Post-Soviet Media Law & Policy Newsletter
Issue 36 Benjamin
N. Cardozo School of Law April 20, 1997
Commentary
The State Department’s Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices generally do a good job of covering press freedom issues—particularly
issues of importance to the Committee to Protect Journalists, such as the
prevalence of violent attacks on reporters, and the practice of state censorship.
Of course the State Department has considerably more resources than CPJ,
employing at least one embassy staff person and one Democracy, Human Rights
and Labor Bureau officer to examine the media situation in any given country.
Unevenness in the reporting appears to be explained by inadequate staffing
rather than political considerations, although occasionally some bias possibly
related to U.S. foreign policy exigencies does shine through. Some sections,
such as those on Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Slovakia, and Ukraine show that
embassy report writers follow media issues quite closely, including arcane
press laws moving through several drafts in local parliaments.
Human rights organizations such as Human Rights Watch
began vigorous critiques of the State Department’s annual reports a dozen
years ago, which led to vastly improved coverage but also to the employment
of a sometimes misleading technique whereby the most severe criticism of
a country is ascribed to local press freedom groups, or international human
rights monitors, rather than to the U.S. government itself. This enables
the State Department to show that it has covered a given issue, but occasionally
amounts to pandering to local or international critics in countries where
the U.S. has geopolitical interests.
For example, the country report for Russia liberally
cites CPJ almost to the point of embarrassment, but avoids citing any Russian
government agencies as responsible for abuses. Specifically, the
report notes that President Yeltsin dismissed Oleg Poptsov, former head
of Russian public television (the report incorrectly calls ORT “state”
television although it is partially privately owned). It states that “human
rights organizations asserted” the action was in response to critical coverage
of the war in Chechnya. There was no need to attribute the analysis to
such NGOs, however. President Yeltsin was on the record himself as saying
that Poptsov had focused too much on “gloomy” issues, and had portrayed
events “in black hues.”
By the same token, regarding Croatia, while the report
acknowledged that “the Government controls all national broadcasting,”
it left it to “opposition figures and human rights activists” to “uniformly
charge that state-owned media outlets have a strong progovernment bias.”
The name of President Franjo Tudjman, a figure courted by the U.S. in the
Dayton Accords process, never appears in the report, although he
personally, as well as his close political associates, were responsible
for most of the attacks initiated on independent press like Feral Tribune,
who had printed a satirical caricature of Tudjman.
These reports are contrasted with the section on Belarus,
where President Lukashenka is repeatedly mentioned as responsible for repressive
measures.
The Bosnia-Herzegovina country report also contains
serious omissions, a sign of either insufficient staff reporting or political
concerns. No mention at all is made of the most severe problem in the region—the
barriers to foreign reporters who have attempted to work in the region,
and the obstacles to the freedom of movement by local journalists who try
to cross inter-ethnic boundaries (see CPJ’s report). Particularly outstanding
is the failure to note, in a somewhat celebratory passage on the Western-sponsored
Open Broadcasting Network, that broadcasts began a mere week before the
elections and did not reach rural areas where they were ostensibly most
needed.
In response to the criticism of the Washington Post,
CPJ, and other international observers of the U.S. government’s human rights
reporting and actions in Bosnia-Herzegovina, American staffing of the OSCE-sponsored
Media Experts Commission was vastly improved early in 1997. We therefore
hope that a far fuller and more objective report will be available next
year.
Overall, the reports have a disturbing tendency to emphasis
the self-censorship of journalists, sometimes to the exclusion of covering
state-sponsored attacks. While a few country reports note cases of criminal
and civil libel suits, generally this very widespread and insidious phenomenon,
which actually sparks self-censorship and causes some media outlets to
close, is neglected by the State Department. For example in Russia, many
of the approximately 3,000 libel suits filed within the past two years
involved government officials claiming “insult.”
Except for the report on Uzbekistan, generally the reports
fail to explain that all of the post-Soviet countries to some degree retain
a system of “founders” required to register newspapers. In some cases,
such as in the case of Sovetskaya Kalmykia and other provincial papers
in Russia, a good deal of local government manipulation can be involved
in obtaining and keeping the license to publish under the system of “founders”—which
entails more rights and interference in content than the equivalent system
of, say, incorporators or owners in the U.S.
While the State Department cannot be expected to report
overall media developments in a document that is supposed to cover human
rights abuses, perhaps more mention should be made of the role of the U.S.
government (sometimes controversial, as in Belarus), through USAID media
programs, along with private foundations, notably those sponsored by George
Soros, in aiding the press in the region. Also important to stress is the
continuing necessity of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and Voice of America,
as well as BBC, Deutche Welle and other foreign broadcasters, in the region.
Because these stations are still so vital for objective news, governments
target their stringers and local affiliates quite frequently, a phenomenon
noted in the reports of some countries although it could be said
to be true for all in the region. For example, the report on Romania neglected
to note the pre-election pressure placed on local re-broadcasters of BBC
programming in Romania.
Two country reports—Kazakstan and Tajikistan—stand out
as inadequate given the severe government restraints on press freedom.
In Kazakstan, again, concerns about the pressures placed on Radio/TV M
and other outlets are placed in the mouths of local observers rather than
stated categorically, although the results of the January broadcast frequency
tender (post-publication) vividly illustrated that more than “government
fiscal concerns” were at play when three of the most critical stations
who did bid in the auction were not awarded licenses. While the attempt
to close Komsomolskaya Pravda was noted, no mention was noted of the closure
of another paper, Dozhivyom do ponedel’nika,
when the editor was threatened with various lawsuits. Kazakstan had the
dubious distinction of being the only country in the region under review
to hold a journalist (Sergei Vasilyev, correspondent for Argument i Fakty)
in jail for a prolonged length of time for criminal libel charges. CPJ
has been informed of other such cases although it was unable to document
them fully, and certainly these have had a chilling effect on press freedom.
The State Department diminishes the importance of such cases by claiming
that Nina Sidorovov was “found guilty of insulting officials of the court,
insulting government officials, and assault and battery of court representatives.”
It is not certain that the charges of violent behavior are supported, and
the context is not explained.
The murder of ORT bureau chief Vladimir Nikulin is noted
briefly in the section on Tajikistan, however no mention is made of the
failure of the Tajikistan government to prosecute at least 29 other murders
of journalists since 1992, although two murders of civilians by pro-government
forces were prosecuted in 1996. CPJ would expect the U.S. government to
apply pressure regarding these investigations by reporting on their progress
each year. Also, the Tajikistan section makes no mention of the harassment
of Russian and other foreign reporters in Tajikistan, (censorship, confiscation
of tapes, warnings) especially in conflict zones. The importance of Russian
and foreign broadcasting is also not noted.
While it is important to note the appearance of some
semi-independent journals, the report should have also covered the continued
banning of publications forced into exile like Charogi ruz, published in
Moscow. Other comments as follows:
Armenia—While the Ministry of Information may have disbanded, censorship
functions have merely been assumed by other government bodies. In the period
preceding and following the September elections, for example, there were
incidents when Russian broadcasting was stopped (not reported) and Armenian
journalists were beaten (underreported). A more balanced picture may have
been provided by noting that the Dashnak party-affiliated media outlets
also included the formerly largest-circulation daily.
Azerbaijan—Like the old joke from the Soviet era about Russians
having freedom to demonstrate on Red Square (it’s just that they’re jailed
AFTERWARDS for doing it), one statement is misleading: “Newspapers were
able to publish articles opposing Azerbaijan’s relations with Russia and
Iran, the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process, conflicts within the President’s
political party, and government failures in economic reform.” These subjects,
as well as even more controversial matters such as the assassination attempt
on President Heidar Aliyev, are the same ones that led either to blank
pages or libel suits.
Georgia—While the Supreme Court did rule in favor of the beleaguered
independent tv station Rustavi-2, in a system dominated by President Shevardnaze
and his cronies, this was insufficient to actually bring the station back
on the air. At year’s end the station was still struggling with red tape
at the Ministry of Communications—which should have been reported—and the
station is still not on the air as of April 15, 1997.
Kyrgyzstan—The claim that, “No overt efforts to interfere with the
press were observed in 1996” seems inappropriate. President Akayev did
“rotate” the heads of several leading editors of state-sponsored newspapers,
prevented a state-owned paper from privatizing, tacitly sanctioned lawsuits
against journalists by government officials, and installed a Communist-era
ideology official in charge of information.
Russia—The problems of a few provincial papers (incidentally, all
cribbed from CPJ reports) are illustrated, but a more comprehensive analysis
of the state of the press outside of Moscow and St. Petersburg is needed.
Most importantly, many regional papers rely solely on subsidies from the
local administration, which can invoke political considerations.
Since CPJ was quoted so extensively, we would hope for
a more accurate rendering of our reports, especially when texts have been
supplied to State Department officers. One serious mistake was made in
citing CPJ’s material: CPJ does not claim, as the State Department wrote,
that all 10 documented cases of journalists’ killings in Chechnya since
1994 were attributed to assassins. In fact, some of these deaths occurred
in crossfire. A number of misquotes were contained in the report on the
Chaikova murder (see CPJ’s report for corrections). Valeriya Novodvorskaya
is a leader of Democratic Union, not Democratic Choice.
Ukraine—The report does not make sufficiently clear whether, “establish
and operate their own transmission facilities,” means actual private ownership
of the means of broadcasting, or leasing. This is an important factor.
The report neglects any mention of the well-documented
violence against Russian reporters covering the controversies in the Crimea.
Croatia—The statement, “government intimidation induces self-censorship”
seems unfair to an extremely vigorous and outspoken journalists’ corps
in Zagreb that continues to engage in satirical commentary despite frequent
lawsuits for libel and other intrusive government measures.
Romania—The offensive Penal Code amendments also included penalties
for “dissemination of false information abroad” or “threatening the integrity
of the republic.”
Slovakia—The section should make clear—an omission made by CPJ as
well—that when in December, a controversial anti-subversion law was returned
to the parliament by the President, the parliament postponed debate on
the law indefinitely.
The “opposition daily” guilt of libel should have been
named—Sme—especially because another attack on Sme is noted in the next
paragraph. And although the newspaper is appealing charges, it should have
been stated that if it loses, the financial costs leveled by the cabinet
members (who have demanded increasing fines depending on rank) will be
enough to shut the newspaper down.
Catherine J. Fitzpatrick
Committee to Protect Journalists
The 1996 U.S. State Department Human
Rights Reports should be considered a valuable baseline tool for examining
the NIS countries’ media situations. In all the reports, however, insufficient
emphasis was given to the fact that (except in Turkmenistan) economic difficulties
play at least as large a part in limiting media freedom as do political
ones. Russia, for instance, is (to the best of my knowledge) the only country
which has recognized this as a problem and has even implemented legislation
providing a two-year tax holiday to the media, to encourage its development.
And while Russia’s main central channels, ORT and RTR (both government-controlled),
retain overwhelming audience popularity throughout the NIS, the reports
fail to mention that in most cities in and out of Russia, local non-governmental
TV stations now have ratings as high as, and in many cases significantly
higher than, those of national state-run TV channels.
Armenia—The report gives too little attention to the 17 or so non-governmental
broadcasters working throughout the country, many of whom provide valuable
local news to their viewers.
Azerbaijan and Georgia—The reports are well-balanced and reflect
the existence of non-governmental TV and radio stations.
Belarus—While completely failing to mention the work of the dozen
or so non-governmental TV stations (all outside the capital), the report
accurately describes President Lukashenko’s ongoing campaign of harassment
of independent media.
Kazakstan—The report reflects the increasing power of the non-governmental
TV stations, but unfortunately errs in reporting that “the Government controls
all broadcasting facilities.” In fact, a number of TV and radio stations
own their own transmitters.
Kyrgyzstan- The report provides accurate information about non-governmental
radio and TV but does not note that unlike much of the rest of the NIS,
a number of larger regional cities in Kyrgyzstan still lack non-governmental
broadcasters, less because of any government policy and more because of
the difficult economic situation (media are not, for the most part, economically
self-sustainable).
Moldova—The report completely fails to note the existence of over
a dozen local non-governmental TV stations (a handful of which have united
together into a commercial network). Due in part to economic difficulties,
though, they are for the most part relatively weak and produce little news.
Russia—The report is quite accurate but on occasion applies with
a broad brush criticisms which would more appropriately be directed only
at state-run media. For instance, discussion of the election coverage
failed to note that hundreds of independent TV stations in Russia’s regional
cities carried a great deal of unbiased reporting about the election campaigns,
both national and, later in the fall, local. Most of the remainder of the
report’s discussion addresses violations of press freedom in the print
sphere, even as well over half (some say as much as 80%) of Russians consider
television to be their prime news source.
The accent given to violations of press freedom in Chechnya
is quite well-founded.
Tajikistan—On the whole accurate, although unfortunately while the
report mentioned the conference on media law in August, it failed to note
that as a result, in December, Tajikistan became one of the first NIS republics
to pass a law on broadcasting which provides for a relatively normal licensing
procedure for non-governmental TV stations. Under the law a number of previously
illegally-broadcasting stations have already begun the registration process.
I was also surprised to read that the government controls
newsprint supplies; this is a common fallacy of Western reporting about
the NIS media situation. Anyone who wants to bring newsprint into Tajikistan
is free to do so. Insofar as the government “controls” newsprint, it doles
it out free or at a subsidized rate to publications which tow the government
line — its right, in principle.
In a similar manner, the government controls broadcasting
facilities only to the extent that most private media lack the resources
to buy their own. Where they have the resources (as in Khojent, in the
north, and in a number of other cities around the country), a private station
has every right to buy, set up, and operate a TV transmitter privately.
Turkmenistan—The report quite accurately reflects the total lack
of non-governmental media in the country.
Ukraine—The report signally fails to recognize the work of dozens
of non-governmental TV stations around the country which are increasingly
a major source of objective local news. In its discussion of Vikna, the
report fails to note that while the news program managed to preserve its
time slot through 1996, its contract was not renewed for 1997 and it is
now off the air. And unfortunately the report gives too little attention
to the very important National Council. The Council is supposed to regulate
TV broadcasting licenses in an autonomous manner, but in fact has conducted
its work in a way which calls into question its political and financial
independence from economic and political leaders.
Uzbekistan—The report recognizes the existence of a non-governmental
TV station in Samarkand, yet it also states that “Television broadcasting
is state controlled.” While it would be an exaggeration to say that the
country’s private TV stations are able to assert a great deal of independence,
the report failed to note the existence of over 20 non-governmental TV
stations, many of which produce news programs that are, if not critical
of the government, at least independent. Some are even critical, and a
number of these stations own their own transmitters.
Eric S. Johnson
Internews Moscow