Post-Soviet Media Law & Policy Newsletter


Issue 30-31     Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law     May 30, 1996 

Commentaries

1.  Media Bias May Backfire: The View from Abroad

    Observing the unfolding campaign, western commentators note a continuing improvement in Yeltsin’s style. While the results of recent opinion polls are confusing (in some, Yeltsin has caught up with, and even overtaken Zyuganov, while others show the communist retaining his lead) Yeltsin’s public confidence is growing. Following the Chechen leader Dudayev’s death in early May the US News and World Report noted that Yeltsin was «back in the fray. Energized by the political battle, the 65-year-old Russian President has recaptured the glow he had in 1991.» The item quoted Izvestia commentator Otto Laptis’ view that Yeltsin «has finally gotten a grip on his image, All in all, he’s running a pretty good campaign.»
    Yeltsin may be improving his image, but concerns about the poor performance of the Russian media continue in western coverage of the campaign. The British Guardian, observing the tight control exercised by Yeltsin’s allies over the majority of the Russian media, argued on May 18 that such control could be counter-productive to the aim of getting the president re-elected. «By backing Boris Yeltsin openly, as it is now, the Russian media risk losing in three ways: turning the underdog-loving electorate towards the communists, discrediting the democratic values it claims to be defending, and inciting the communists to similar manipulation if they win.» The author goes on to note, «the history of elections in Russia and other former communist countries has shown that saturation coverage of the party of power, and slurs on rivals, are more capable of losing votes than winning them.»
    This writer, like many others who have observed the Russian media during this campaign, sympathizes with the reasons for the blatant bias — the dependence of media organizations, especially at the regional level, on state-controlled resources; and the sincere belief of many journalists that a Zyuganov victory will mean a return to Soviet-style practices of censorship. Furthermore, «there is no comparison between the anodyne, patronizing collage of lies, denunciations and eulogies which Russians were fed in Soviet times and the media’s pro-Yeltsin line now, accompanied as it is by much anguish and cynicism from the reluctant Yeltsin supporters and by continued criticism of the government, particularly over the war in Chechnya. The media is still incomparably more diverse, bold and entertaining than it was ten years ago.» But that, the author concludes, «only makes its pro-Kremlin line more dispiriting.»
    A different angle on the same theme was taken by the Los Angeles Times on May 14, reporting on Anatoly Sobchak’s St. Petersburg gubernatorial campaign. Here too, it was reported, a professed democrat and reformer had taken to manipulating the media, with St. Petersburg TV becoming as pro-Sobchak as the all-Russian channels were pro-Yeltsin. «By doing these things,» the LA Times suggested, «he hurts his reputation as a democrat and the cause of democracy as a whole.»
    The Sunday Times of May 19 noted that Zyuganov is more visible in the western media than in most of the Russian media. Anti-Zyuganov scare stories and black propaganda are common. In an effort to explain the bias, the article quotes an unnamed Russian commentator: «Yeltsin is a bastard. I hate the guy but I’ll vote for him, because I know where I am with him. We can go back to attacking the regime after he gets in again.»
    But Yeltsin may not get in again, and the communists, so badly treated by the media in this campaign, may argue with some justification that they owe no favors to the reformers, or their media, in the years ahead. If such is the outcome of the election, the journalists who have lent themselves so uncritically to Yeltsin in this campaign will bear at least some of the responsibility.

Brian McNair



2.  How Much for Equal Opportunity?     We asked Vladimir Lepekhin, consultant to the State Duma Public Relations Committee, to comment on this issue.
    With TV advertising, the candidates enjoy equal chances only in regard to free air time, distributed equally among the candidates after the drawing of lots. Since this kind of campaign advertising is known to have little impact on voters, stronger and more well-off candidates are reluctant to appear on the free air time. Fee-based air time is to be of the same duration as free TV advertising but not every candidate can afford it. The promotional impact of fee-based TV advertising is very low, and, considering its quality, hardly cost-effective.
    According to research conducted by the I.Q. Agency, news programs and certain other informational programs have the greatest impact but most candidates have little or no access to them. The content of such programs and, accordingly, total air time favoring one candidate or other, is in no way controlled by the Central Election Commission. The Agency reported that, in the past parliamentary election, financial controls carried out by monitoring the movement of campaign funds could trace only half of TV advertising-related expenditures.
    The situation is likely to repeat itself in the presidential race. The lion’s share of the money earmarked for television advertising will most likely bypass the campaign funds to bribe program managers and news anchors. One should remember also that the central television channel is a single corporation with an established corporate decision-making procedure, a financial chain-of-command, etc. Today, Central Television’s main concern is how to preserve the standing it attained over the past decade, and Boris Yeltsin is the only candidate who can fill the bill. Therefore, one shouldn’t be surprised that Central Television’s corporate effort would be to support Yeltsin, with no great expense incurred by Yeltsin’s campaign managers. This can be achieved via news programs, indirect advertising, regular prime-time access for the President and his supporters, etc.
    Central Television is Yeltsin’s basic and decisive resource, and to which the incumbent president may owe his re-election.



3.  Defining Political Advertisements

    During this final month before the election you will be faced with the uneasy and unfamiliar task of producing political advertising for both print and electronic media. At first glance, the provisions issued by the Central Election Commission have set out the appropriate recommendations, and these are enough to launch the campaign. However, political advertising in Russia today remains a faulty and untested medium.
    For one thing, there is a real need to define precisely what political advertising is. Strictly speaking, political advertising occurs only when some political party or movement hires an advertising agency to execute a radio or television spot and to weigh selection and strategy options. All other cases in this country are merely old-style propaganda. Some people pay no attention to it. Others, for want of anything better, listen to it and let it guide their decision. Ultimately though, as in the bad old days, such agitprop exists only for itself and doesn’t really alter voters’ behavior.
    On the other hand, there is no disputing that political advertising is effective. US voters, for example, over the last forty years have favored a TV spot over other methods of advertising, with three quarters of the campaign funds in any race paying for TV advertising. The situation here, however, is significantly different, at least for now. The aggressive advertising of pyramid schemes by various financial companies has probably undermined public confidence in TV advertising as such. Public opinion research shows that only 5.4 percent of males and 7.8 percent of females trust TV advertising today. This attitude is undoubtedly due to the excessive complexity of advertising copy, which repels rather than attracts. What immediately comes to mind is the TV spot of the husband-and-wife team of cows urging people to vote for Ivan Rybkin.
    In other words, today, a TV spot does not do the trick. Considering that the total time clearance for fee-based political advertising in the present campaign amounts to a maximum of 17.5 minutes for each of eleven presidential candidates, and given the current rate for a TV spot amounts to $10,000 per 30 seconds with 35 runs, producing such a spot is not worth it. The only remaining alternative is to rely on TV debates and candidate appearances until June 14. Underrated during the previous election, such campaign techniques will probably become the main format for 24 hours of free and 8 hours of fee-based political advertising on TV for all candidates. It is unfortunate that debates, one of the best ways in the west of finding out about a candidate, are avoided by many Russian politicians.

Igor Krylov
Professor Moscow State Institute of International Relations
Expert of Russia’s Advertising Agencies Association



4.  Persisting in Independence

    I must say, our mass information systems are now experiencing the greatest pressures of the election period, and are in a state of real disorder as a result. Many different circumstances contribute to this. Perhaps the most important of these is the serious lack of experience with election campaigns both on the part of the mass media as well as the campaign representatives. Apparently our domestic democracy is too young, the principles of a civil society have yet to take root, and there is as yet no hope for self-regulation. Therefore the old way still reigns: the proprietary attitude, the striving to force, at any cost, the supposedly free press to sing a different tune, tactics which both sides are using with equal success.
    Many of you must be experiencing this yourselves. You know that should the media get too persistent in its independence, the local government could easily delay its subsidies, or refuse to allow access to distribution channels. In some places executive organs are trying to become co-founders of key mass media outlets as a way to keep them «in line». What kind of independent reporting can we count on in this event?
    Such crude forms of influencing the local press (and not only the press) are employed alongside more refined ones. The threat of canceling the elections not only heats up social passions, it gives the impression that everything is permitted in election polemics, putting the entire process of democratization in doubt. It plants the seeds of distrust and skepticism among journalists, and aggravates the already dark mood of the people, who, sociologists tell us, are already beset by predominantly troubled expectations.
    It may be too much to demand civilized elections from a society at the crossroads, a society struggling to regain its balance. This fundamental expression of democracy, however, will never just appear on its own. We have to start somewhere, but where? As a first step, we should get rid of some of the myths and bad habits we have, like those which claim that 45% of the people believe the only path to economic recovery is through seizure of property from «New Russians», or the use of rude insults to describe a political opponent, or the old belief that all is fair in war.
    The way we, respected colleagues, resolve these problems for ourselves may well determine the future of Russia.

Vladimir Smirnov, Ph. D.



5.  The President’s Information Disputes Tribunal

    Judging by the information filed by the Choice of the Regions correspondent in Kemerovo, the rapidly degrading relations between the local authorities and the mass media clearly violate the requirements of Russia’s electoral law. The violators are primarily members of local administrations and affiliated offices. Under Art.38 of the Federal Law on Election of the President of the Russian Federation, the local governor is directly prohibited from exerting pressure of any kind on newspaper editors in order to sway their editorial stance. Calling editors on the carpet, lobbying them and threatening them with economic levers is clearly prohibited.
    An important distinction of this campaign is that, unlike the previous campaigns, newspapers act under the general provisions which envisage fee-based advertising of campaigns. It follows that the electoral law is infringed in letter and spirit only when a state-owned newspaper which advertises one candidate, refuses to run advertisements of another candidate. Under Art.41 of the Federal Act, the editorial board of a government medium is obliged to publish all advertising copy on the same terms as it publishes the copy of its own preferred candidate, and it should do so with «no delays».
    The provisions for the electronic media are different. The procedure for broadcast time access for candidates on state-run TV channels is defined by special regulation No. 861716 of the Central Election Commission dated April 5, 1996 and printed in the «Rossiyskaya Gazeta» April 17, 1996. The same issue of the newspaper carries the list of TV companies subject to these regulations and Kuzbas TV is one of them.
    As we can see, the whole electoral campaign is strictly regulated and, should there be infringement of the law, any participant in the electoral process has the right of appeal to the appropriate election commission, to the Juridical Chamber for Information Disputes, or to a court of law. In fact since the parliamentary elections of last year, legal instructions have been improved.
    Among other provisions, a court of law may, under Art.40 Para.8 of the Administrative Code of the Russian Federation, impose a fine in the amount of 10 to 50 minimal wages on a media organ or an individual journalist who violates the campaign regulations. To conclude, let’s not forget an old Russian saying: «Fight, and you shall gain legal status».

Victor Monakhov
President’s Chamber on Information Disputes



OMRI Reports on the Presidential Election

    The selections here are from the issues of May 22 and June 3. All issues of the Special Reports are archived on the OMRI WWW server, at: http://www.omri.cz/Publications/SR/SR.html.

YABOV: SOME CANDIDATES ARE BREAKING THE RULES.

    According to Central Electoral Commission Chairman Nikolai Ryabov, some presidential candidates are violating the rules on campaign agitation, RTR reported on 18 May. In particular, he cited materials supporting Gennadii Zyuganov that incited “social hatred,” such as an April interview in Zavtra during which Zyuganov called television “our main enemy today.” By contrast, Ryabov said the same day that the extensive media coverage being given to President Yeltsin is fair because the law does not make clear “where the actions of the president end” and those of the candidate begin, Reuters reported. Appearing before the State Duma on 17 May, Ryabov said the anti-Communist glossy newspaper Ne dai bog (God forbid), which has appeared in voters’ mailboxes across Russia, also violates the rules, ITAR-TASS reported. For instance, the name of the paper’s founder (uchreditel) does not appear anywhere on the publication. — Laura Belin

CANDIDATES DISCUSS ATTITUDES TOWARD TV.

    The 18 May edition of Nezavisimaya gazeta asked presidential candidates what actions they would take concerning television if elected. Gennadii Zyuganov said he hoped the “best representatives of the creative intelligentsia” could help alleviate the “unrestrained and sometimes cynical transition from romantic television to commercial television.” Vladimir Zhirinovsky, who in the past has threatened to shut down NTV and other independent media,claimed that he would not take a single program off the air if elected. Instead, he would show “more honest” programs to compete against slanderous ones: “word against word, truth against lies.” Aleksandr Lebed said Channel 1 should remain in state hands (49% of the shares in the Channel 1 broadcaster ORT were sold to private firms under a controversial November 1994 presidential decree). Mikhail Gorbachev, whose policy of glasnost changed Soviet television forever, said television should reflect genuine freedom of speech, unlike its current position as the “political theater of one actor, where stormy applause leading to an ovation is constantly heard.” President Yeltsin—who is currently the main beneficiary of biased television coverage—quite understandably declined to answer the paper’s questions, Nezavisimaya gazeta observed. — Laura Belin

YELTSIN ADS MOST VISIBLE IN MOSCOW AND ON TV.

    President Yeltsin is by far the most visible presidential candidate in Moscow. He has plastered the city with billboards that show him shaking hands with Moscow Mayor Yurii Luzkhov, who is also running for re-election on 16 June. The two tower over the Kremlin churches with the slogan “Muscovites have already made their choice in 96.” On television, Yeltsin is running an upbeat paid advertisement for a rock concert that is touring the country as part of the “Vote or You Lose” campaign aimed at mobilizing young people. The ad shows a number of pop groups with the slogan “Yeltsin—Our President.” The incumbent is also playing the anti-communist card with a number of testimonials from average people describing how difficult life was under the old regime. One paid advertisement on NTV gives the autobiography of a worker from Yaroslavl who claims that if the communists come back, people will be forced to use rationing coupons as in the late 1980s and early 1990s, while the comrades will eat in well-stocked cafeterias. The advertisement ends with Yeltsin’s signature under the words “I believe, I love, I hope.” In a newspaper advertisement printed in the 21 May issue of Izvestiya, a woman describes how it was impossible to earn more than the average salary by working hard during the Brezhnev era. Yeltsin used a similar format in his 21 May free airtime slot on ORT. Well-known figures, such as Forward, Russia! leader Boris Fedorov, described the dire consequences of a communist return to power, but Yeltsin did not appear once in the 10 minute presentation. — Robert Orttung in Moscow.

ZYUGANOV’S CAMPAIGN TO SUE NEWSPAPER.

    Gennadii Zyuganov’s campaign headquarters are planning to sue Komsomolskaya pravda for publishing a document on 15 May that it claimed was a secret Communist Party (KPRF) economic program, according to the 17 May Kommersant-Daily. Zyuganov has vehemently denied that his party has a secret extremist agenda, and KPRF figures have denounced the publication as a “falsehood.” The anti-communist press has played up rumors of a secret program ever since KPRF Duma member Valentin Varennikov claimed on 16 March that the party has an unpublished “maximum plan.” Varennikov meant to defend Zyuganov against charges leveled by more orthodox communists that he was too moderate. Kommersant-Daily also reported that a controversial interview with Zyuganov published in the Far East newspaper Amurskaya pravda contained inaccuracies. Zyuganov was quoted as saying that he would not take orders from “odious” members of the KPRF leadership including Varennikov, the party’s deputy chairman Valentin Kuptsov, or Albert Makashov, one of the leaders of the opposition to Yeltsin during October 1993 street clashes. Apparently someone at Amurskaya pravda added the word “odious” to the text, Kommersant-Daily reported. — Laura Belin

OFFICIAL MEDIA ACCUSED OF “BRAINWASHING” RUSSIANS.

    Figures in Yeltsin’s circle are using the media to carry out “unprecedented” levels of “brainwashing,” according to the latest edition of the nationalist and pro-Zyuganov newspaper Zavtra (no. 20). The paper said that when covering Yeltsin’s campaign appearances, news programs use photo montage or commentary to distort the true nature of the events: “Not even one-hundredth of what actually takes place during Yeltsin’s tours of the regions finds its way to the television screen.” Curiously, for a newspaper that frequently attributes Russia’s ills to “foreign secret services,” Zavtra complained that “in any Western society,” hidden advertisements such as those in favor of Yeltsin on the Channel 1 broadcaster ORT “would long ago have become a matter of legal proceedings.” — Laura Belin

ORT MANAGERS DISCUSS CHANNEL 1 COVERAGE.

    The Moscow-based media are generally biased toward President Yeltsin, probably none more so than the Channel 1 broadcaster ORT, informally known as “the president’s television.” In an interview published in Argumenty i fakty (no. 16), ORT’s General Director Sergei Blagovolin admitted that he personally supports the current authorities but said opposition figures receive airtime on his network as well. When asked why Yeltsin is given so much more exposure on news programs than other candidates, Blagovolin saidthe president leads an “active political life.” The most powerful figure at ORT is arguably Logovaz head Boris Berezovskii, who is technically the deputy chairman of ORT’s board of directors but who is considered to have more influence over the network’s policy than the chairman of the board, Aleksandr Yakovlev. In an interview published in the most recent Moskovskie novosti, Berezovskii admitted that his investment in ORT was not entirely “altruistic” and the network’s election coverage was not “neutral” but said ORT supports a “compromise” between different political forces in Russia. Berezovskii was one of the 13 entrepreneurs who signed an appeal in late April for a political compromise to avert civil war. He is also a primary financial backer of Nezavisimaya gazeta and the popular magazine Ogonek. — Laura Belin

YELTSIN CAMPAIGN ISSUES LAVISH PHOTO ALBUM.

    President Boris Yeltsin's campaign organizers have issued a lavish, color 100-page picture book documenting the incumbent's achievements during his five years in office. The book opens with Yeltsin taking his oath of office and a large crowd of supporters. The pictures show him striking a decisive pose and meeting with ordinary people far from Moscow in his shirtsleeves. He visits a store where the “shelves are no longer empty” and shakes hands with world leaders like U.S. President Bill Clinton, whom he advises “everything is not so simple, Bill.” He meets with priests and admits that “we underestimated the importance of constant dialogue with our citizens.” He speaks to the British elite in an ornately decorated hall and shares a belly laugh with German Chancellor Helmut Kohl. The zestful president returns a serve in a quick game of tennis and hangs out with his family in his green-wallpapered office. The book does not include the usual publication information, leaving the reader to wonder how much it cost, how many copies were printed, and with whose help.—Robert Orttung

PRAVDA BLASTS DEFENSE MINISTRY FOR FORCING SERVICEMEN TO VOTE FOR YELTSIN.

    The pro-communist newspaper Pravda accused the Russian Defense Ministry on 4 June of implementing a special program, “Organizing presidential elections in the armed forces,” to force servicemen to vote for President Yeltsin. Pravda claimed that all military commanders are expected to endorse Yeltsin. The program also allegedly instructs the military to set up special agitation and information centers, actively using newspapers, TV and radio, to inform the servicemen daily about Yeltsin's activities and speeches, and urge them to vote for him. The soldiers will also be encouraged to write letters home asking their relatives to vote for Yeltsin. — Constantine Dmitriev

OLSHANSKII CLAIMS MEDIA IS BOOSTING LEBED

    . . . Dmitrii Olshanskii, director of the Center for Strategic Analysis and Prognosis, argued on 3 June that the media are deliberately giving enormous exposure to Aleksandr Lebed. He noted that in recent days, Lebed has appeared on television far more often than Grigorii Yavlinskii (for instance, Lebed was interviewed live on the 2 June edition of NTV's "Itogi"). In Olshanskii's view, the media's orientation is driven by the belief that Yavlinskii will only take votes away from President Yeltsin on 16 June, whereas Lebed could draw support away from Zyuganov. — Laura Belin in Moscow