths.
Several laws control advertising in the mass media. One law restricts alcohol and tobacco advertising on television, as well as “pornography” and “violence” during prime viewing hours. Another law restricts the amount of advertising in newspapers to 20 percent of the total material in each issue. The Minister of Justice and the Minister of Press and Mass Media have interpreted this law as restricting paid articles, but not commercial advertisements.
The Government respects academic freedom.
The report is dated. Just after its publication, it has become possible for several non-governmental radio and TV stations to broadcast nationally. The Internews web page would have the most up-to-date information on this.
I strongly object to the assumption in the report that news is low-profit. In fact, private broadcasters, as have radios, have found the revenue from news advertising time quite significant.
On the tender award committee, although there are some representatives of governmental media, there is no non-governmental “media representative.” I think the writer meant, perhaps, the woman from Internews, N. Muhamejanova. She does represent private interests, but she is not (anymore) from the media.
The only glaring omission of the report is the 50/50 Kazakh-Russian language broadcasting law, which went into effect last July or August. This law has been a significant concern of broadcasters, because Kazakh-language programs (and ads) attract far fewer viewers than those in Russian. The law becomes an economic threat, as well as an imposition on what the broadcasters have to broadcast.
Elizabeth Schuster
Counterpart Consortium
The 1997 State Department Human Rights Report for Kazakhstan provides an even-handed summary of events on the media landscape in 1997. However, its analysis of the signal event in the life of the electronic media during the year—a frequency re-licensing process for private broadcasters—does not provide details about some of the most critical issues associated with the Government’s actions. In fact, the means by which the re-licensing process was carried out ended up completely belying its good intentions and had the result, unintended or otherwise, of silencing almost all independent broadcasting in the country.
Several issues that had an important effect on the ability of independent media to practice their trade in Kazakhstan were not noted in the Report, presumably because of lack of space. On May 1 (a holiday), on the basis of an unpublished decree of the previous year, the government without warning turned off the signals of all private broadcasters using VHF frequencies. Overnight, this move reduced to zero many stations’ investment in transmitting equipment and audience recognition on existing channels, and it essentially instantly closed some stations—especially those that had not yet been able to receive a new license on a UHF frequency.
Secondly, during the course of the year, local governments pressured remaining private stations not to broadcast material critical of the government, threatening, if their wishes were not observed, to implement an older law requiring that half of air time be in the Kazakh language. By optimistic estimates no more than a quarter of the population speaks Kazakh and most Kazakh-speakers live in rural regions which private broadcasters do not reach, so there is practically no Kazakh-language programming available, and it is uneconomical to produce it. Minister of Information Sarsenbaev, at a conference on broadcast law in April 1998 in Akmola (Kazakhstan’s new capital, since renamed Astana), announced that the language restriction applies only to a station’s own production, not all air time—if true, for private broadcasters, this announcement is an immensely helpful restatement of the law. The pattern of draconian measures like this one which are later “clarified”—after a great deal of damage has been done—helps to explain why many believe the government’s missteps were more than spectacular ineptitude and constituted a calculated campaign to weaken the institution of private media in Kazakhstan.
Of the 26 private broadcasters that closed in the course of the year (40 percent of all private stations in the country), the Report notes that “half closed due to the frequencies auctions.” In fact, without the frequency licensing process none would have closed. The process for acquiring a frequency license was, unfortunately, not an auction, because many of the frequencies announced as being available were not awarded—even when an applicant met all the formal application requirements, including the minimum bid. In many cases the Commission simply refused to provide any reason. Not until the April 1998 conference were the license award criteria even made public, and then only in the vaguest terms.
In addition, several stations found, to their surprise, that the frequency on which they had been broadcasting was not included in the list for which applicants could submit documents in their city. After the private station was turned off, in at least one case, the local government has begun to use that frequency—throwing into doubt the argument that those frequencies were withdrawn from circulation due to undesired “interference,” as the Ministry of Communications asserted.
The Report’s statement that “only a small number of stations lost their frequencies” is true in that only a quarter of all TV stations actually lost their license. However, a further fifteen percent had no choice but to essentially become contractors for local governments, thus de facto losing such independence as they had. Some of them applied for a license but were rejected for spurious reasons.
The late-1996 re-licensing provision was implemented by decree and without a legislative basis that would authorize such a fundamental change in federal policy. (Truth to tell, there is no legislative basis for many government actions in the NIS, due as much to a paucity of legal institutions as to any attempt by the executive branch to circumvent the legislative.) Partly on this basis, stations that were not awarded licenses filed several court cases in November challenging the licensing process on constitutional grounds.
The Report notes that “[p]rior to the frequencies auction, there was no formal process for obtaining a frequency.” In fact, there was a frequency application and award process by which dozens of frequencies had been awarded and, periodically, renewed. (One of the government’s arguments when the first of the above-mentioned court cases was heard, in March 1998, was that the station which brought the case had lost its claim on its frequency because it did not properly renew its license in 1996.) The December 1996 re-licensing provision effectively nullified existing licenses that had been issued by the previous licensing authority, and on the basis of which companies had hired and trained staff, had invested resources in creating a technical base, and had undertaken obligations, such as selling advertising time for periods of up to a year in advance.
The Report notes that “the tender award committee was eventually expanded to include a mass media representative,” but throughout 1997 the Commission included only twelve government functionaries whose identity was never made public. In 1998, the Prime Minister appointed one non-governmental representative, the Deputy Director of Internews, an international NGO providing technical assistance to broadcasters. The Commission’s procedures for meeting have made her participation difficult. At the April 1998 conference, Minister of Information Sarsenbaev committed to expanding the Commission’s membership to better take account of public opinion.
The Report glosses over the fact that, country-wide, with one exception, every station which was considered outspoken in criticism of the government was not awarded a license in the tender process. The exception, KTK, is a powerful station in the capital that was founded with assistance from the Communist Party. That station is now one of the best alternative sources of information for the capital’s population. But it retains access to well-placed government officials, access about which the rest of the country’s private broadcasters can only dream. Symptomatic of its power is the fact that it is the only private station in the country that was allowed to keep its license on a VHF channel. In 1998, a long-standing rumor was confirmed when the Commission provided preliminary approval to a document that would furnish no-cost VHF frequency licenses to KTK in most major cities of the country. If KTK is co-opted in such a manner, it is difficult to imagine they will aggressively pursue news stories that might be unpleasant for those in power.
The Report correctly notes that the government, in implementing the re-licensing process, “denied any intent to limit free speech and asserted that it was acting in its own fiscal interest.” However, the number of licenses (and correspondingly the amount of cash raised for the federal treasury) that the Commission failed to award by leaving frequencies empty even when there was an applicant was greater than the number that they did award.
The Report correctly notes that many broadcasters, particularly outside of the capital, had great difficulty meeting the required minimum license fee. The Ministry of Communications official responsible for drawing up the technical aspects of the process confirmed at the April 1998 conference that, indeed, the Kazakhstan license fee structure was based on the Australian model. But the volume of Kazakhstan’s entire 1996 market for advertising (the chief source of revenue for private broadcasters) was about three percent of just the turnover of Australia’s single largest ad agency, and a fraction of a percent of that of Australia in general. Minister Sarsenbaev at the April 1998 conference asserted that the Commission was considering lowering the rates outside of the two capital cities, but the damage has already been done; the proportion of Kazakhstan’s twenty major cities without any private television broadcasters rose during 1997 from 10 to 43 percent. Thus, many cities’ lone source of non-governmental news was silenced. And neighboring Uzbekistan leapfrogged over Kazakhstan in the number of private broadcasters.
During the March 1998 round of license applications, the number of arguably unjust Commission actions declined significantly from the 1997 rounds, though it was not reduced to nil. However, major flaws remain in some aspects of the licensing process itself, as well as its application. Due in part to the criticism to which the government has been subject in documents such as the State Department Human Rights Report, as well as the work of Internews, a USAID grantee, the government indicated, at the April 1998 conference, a willingness to re-examine a number of these aspects. The ball is now in the government’s court to show that Kazakhstan’s constitutionally-protected freedom of speech is other than good intentions.
Anonymous Statement from an Organization Defending Freedom of the Press
On December 6, President Akayev vetoed a new draft media law, which would have further restricted journalistic freedom. His action leaves in effect a 1992 law which calls for freedom of the press and mass media but also provides guidelines proscribing publication of certain information. The law supports the right of journalists to obtain information, to publish without prior restraint, and to protect sources. However, it also contains provisions that the Government used to restrict press freedom. For example the law prohibits publication of material that advocates war, violence, or intolerance toward ethnic or religious groups; desecration of national norms, ethics, and symbols, such as the national seal, anthem, or flag; publication of pornography; and publication of “false information.” The law also states that the press should not violate the privacy, honor, or dignity of individuals. It requires all media to register with the Ministry of Justice and to await the Ministry’s approval before beginning to operate. The Ministry has ruled that foreign entities are not entitled to register. An amendment to the Constitution makes the dignity of presidents or former presidents inviolable.
Criminal libel is not a private action. As a criminal charge, such an action must have, at the least, the consent of a prosecutor’s office. At times other government agencies appear to have been involved in specific cases of criminal libel.
There are approximately 40 to 50 independent newspapers and magazines, including some with local, not national, standing. There are also a few hours daily of independent television broadcasting and some independent radio stations. However, state television and radio and government newspapers receive government subsidies, which permit the Government to influence media coverage. Additionally, the state printing house, Uchlan, is the only place to print newspapers. Thus, the Government could be in a position to control or pressure even the independent newspapers.
Two print journalists were barred from practicing their profession in 1995 libel convictions. One has returned to journalism (although the conviction for criminal libel has not been overturned), but the other has not. The conviction of two campaign workers and one journalist for criminal defamation of the President during the election campaign of 1995 emphasized the limits to freedom of speech. These persons were given 1-year suspended sentences in 1996, then released (see Section l.d.). On September 29, the journalist Yrysbek Omurzakov was sentenced to 30 months in a penal colony for criminal libel against a prominent industrialist. At year’s end, this case remained under appeal. Also on September 29, the President’s press secretary announced eight new cases of criminal libel against an opposition newspaper Asaba. An Osh newspaper was also threatened with court action in late September for “insulting the honor and dignity” of the police in alleged cases of drug corruption.
A vaguely worded new Criminal Code was passed by Parliament and signed by President Akayev in June. It will take effect on January 1, 1998 and could potentially be used to prosecute journalists for criticizing government officials. The existing code was used this year to convict journalists of criminal libel. In November President Akayev publicly requested his legal department to draft an amendment to the Criminal Code transferring libel and slander to the Civil Code.
The editor of an opposition newspaper has arranged on five separate occasions to rent space in Bishkek to reestablish his newspaper, which had been suspended by government action. On each occasion, the deal fell through after potential landlords received warnings by telephone from government officials.
Officials from the MNB (the KGB successor organization) have repeatedly contacted editors to discourage “unacceptable” types of coverage. Although the Government’s treatment of journalists occasionally has been heavyhanded, journalistic standards and ethics remain uneven. For example it is not uncommon for newspaper articles to be inaccurate or to contain potentially libelous language. However, the number of criminal libel cases increased this year.
In January and February, one newspaper, Kattama, was closed for allegedly publishing pornography. Although regulations on pornography are not clear, this case does not appear to have been politically motivated. Another newspaper, Kriminal, was closed after one edition for alleged violations of the mass media law. The edition had been extremely critical of the President and his wife, the Prime Minister, and other government officials. In May the journalists Zamira Sydykova and A. Alyanchikov were sentenced to 18 months in prison for criminal libel against a prominent industrialist. In August Sydykova was released after her appeal reduced the sentence to the time she had already served. She is continuing her journalist activities. Two other journalists were fined and forbidden to practice journalism; they were subsequently acquitted on appeal.
Academic freedom is respected.
The Constitutional Law provides for freedom of speech and the press, and the Government generally respects this right in practice. The 1991 Press Law prohibits censorship of the press or other mass media. Most newspapers and magazines are privately owned. New publications continued to appear, but economic difficulties forced others to close. Newspapers in both Latvian and Russian published a wide range of criticism and political viewpoints.
A large number of independent television and radio outlets broadcast in both Russian and Latvian, and the number of people receiving satellite television broadcasts continued to increase.
The Law on Radio and Television contains a number of restrictive provisions regulating the content and language of broadcasts. No more than 30 percent of private broadcasts may be in languages other than Latvian; in prime time, 40 percent of television broadcasts must be of Latvian and 80 percent of European origin. However, these provisions are not always implemented. In addition foreign investment may not exceed 20 percent of the capital in electronic media organizations.
There are no restrictions on academic freedom.
The Constitution provides for freedom of speech and of the press. The Government generally respects these rights in practice.
Prior restraint over either print or broadcast media and restrictions on disclosure are prohibited, unless the Government determines that national security is involved) The Parliament adopted its long-awaited media law in July, after a draft public information law failed to pass in November 1995 because most independent news publications and many prominent journalists protested that it was too restrictive. The new media law introduced an element of self-regulation but postponed a difficult decision on television advertising. Under the new law, the media are to create a special ethics commission and ombudsman to check libel cases and other complaints. The final version of the law allows reporting on the private lives of officials as long as the information affects the welfare of the people.
The independent print media has flourished since independence, including a wide range of economic newspapers and specialty magazines. Officially there are over 2,000 newspapers and magazines registered, but only a fraction are still published.
Many investigative journalists covering organized crime were harassed by and received death threats from organized “crime families.”
State radio and five private radio stations broadcast throughout the country. In addition to state television, which is in the process of being transformed into public television, three private television stations also broadcast regular programming nationwide. Additional radio and television stations, including a Polish-language radio station in the Vilnius region, are found throughout the country in population centers.
There are no restrictions on academic freedom.
The Constitution and the law provide for freedom of speech and press, although with some restrictions. The Government does not abridge freedom of speech, and the print media express a wide variety of political views and commentary. National and city governments subsidize a number of newspapers, but political parties and professional organizations, including trade unions, also publish newspapers.
Although the number of media outlets that are not owned and operated publicly by the State or a political party is growing, most of these “independent” media are still in the service of a politician or political movement, commercial interest, or foreign country, and secure large subsidies from these sources. There are several independent radio stations, including one that broadcasts religious programs. Two independent television stations broadcast in the Chisinau area. The larger independent outlet in Chisinau maintains a news staff and conducts a number of public interest programs. The Government owns and operates a television channel that covers the whole country and several of the major radio stations. A number of regional centers, including Gagauzia, operate local television and radio stations. In contrast, there is only one private radio station, which broadcasts religious programs outside of Chisinau.
Restrictions on press freedoms forbidding “disputing or defaming the State and the people” and political parties that “militate” against the country’s sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity remain in the Constitution. They lack implementing legislation and are not invoked. The press law includes an article that allows public figures to sue for defamation without distinguishing between their private and public persons and leads the journalists to practice some degree of self-censorship. In cases where suits have been filed against journalists and media organs, the plaintiffs almost always lose.
The Government does not restrict foreign publications. However, foreign publications do not circulate widely since they are very expensive by local standards. Russian newspapers are available, however, and some publish a special Moldovan weekly supplement. Moldova receives television and radio broadcasts from Romania and Russia. Cable subscribers receive Cable News Network , Euro-News, British Broadcasting System Prime, National Broadcasting Company Super Channel, Pro-TV (Romania) and a number of other news and entertainment networks, but there are only approximately 600 customers.
Of the two major newspapers in Transnistria, one is controlled by the regional authorities and the other by the Tiraspol city government. There is also an independent newspaper in the northern Transnistrian city of Ribnitsa. The latter two criticize the regime from time to time. Other print media in Transnistria do not have large circulations and appear only on a weekly or monthly basis. Nonetheless, some of them also criticize local authorities. Among them is a new newspaper that is reportedly financed and largely written by the local “Ministry of State Security.” The one independent television station is trying to enlarge its broadcast radius. Resistance to this move comes from the local official Transnistrian television, which up until now has enjoyed a virtual monopoly of advertising revenues. Most Moldovan newspapers do not circulate in Transnistria. Circulation of all print media in Transnistria is hampered by the closed nature of society and the local economic crisis, which is more severe than in the rest of Moldova.
The Government respects academic freedom.
[In this section, the report refers to the separatist
region of Transnistria. It is the Transdniester region or Trandniestria,
for the Dniester (not Nister) River flows through it. — Chrystyna Lapychak,
Committee to Protect Journalists]