This paper was originally presented by Mikhail Gulyaev at Post-Soviet Media in Transition, An East-West Symposium at Stirling Media Research Institute, University of Glasgow, February 2-4, 1996.
In 1992, the Russian media entered a new post-glasnost period. By that time, the political and historical sensationalism sponsored by Mikhail Gorbachev, who personally managed the media, became irrelevant. With time Russian media diversified, commodified and achieved new level of power in a symbolic sense particularly. The Russian media are not called more an more often “the fourth estate” both by politicians and journalists. Paradoxically, however, the more power the Russian media achieve, the less freedom they have.
The primary function of mass media in Russia in not yet to attract and hold large audiences for advertisers as in the West, although a strong tendency toward this exists, but to attract and hold large audiences for individual politicians who either already control or strive to control the mass media.
Mediazation of Russian culture is highly appreciated by power holders and those who long to acquire political power. The politicians, the new economic elite and the journalists are mesmerized by the tremendous power they believe the mass media have. Three competing groups look at the Russian media as an important tool to dominate the public discourse.
My paper will examine some of the methods these three groups employ to achieve and exercise control over the Russian media and I will show how their efforts may curtail freedom of speech in Russia.
Suppression of free word in tsarist and Soviet Russia led to creation of a certain Russian phenomenon—ritualization of the word and image. In the 1980s reading samizdat publications and listening to foreign radio stations was a political action (Lisyutkina). Under Gorbechev political action became routine, and the media, although still controlled by the state, were proclaimed an independent institution, a fourth estate.
Under Yelstin, when political action of the masses became almost meaningless, the media supposedly received full freedom. At the same time, most Russians still tended to trust their media and ritualized at least some of the opinions in the media. Reading a tabloid newspaper like Moskovsky Komsomolets, watching a popular televisions show like Tema, keeping a glossy Russian-language Cosmopolitan on the coffee—table and Penthouse under the bed have become Russian rituals.
Although the structure of the Russian media has significantly changed in the last four years, the state retains the controlling stake in most of the press, radio and television. The largest national television companies ORT (Public Russian Television) and RTR (Russian television) along with all national radio channels are controlled by the federal government. While most of the Moscow-based press is nominally independent almost all regional press still answer to local administrations. The same is true for local television stations including Russia’s largest local television companies MTK (Moscow Television Company) and St. Petersburg Television. The government still owns Russia’s largest news agency ITAR-TASS and largely controls the second largest agency RIA-Novosti.
Corporate control over the media is growing fast. Several media empires are in the making in Russia. One of Russia’s largest banks, Mostbank, invested into Moscow’s leading quality daily Segodnya, the third largest television company NTV, and a popular Moscow radio station Ekho Moskvy. Moscow-based entertainment television station TV-6 earlier partly owned by American TBS is currently controlled by a group of Russian commercial companies including Logovaz, LUKoil, and Mosbiznesbank with Moscow city government also owning a stake. Kommersant Publishing House which puts out several economic and entertainment publications including Russia’s leading business newspaper Kommersant-daily is linked to another major Russian bank, Stolichny. The Dutch-controlled Independent Media company publishes Russian versions of Cosmopolitan, Playboy, Good Housekeeping, a weekly Kapital and The Moscow Times English-language daily.
It is almost impossible to find a media outlet in Russia that currently makes a profit. Most of the media cannot survive without some type of outside financial support. According to the Russian Media Institute, almost 90 percent of the Russian media receive government subsides (Dzyaloshinskii). Commercial media also cannot yet become profitable. Corporate-controlled media are subsidized even more that the state-controlled media.
Not all media are entitled to receive government subsidies, but those that receive them are approved by a special council consisting of eight people selected by the State Committee on the Press. The council annually reviews applications from about 800 newspapers and 400 magazines; about 500 applications are approved (Chugayev). In January 1996 the government designed a new system of supplying cash to the loyal press. The Russian government approved a system of so—called guaranteed state orders for the media. The media will be openly paid for positive reporting on government activities.
After four years of Yelstin’s rule, economic control remains a major basis for the government interference in media affairs. Before 1991 almost all Soviet national newspapers and other periodicals were published at Pravda Publishers, the biggest and most powerful printing house in Russia. Today almost all Moscow-based newspapers are still dependent on Pravda Publishers, renamed in 1992 as Pressa Publishers. Most print media also rely on the newsprint supplied by government enterprises, and depend on the government-controlled distribution system. As a result of frequent price increases since January 1992 when radical economic reform began, the circulation of major national newspapers fell significantly, and they turned into purely Moscow publications. While an average Soviet citizen in the early 1980s subscribed to a least two newspapers, one local and one national, in 1995 few Russian citizens could afford a Moscow-based daily, and had to rely on less expensive local periodicals controlled by the local government providing subsides.
Both state-controlled and independent television and radio stations are as much dependent on government as the press. They all have to pay up to two thirds of their budget to cover transmission and energy costs. Transmission facilities are controlled solely by the Russian Ministry of Communications while the electricity supply is controlled by the Untied Energy Systems company, both state monopolies that regularly raise their prices in the absence of competition.
The press and especially television are popular among Russian bankers who work on creation media empires. But most bankers are not yet looking for money profit in their investments. If Segodnya daily ever carries ads, they are for its owner, Mostbank and affiliated companies. for Russian media barons political gain is more important than commercial returns.
While government and corporate economic control over the Russian media is growing, it remains only a basis for even more significant political control. Some Russian media survive both without government or corporate subsidy—political. The status of the commercially independent media depends on their loyalty to the president, government, particular bureaucrats or politicians, and the corporate interest.
Political control over mass media in Russia occurs in the forms of prior restraint, pre- and post-publication pressure and censorship; government and corporate secrecy; state and corporate advertising and lying.
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has been going through a political and economic crisis that allowed authorities to exert pressure on the media, introduce censorship and other restraints every time bureaucrats felt these measures were necessary. The most recent example of the political control over media is the hostage crisis in Dagestan, an autonomous republic neighboring Chechnya. From the beginning of the crisis, authorities felt threatened by mass media and took extreme measures to control them.
During the crisis in Dagestan, censorship was enforced by the assigned military and police officials. Fifty Russian and foreign journalists were banned from the area where the Russian military were to free the hostages. Journalists were denied access to truthful information, and when they persisted in their reporting, the military used force to stop them. Reporters were ordered to destroy their films or surrender their tapes; and threatened with guns by the Russian servicemen when they refused to follow orders.
Lying became a major method of controlling the media. President Yeltsin got personally involved in the disinformation campaign with his regular ad hoc interviews with loyal reporters. The press was manipulated to make the public believe the official version of the events. Yeltsin posed almost as the only respected source since other officials declined to talk to the media on regular basis.
Instead of letting the journalists to report what they saw and heard, the press-service of the FSB (Federal Security Service) fed the media with outright lies, and the media relayed them to public. Three days before Russian troops stormed the village where the hostages were kept, major Russian independent news agency Interfax reported that U.S. political sources supported the use of force in resolving the crisis. The American embassy in Moscow denied the report (Hecker).
All television stations including an independent NTV station broadcast transcripts of the alleged radio transmissions between the terrorists and their headquarters in Chechnya. The transcripts were to show the cruelty of the Chechens. One report said that the Chechen leader Jokhar Dudaev advised his men in Gagestan to kill female rather than male hostages. Another broadcast report said Chechens were executing their hostages. The freed hostages denied these reports as lies.
The head of FSB press-service general Aleksandr Mikhailov was dismissed after the crisis was over, apparently for publicly admitting that many hostages had been killed during the military operation.
In solving political problems President Yeltsin relies mostly on the so called “power ministries” that are deeply antagonistic to freedom of speech. Indeed, the top officials within the “power ministries” are the ones who influence many of Yeltsin’s decision on the media. Their own method of control over the media is the tradition of policy of enforced secrecy, which is just another method of media control closely related to lying.
The notorious Glavlit censorship agency was turned by bureaucrats into the State Inspectorate for the Defense of Freedom of the Press and Mass Information, a move very few people ever heard about. Regardless of the official name, the Inspectorate was not intended to promote freedom of speech but to conduct post-publication censorship.
In February 1994 Yeltsin signed a new order that confirmed the list of officials within 38 ministries that had the power to classify information. Officials of all ranks and positions received virtually unlimited authority to declare information classified to deny it to journalists. In another move to enforce secrecy, in February 1994 journalists were banned from the sessions of the government. Only few loyal reporters were allowed to stay.
In non-crisis situations the government uses gentler, more informal methods of restraint and control over the media. In recent times Russian government officials eagerly adopted methods of state advertising used for a long time by their Western colleagues: briefings and press-conferences, official press-releases, unattributed back-door leaks, and kite-flying, which is the unacknowledged spreading of rumors or disinformation by the government. Other methods of government advertising including special promotional campaigns prepared by professional consultants and positive coverage of politicians through positive interviews on radio and television.
When Yeltsin began his tenure as a Russian president, like Gorbachev, he treated media as his own domain, and journalists as his servants. With time, Yeltsin became more sophisticated on his public relations. In November 1994 the President united his public relations and information office under a new bureaucratic structure called “Information Administration.” In includes all informational services that prepared reports for President Yeltsin, the President’s press service, and his personal press-secretary. A number of analytical think tanks and ITAR-TASS news agency are linked to the Information Administration. The current aim of the Information Administration is to prepare and carry a powerful reelection campaign for President Yeltsin.
Media executives have personal government telephone lines that only top government officials can use. Most editors-in-chief receive regular calls from the highest government offices asking them to run or to suppress a certain article, or to cover or not cover a certain events. It is considered a normal practice for politicians to reprimand journalists for their “irresponsibility” and “abuses” of the freedom of speech.
Frequent government attacks on the media declare “unbalanced” criticism, investigative journalism, and alternative media “enemies” of stability and democracy. Government criticism intimidates journalists and makes them think twice before reporting the facts instead of an opinion that reflects the official position. Last year addressing the nation in the middle of the Chechen campaign President Yeltsin, ”upset” with the media coverage of the war, said the following: “I know that Chechen money pays for the functioning of some Russian mass media.” (Bershidsky). Yeltsin never explained his allegation, and never returned to this topic again. But the message was sent—do not believe what media tell you about the conflict, listen only to what government and I personally tell you.
Half-lies, or leaks and kite-flying are wide-spread forms of state advertising in Russia. Off-the-record statements of officials are a normal practice. Leaks and rumors are regularly spread among friendly journalists.
Authorities have relations with some media professionals that enjoy “privileges” to receive information unavailable to the rest of the media. Among the privileged media are ITAR-TASS, Kommersant-daily, Izvestia, Interfax news agency Argumenty i Fakty. Representatives of these media strongly opposed introduction of the freedom of information principles in Russia, Russian-American Freedom of Information Commission reported last month (“Workshops Focus On Freedom of Information”).
In contemporary Russia it is too early to speak about reproduction of the power of the new capitalist class. The rich have not yet established themselves in the economy and politics of new Russia. Their position within the power structure is still unstable and has to be constantly legitimized.
The new capitalist class are also aware of the negative perception the public has about them, and they are eager to change this perception. Media are the most accessible tools the so-called New Russian have at their disposal to legitimize their existence in the Russian economic and political scene. Media manipulation is a very important issue for the new business elite, and they do not spare money for this matter. The methods the new capitalist class uses to manipulate the media are similar to the methods employed by the government but businessmen apply them in a gentler way.
Corporate secrecy and public relations are their major methods of control. Open pressure and threats are less popular among business people than among government bureaucrats. Russian private companies and corporation are even more secretive than the Russian government. They do not feel obliged to share information with the public. The top executives as well as middle management are rarely available to the media, and the recently created press-service often pose as guard rather than providers of information.
At the same time, the positive corporate news are always available to the media at special media events that often coincide with lunches and cocktail parties. Often the positive news is presented as regular press-releases, leaks, and so-called exclusive interviews. Bribes to the journalists in the form of cash, free trips and valuable gifts are also wide-spread.
Theses manipulative methods have some effects on reporters, for whom entrepreneurs often symbolize a new elite of domestic Russia. “I associate myself with entrepreneurs,” says Aleksandr Gubsky, correspondent from l Kapital weekly. “Their and my interests are very close” (Gubsky).
The third group that exercise considerable influence on the Russian media are media professionals themselves who often pose not only as mediators between the public and the political and economic authorities, but as a separate authority. In reality, the media professionals constitute a political and economically dependent group that only survives by serving dominant political and economic groups positioned outside the field of production.
Traditionally, in Russia journalists had two choices—either to serve authorities and receive privileges and benefits, or raise their voice against authorities and be punished and silenced for the uncensored word. Journalists have more choices under the present regime. While most journalists still serve political or/and economic authorities in power, others serve the alternative elite, for example the communists or the nationalists. Some raise their voices against all type of domination but lack of capital available to the alternative and non-commercial media silences their voices. Although alternative and non-commercial media exist in Russia, like in the West they are available only to limited groups of people.
The glasnost period in Russian history has significantly changed public attitudes towards the media and the public uses of the media. The Russians have become more dependent on the media and more entrusted in the media. Surveys indicate that the post-glasnost Russian audience also use media differently than before. Audiences see the media more as a supplier of information, a guide on different issues and ideas and an entertainer rather than a promoter of certain values or ideology (Smirnova 4).
Unfortunately, as one survey of fifty professionals at Russian television (RTR) indicate the “[a]udience is the last thing the journalist at Russian TV cares about” (Bystriskii and Krasilnikov 60). Most of the television professionals see an average viewer as “a rather primitive, dull, weak, dependent, simple, blunt, conservative, angry, passive rough rationalist creature” (Bystritskii and Krasilnikov 59-60). Television professionals do not fell that they work primarily for the audience, but for prestige, popularity, and status among Moscow-based political elite. Most journalists believe that their major function is “promoting a certain political line, but not informing the audience of a hot topic” (Bystriskii and Krasilnikov 60).
Answering the question of how information is selected for the newscast, most of the respondents cited the following: political preferences, a desire to raise their status among certain politicians; manipulation of public opinion; and getting a feeling of being a part of the influential elite. (Bystritskii and Krasilnikov 60).
Political corruption dominates the world of Russian media professionals. Many reporters still think of information as propaganda, and it does not matter who they report on, president Boris Yeltsin, Moscow mayor Yury Luzhkov or a famous businessman. News in Russia is still rarely separated from opinion. Positive or negative, propaganda remains propaganda.
Most media professionals look at their task as three-sided: to serve as an effective information vehicle for the authorities; extend their own power base through the position of a supposedly independent mediator; and at the same time make a profit, both corporate and personal.
Political corruption is directly connected with another type of corruption that is widely spread among Russian journalists—economic corruption. Covert advertisement is wide-spread in the Russian media. Not many journalists can decline a bribe whether it is cash, valuable gift or a free trip to Hawaii. Often when young journalists apply for a job, they are not worried about the salary as much as the possibility to publish so-called “ordered stories” that can add much value to their job. It is not a paradox that “ordered” interviews and business profiles often cost more than a paid advertisement. Some editors encourage bribe-taking asking reporters to share their side earnings with them. It is also not uncommon for political reporters to get paid by political parties and individual politicians for positive reporting about them.
During the December 1995 parliamentary elections ordinary Russians were left out from the whole political discourse that was happening in the media. Most reporters and politicians had no interest discussing the problems and showing the life of an average Russian citizen. Russian people were perceived by the media professionals and the politicians as a gray mass called the “electorate,” which was implied to be easily manipulated. Freedom of speech was literally taken over by popular television hosts and top politicians who eclipsed the public to dominate the discourse.
Contemporary Russian media have grown out of the glasnost period and stepped into the period of limited freedom of speech. In Russia freedom of speech, on one hand is limited by the monopoly that state authorities of all levels have on printing and transmission facilities, newsprint production and distribution. On the other hand, freedom of speech is limited by a new Russian phenomena—corporate interest and property rights. At the same time, media professionals limit freedom of speech by self-censorship, open and coveted political and economic dependence, biased understanding of their functions, negative attitudes to their audience, and ideological stereotypes they consciously and unconsciously produce and reproduce.
The Russian audience has turned into a passive consumer of news and views supplied by the government and the new capitalist class through politically and economically engaged media professionals. The media do not reflect in their structure and content the whole diversified picture of contemporary Russian society. Social, ethnic and cultural minorities receive very little attention in the media.
Indeed one cannot talk about full freedom of speech in Russian until genuine democracy emerges there making the media free of political and economic propaganda, and when the country’s problems are solved not with guns but with words.
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