Post-Soviet Media Law & Policy Newsletter

Issue 26     Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law     February 26, 1996 

Chief of Ukrainian TV and Radio Reviews Historic Relationship with Ostankino

    Zynoviy Kulyk, the head of Ukrainian state radio and TV has written an extensive article in ‘Holos Ukrayiny’ on January 6, 1996, defending last August’s transfer of the relay of Russian Public TV (ORT) to a less favorable channel in Ukraine. This is a question we have covered extensively in past issues of the Post-Soviet Media Law and Policy Newsletter. The article was received through the Broadcast Monitoring Unit of the BBC and its excellent service, previously called “World Broadcasting Information.”  The article is a response to an attack on the Ukrainian decision by Ukrainian People’s Deputy Volodymyr Alekseyev.  Alekseyev was deputy chairman of the Supreme Council Commission for Legislative Support of the Freedom of Speech and Media.  In his article “For Whom We Give Air Time . . .” (‘Holos Ukrayiny’ 25th October 1995, No. 200), Alsekseyev sought greater support for the Russian television signals in Ukraine’s information space.  Kulyk’s essay is one of the few available discussing distribution of Ostankino assets at the end of the Soviet period.

    I want to inform ‘Holos Ukrayiny’ readers about the actual situation and emphasize that the leadership of Ukraine’s State Television and Radio [Derzhteleradio] is acting according to the legislation in force, and our actions themselves are prompted by objective necessity.
    Deputy Alekseyev states: “When the division of the remnants of the USSR was taking place in 1992, Ukraine was offered the chance to take part in buying shares of the Ostankino television company in order to transform it into an interstate company. Ukraine’s leadership at that time rejected this offer out of political motives . . . .”
    This statement surprises me greatly. It is apparently known only to the author of this statement when and where “the division of the remnants of the USSR” took place. As for documents, they testify to the opposite. It is generally known that Russia inherited all that was possible, while other republics of the former USSR inherited only what was left. This also applied to television.
    First, by virtue of a presidential edict, USSR State Television and Radio was unilaterally declared the Russian State Television and Radio Company “Ostankino” which, incidentally, never issued any shares.
    Second, proceeding from the above-mentioned edict, the authors of a draft statute of the Interstate Television and Radio Company (ITRC) said in Article 7: “The authorized capital of the ITRC is formed from the property of the Russian State Television and Radio Company Ostankino and other property.” This meant that approximately 62 percent of the stock was to be concentrated in one state—the Russian Federation.
    At the same time, the fact that the property of the above-mentioned company belonged to the State Television and Radio of the USSR and was formed out of planned contributions from all the former USSR republics was ignored completely. Consequently, it was the joint property of all these republics, which are currently independent states.
    The structure of the ITRC was seen by the authors of the draft in the following way: The technical basis was to be provided by Ostankino, while subsidies were to be provided by CIS countries. As we see it, there was no mention of any division of the property of the former USSR State Television and Radio. On the contrary, the leading bodies of the new company were to be left in Moscow. The statute provided only formally for the participation of CIS countries in a “council of observers” (Article 13 of the draft statute).
    Thus, the CIS states were only given the right to subsidize the ITRC without exercising real control over its activity. This newly-created structure was in fact to represent only the interests of the Russian Federation in the name of all CIS states. Ukraine was to provide funds for the production of Russian television programmes (Article 15 of the draft statute), and that was all.
    All these pretensions were voiced by the Ukrainian side at a meeting of experts—representatives of national television and radio organizations from CIS states—that took place in Minsk on 1st and 2nd June 1992. However, after two years, during negotiations held in Moscow between 20th and 30th 20-30 July 1994, it turned out that Russia had not changed the principles of forming the ITRC and that Ukraine’s interests had not been taken into account. Overall, the implementation of this project would require huge costs from us—approximately 12 trillion karbovantsi [K]. For the sake of comparison: the planned 1995 budget of Ukraine’s State Television and Radio is equal to K9.4 trillion.
    V. Alekseyev spoke in favour of working out a new legislative basis that could provide possibilities for a civilized information exchange between Ukraine and the Russian Federation, and said that such a proposal had been made by Russian Ambassador A. Smolyakov to the head of our state. Unfortunately, Alekseyev did not publish this letter.
    The proposal to work out an intergovernmental agreement did not originate in Russia. A draft agreement on cooperation in the sphere of information exchange was prepared by the Ukrainian side as early as May 1995, that is, well before the television channels were switched over. So far, there has been no answer to this document.
    Under normal circumstances, bilateral agreements in this sphere have already been concluded with Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. Unfortunately, it is Russia which has so far not found it possible to sign a similar agreement with us.
    Regarding the legislative basis, we must inform our opponent that such a basis does exist! It consists of Ukraine’s laws “On Television and Radio Broadcasting” and “On Ukraine’s International Agreements.”
    It is also impossible to agree with the thesis that Ukraine in 1992 did not contribute a kopek to the Ostankino television company, “although we (the Ukrainian television) were receiving intellectual production all the time.”
    Alas, the case is not so simple as Deputy Alekseyev makes out. The global practice is that the cost of “pushing ahead” with information is paid by those who are interested. For instance, this is how the Voice of America (the United States), the BBC (Great Britain), and others operate. Why was such a practice adopted?
    First, the dissemination of television and radio programs, aside from anything else, also pursues propaganda goals. These media are powerful means of ideological influence and, understandably, they are used for appropriate purposes.
    Second, the dissemination of television and radio programmes is an additional source of income obtained for advertising. According to official data, in 1994 Ostankino obtained income totalling 95m dollars. As of today, one minute of advertising on ORT costs 30,000 dollars. ORT is paid not only for the quality of programmes, but, in essence, for their audience. You must admit that 250m residents of the CIS is not the same as 150m residents of Russia.
    V. Alekseyev is right here: There is a struggle for the advertising market under way. However, why should the profits from this go to ORT alone? Proceeding from this, our country proposed that ORT should transfer 20 per cent of the profits from advertising to us (since one-fifth of the ORT audience lives on Ukrainian territory), and a lot of problems with the dissemination of ORT programmes in Ukraine would be removed. However, Moscow has also rejected this proposal.  Now we propose another simple calculation. The author of the article states that the Russian Federation is compensating for a part of the costs connected with the dissemination of ORT programmes. However, he does not specify this part; but that is exactly where the problem lies.
    According to an agreement of June 23, 1994 between the ORT concern and the then Russian Television and Radio Broadcasting Company Ostankino, Ukraine was to be paid for only six hours of broadcasting, while in actual fact the [Ostankino] program was on the air for 16-18 hours. Thus, a larger part of costs was covered by Ukraine. In addition, the Russian side paid so “punctually” that, as of 31st March 1995, it has accumulated a debt of 15bn Russian roubles. As is known, following 1st April 1995, broadcasting the ORT programme in Ukraine was resumed and cost us over K600 billion. If the channels had not been switched, this sum would be even larger. Who will compensate this sum for Ukraine, and when?
    One also must pay attention to the fact that the Ukrainian people’s deputy refers to Ostankino or the ORT as “Central Television” . . . To see whether this is true or not, it is enough to look at the screen caption which reads: the Russian Public Television Joint Stock Company. It turns out that this is not the case. As we remember, Central Television was a completely state-run organization. A joint stock company, to put it mildly, is another business. Have we the right to continue financing foreign joint stockholders? Obviously, this is a rhetorical question.
    Moscow has sent a letter with the following: The ORT Joint Stock Company is not a successor to the debts of the Ostankino Television and Radio Company and will not repay the 15bn roubles. Seemingly, it should be clear to everybody that this case is not the same as the earlier one. Therefore, the issue of cooperation with the ORT Joint Stock Company should be resolved on a fundamentally new basis—that of partnership and equality. Nobody doubts the need for such cooperation. Another point is dubious: It is the categorical tone with which the author denies the right to organize a broadcasting sphere for his own state. For example, he asserts that “switching the channels over was supported only by two letters, including one unsigned.”
    Let us address documents once again. Just in August 1995, Ukraine’s State Television and Radio received 1,136 letters touching upon the problem of switching the channels over. This action was opposed by 600 letters and supported by 536. The results of a poll taken by the trustworthy service Socis-Gallup testified to the fact that currently only about 10 per cent of those polled remain dissatisfied.
    It is understandable that the measures taken by the State Television and Radio Company touched upon the interests of many Ukrainian citizens. However, this was a necessary step. Its legal basis was established, particularly by Ukraine’s law “On Television and Radio Broadcasting,” which stipulates that the National Television of Ukraine is based on state television organizations, which have priority in using the state television network (Article 12). By edict No. 12 of 3rd January 1995, the Ukrainian president created Ukraine State Radio, whose main task is to form a national radio broadcasting area (Article 2).
    It is also possible to cite a multitude of arguments against Alekseyev’s remark stating that “. . .Ukrainian television today has neither forces nor funds, nor creative and technical potential to fill a vacuum created by the removal of the ORT from the first channel.” However, the refusal to subsidize the expansion of ORT programmes in Ukraine from the state budget and the obtaining of additional funds from advertising on Ukrainian Television, which formerly were transferred to Moscow, will provide the money so urgently needed for the development of Ukrainian television. The leadership of Ukraine’s State Television and Radio cares about the development of the national television and radio, and seeks to create appropriate conditions to increase its competitiveness.
    The issue of foreign programming:  The author is particularly annoyed by the saturation of our television channels by programmes of foreign television companies. Therefore, I want to draw V. Alekseyev’s attention to ORT programmes. Has the ORT not given its best time to such programmes? Are the “ Tropicana,” “Santa Barbara,” “Twin Peaks” or “Royal Rifleman Sharp’s Adventures” Mosfilm productions? Do the ORT commercials publicize the superiority of the “Red October” plant products over Sneakers? Or, maybe, does the ORT call for consuming Kostroma cheese or Volgograd tomatoes? The advertisers remain the same. Earlier, however, they paid all money to the ORT, while now they will have to share it with our state and non-state companies.
    The following questions also suggests themselves: Why is it moral to watch a foreign television series bought by the ORT, but immoral and anti-patriotic to watch one bought by Ukrainian television?
    A final chord in the “funeral symphony” dedicated to us is the author’s opinion about the legality of Ukraine’s State Television and Radio in general. V. Alekseyev confronts the Ukrainian president with the dilemma: to defend either the Constitutional Agreement or the leadership of Ukraine’s State Television and Radio. None of the lawyers who read this article was able to establish a connection between the switching over of the channels and the Constitutional Agreement. As to the author himself, he did not explain this point.
    Assessing the situation in Ukrainian television objectively, one can see many shortcomings against the background of its noticeable improvement. Indeed, good programs and interesting entertainment shows are still scarce; news releases are not always timely. However, this situation has in no way been caused by the reasons given by V. Alekseyev. The main reason is the lack of subsidies. It was the lack of budget subsidies which forced us to look for advantageous partners among non-state and foreign companies, due to which the ratings of Ukrainian television increased considerably. As for disadvantageous partners who do not want to operate on the basis of equality, we do not need them.