Post-Soviet Media Law & Policy Newsletter
Issue 35 Benjamin
N. Cardozo School of Law February 27, 1997
The Politics of Religious Media in Russia
Religious media in Russia have been one of the dynamically
developing sectors of Russian mass media of the late 90s.
Appearance and sources. Religious media
are often supposed to have arisen as a result of “perestroika” and democratic
processes here in Russia. In reality, it was long before this that
a number of audiences received occasional periodicals published by the
official institutions of the Church, although they were not used widely.
The spiritual needs of another part of the population were being addressed
by samizdat and by radio transmissions from western religious organizations.
The two streams of religious information had different natures from the
very beginning: the official media were published under the oppression
of the censorship, at the same time samizdat (printed media, published
and copied by people) and western radio, being part of the whole media
system, were free from totalitarian politics and communist ideology.
Therefore, as soon as it became available due to social
and political changes, the number of religious media outlets and the size
of their audiences began to grow. The first substantial portion of
religious media products was devoted to the 1000th anniversary of Christianity
in Russia in 1989.
The most important factors in the development of this
sphere have been:
• the new political and legislative structure of the state, protected
by the Constitution of Russian Federation, the Law on Freedom of Religion,
the Law on Mass Media.
• the strengthening of different Churches as the institutions of
civil society, and their growing influence on the spiritual life of the
population. According to the sociological public opinion research
religious leaders occupy the leading positions among the social “figures
of trust.”
• a need in society for a spiritual and ideological message which
reflects the interests of the entire nation and which can help in the rebuilding
of national ethical codes.
• the demand of the population for religious information relating
to their spiritual needs. We can determine clearly a growing level
of religious interest in the population: more than half of the population
consider themselves to be believers (the real state of the religiosity
of the population is, of course, another question).
“Closed systems” in a multi-religious world.
After the first seven years of development it is possible to speak about
the first bricks in the system of religious mass communications, which
in general terms can be described as a number of “closed systems.”
The communicative relationships here are locked in a circle of rules and
codes of particular audience groups (world religious groupings, congregations,
local parishes, etc.). Media institutions serve these religious groups
and their interests and have practically have no interaction outside of
them. One can find examples mostly within print media—the contents
of the great number of the local parish papers have no connections to everyday
problems of the believers, and most of the papers include reprinted or
styled texts, old-fashioned and practically undecoded especially by the
young generation. In other words they do not solve one of the most
important media features today—the need to extend “outward,” cross space,
time, population and culture; to break national, religious, political,
and local borders of information. “To be open to all”—this modern
media tendency has no sense if we discuss religious papers, magazines,
and programs in Russia today.
Religious radio broadcasting especially on national
channels is more varied, as it reaches a sizable audience and brings broadcasters
into the arena of a multi-religious world. For example, research
on Christian radio broadcasting carried out in 1995 ruined the stereotype
of the expansion of Orthodoxy in electronic media (only 20% of Christian
programs transmitted by national channels were indicated as Orthodox with
regard to their denominational profile; 10% as Protestant, mostly Adventist
and Baptist, and 70% of Christian broadcasters did not affiliate their
production with any particular Christian denomination and preferred a nondenominational
profile of programming). The main reason for this is the freedom
of information achieved during recent years (it is interesting to note
that many Orthodox officials object to the access of Protestant and other
religious minorities to broadcasting, and have been lobbying for an amendment
to the Law on Religion excluding their presence on television and radio.
The sort of programs mentioned above represent a typical
“platform” religious production style, made in the traditional Christian
catechetical method. An intervention of the secular would be connected
with political sphere. A good example of how real market forces and
political interests are intruding into religious communications can be
found during the last president election campaign.
Several religious papers and radio programs were judged
to be free of political affiliations, if there were any. The monitoring
period of included May – June, 1996, when the election campaign was legitimized.
Audiences. The aim of media intervention
is, of course, audiences. Different political forces realize that
religious leaders (as well as media) can have a significant influence on
the political behavior of a part of the electorate.
Much is still not known about the audiences for religious
media. Through studying target groups for religious media production,
there is no difficulty in imagining how wide audiences can be—practicing
believers, those interested in religion, disabled people and those living
in distant regions (mostly radio listeners). As for the demographic
characteristics, according to the results of the telephone poll of one
local Christian radio channel (March – April, 1996); its audience tended
to be old, poor, female more often than male, and better educated than
the average listener (so-called “reading audiences”). They are, incidentally,
the most active electorate.
Stereotypes. The most interesting was the
picture of political involvements in the Orthodox media, the religion of
the great majority. Though the official position of the Russian Church
is supposed to be above the political struggle, Church authorities were
biased towards the ruling political forces. And vice versa: the Russian
political establishment became regular participants of Church ceremonies.
The president and the prime-minister could be seen in Moscow cathedrals
at televised Easter night services. Patriarch Alexy II has become
a figure of the Russian political elite, being on the list of the one hundred
most influential people in Russian politics. There already appeared
an ideological visual stereotype of Russian national identity, in which
Orthodox churches and crosses are necessary background elements.
This stereotype was frequently exploited during the parliamentary and presidential
election campaigns.
In this situation ideology “works” through such symbolic
codes (photo of Patriarch and president, president with churches) and Orthodox
Church authorities simply do not need to express their political position
openly. Practically all pro-president media (television and print)
explored this stereotype. The sympathies of Patriarch Alexy II towards
Yeltsin were obvious, though he did not articulate his position.
However, closer scrutiny raises questions concerning
divisions between various non-Orthodox groups. There are large regions
which are overwhelmingly Muslim and Buddhist—the Tatar Republic, Buriatiya,
Kalmykiya—and some territories in the North have pagan traditions.
Two poles. It is not correct to state that
the Orthodox Church and its leaders have singular political view.
Middle and low-level clergy have there own political attitudes. During
the presidential election campaign-96 the spectrum of political attachments
of different groups in the religious media repeated that of the secular
media. Mechanically the religious media of that period could be divided
into two political groups: pro-president and communist.
The openly pro-president position was expressed by the
Church-Social Christian Radio, which broadcasts on the medium wave in Moscow
and the Moscow region. Several priest-anchors called for their listeners
to vote for Yeltsin: “he is not the worst of the evils” (this argument
was typical of the liberal press at the time). They, as well as the
laymen and the members of the Orthodoxy intellectual elite added their
voices to the aggressive propaganda for the ruling party, which claimed
to possess the truth, and did control the message.
Another part of the clergy expressed its support for
the left communist forces. In religious media this mood was concentrated
in the communist newspaper “Sovetskaya Rossiya” and its religious supplement
“The Orthodox Rus’.” The four issues of this supplement published
during the presidential election campaign were devoted to the promotion
of the communist leader, and also could be described as media propaganda.
Of course its forms were cruder, as during times of war or national crisis:
posters and leaflets with the prayer “God, save Russia from Yeltsin.”
At the same time, the most exploited stereotypes were just the same: Russian
national identity, patriotism, and the same visual picture—communist leader
Ziuganov at the front of the picture with church domes in the background.
The Mitropolit Gedeon of Stavropol (the “red zone” of Russia) and the Bishop
Tikchon (the head of Patriarchate Publishers) represented church authorities
in the camp of left forces and were rather active as communicators.
The ideology that they propagated would surely confuse followers of communism,
not only because in mass they are atheists, but also because these Orthodox
priests are fanatics of the State-and-Church symphony and of the Orthodox
state ideology.
One episode in the presidential election campaign was
not commented on by Russian media, but was nevertheless rather significant
in the sense of political engagements: between the first and the second
rounds of elections Patriarch Alexy II met the communist leader.
The next day their portraits appeared in the communist press together with
Ziuganov’s address to all the Orthodox people.
The third force? Some political sympathies
within the religious media could be checked on their attitudes towards
so-called “third forces.” It is a significant point that none of
them supported the democratic opposition and at the same time there were
those close to the extreme rights.
The weekly “Radonez,” however, one of the most well-known
papers in Orthodox circles, didn’t openly show its political affiliations
towards any of the candidates; but represented patriotic forces closely
identified with national fanaticism. This weekly sympathizes with
the right’s monarchist ideas, which are very popular in church circles.
The paper “Rus’ Derzavnaya” promoted for “the third
patriotic forces.”
According to its contents, the weekly “Russkiy Vestnik”
is supposed to be a chauvinistic publication, focused on the Orthodoxy
and patriotic slogans. In the political spectrum it is an extreme
right, essentially monarchist, force. This weekly promoted Alexander
Lebed as “the best candidate who expresses the interests of the Russian
nation.”
There were also a number of religious media without
any political attachments, or whose attachments were latent. Most
of them belonged to the religious minorities. For example, “The International
Jewish Gazette” did not express its political sympathies because of ethnic
prejudices. “We are simply afraid to destroy the political career
of a candidate,” writes one of the editorials a during the campaign period.
The sympathies of this publication were surely with Javlinsky, a candidate
from the democratic opposition. Before the second stage of the elections
they endorsed Yeltsin.
Left and right radicalism. Political affiliations
of the religious media during the period of the presidential election campaign
demonstrated the tendency to be engaged in left and right radical political
movements. Vaclav Havel, in his essay “Living in Truth,” pointed
to a similar situation concerning “the power of ideologies, systems, apparat,
bureaucracy, artificial languages and political slogans.” We must
resist, he wrote, those “blood brothers of fanaticism and the wellspring
of totalitarian thought.”
The current situation. After the election battles
religious media concentrated on their internal problems, strengthening
institutions, and developing production. The situation within Christian
media now has moved to the phases of “the two-party system,” where you
can clearly observe the leaders of the two opposite media groups, or church
“parties” (not to be confused with political parties with a religious affiliation—”Christians
of Russia,” “Russian Christian Union,” etc.—who are rather weak and still
do not control any media). Both groups use radio and press as the
means of communication: “Sophia”—a Christian Church-Social Radio Channel
and newspaper, and “Radonez”—a weekly and a radio channel as well.
Both groups now are formulating their ideological doctrines, dominant attitudes
toward the state, different political forces, other congregations and religious
groups. In broad terms they could be considered “liberal” and “conservative”
currents in the Russian Orthodox Church.
In one of the December issues of “The Christian Church-Social
Vestnik” (the “liberals”) there was an analytical essay on the problems
concerning church-and-state relations. There, for the first time,
I read that religious (Christian) communications challenged the false values
of political games, and that their responsibility is to bring into politics
a measure of truth.
Maria Loukina, Ph.D.
Faculty of Journalism
Moscow State University