The media in Tajikistan cannot be called free; but the kind of systematic repression practiced by the Kari mov government in Uzbekistan is not the rule. Most parts of the country are still in a “survival of the fittest” mode, and media live insofar as they manage to navigate between various political forces in their region, in addition to dealing with financial difficulties which surpass even the crisis situation in other parts of Central Asia.
As is to be expected in a war zone, journalists have in a number of situations been killed in Tajikistan in the last three years, and in some cases their death is directly attributable to political repression, but in many it is not.
Media is currently governed by Tajikistan’s Law on the Press and Mass Media of December 1990, fun damentally a copy of the Soviet law of the time, considered a moderately permissive document. Registration of media is carried out under Council of Ministers’ Decree #271 of the same month. Printing presses are governed by the Law on Printing Activities (izda tel’skoi de iatelnosti).
The later years of perestroika saw the flourishing of a number of newspapers in Tajikistan (by some accounts as many as 25, though the definition of a publication is fluid and encompasses monthly single-page leaflets as well as daily newspapers), though all have ceased publishing due to both difficult economic straits as well as political pressure from various sides in the civil war and the resulting moderately dictatorial regime led by Rakhmonov.
There are a handful of government-run papers. The main national ones are the Parliament’s Narodnaia gazeta and its Tajik- and Uzbek-language sisters Jumihuriyat and Kholk ovozi, and the Council of Minister’s Golos Tajikistana and its Tajik- and Uzbek-language sisters Tojiki stan and Tojikiston ovozi (these papers share some materials but are not identical). A number of the government newspapers acquired a certain amount of independence in the early 1990s but, as in Uzbekistan, had to turn to the government for support in 1994 when paper became so expensive as to be unaffordable. The city of Dushan be is served by the largest-circulation newspaper in the country, Vecher nyi Dushanbe or Vecherka for short, created by the city government in 1992.
In late 1991, the non-governmental news agency “Novosti Tajikistana” was formed by a local journalist-turned-Party-administrator and bro ther of the then and present foreign minister, Akmal Ali mov. It operated for about a year, trying to pay its way by selling news about Tajiki stan to foreign news agencies and embassies. In October 1992 it closed down when it began to come under pressure because of certain stories which reflected poorly on one or another group in the civil conflict, as well as financial instability. Alimov soon thereafter turned his fifteen staff over to a new newspaper just getting started at the time, Biznes i politika.
B&P is now the only serious contender for the name “independent press” in Dushanbe. Founded by Sadry din Mukhameddov, a local businessman, for his own prestige and advertising purposes, its official main shareholder is Mukhameddov’s Sham, the largest commodity market in Dushanbe (rich by virtue of having acquired a general cotton-trading license shortly after independence). B&P’s revenue does not cover costs and it is unclear how long Sham will continue to be able to sink money into itre portedly 20 million rubles lost so far in 1994 alone. B&P’s circulation is smallofficially 30,000 copies, once per weekand does not reach outside of Dushanbe.
As with Biznes i politika, except for several central newspapers most in the country come out only once per week due to the extreme shortage of newsprint; like its four ex-Soviet Central Asian neighbors, Tajiki stan has no paper production plants of its own and few resources from which paper could be made. Thus, all paper is imported from Russia. At times the price of newsprint has risen as high as $700 per tonne, twice the market rate in the West, and now hovers at around $300/t. Part of the difficulty is transportation; newsprint must come through Uzbeki stan by train, and Uzbeki stan imposes sporadic freight blockades on Tajikistan when the latter is unable to pay for the energy Uzbekistan supplies, which is fairly often.
Another independent “newspaper,” Kur’er, is also distributed only in the capital, but does not carry any news; it consists solely of ads, the horoscope, and TV program schedules. Kur’er is the only publication in the country which is commercially viable, i.e. covers its costs with revenue, because of its classified ads section.
Except for B&P and Kur’er, the only post-war commercial newspaper in the country was apparently Amiron, the brainchild of a businessman in the very small city of Gissar, to the west of Dushan be. It operated for several years on a weekly basis but in early 1994 closed because of financial problems.
Among government-affiliated papers, Golos Tajiki stana is regarded as moderately independent. And the capital’s Russian-language paper, Vecherka, also has some independence by virtue of having been half-cre ated by Mukhameddov’s company Sham. Mukha meddov claims, with some justice, that he has saved the paper in several ways (politically as well as financially), and in fact it is unlikely that the very young and capable but independent-minded editor would remain in his post if the mayor were able to act without Sham’s approval.
One newspaper-in-exile, Charoghi Ruz (Independent Newspaper), continues to publish in Tajik from Moscow and a few copies are brought into Tajiki stan clandestinely. Many have heard of it but few read it, and its limited circulation handicaps it potential effect; in any event its prime audience by all accounts is the opposition circles outside the country. I did not visit with CR’s publishers, but have been told total print run is about 10,000 copies on a biweekly basis.
Outside of Dushanbe, most newspapers in the country are slowly ceasing to exist. The four oblast centers have reduced their papers to a weekly schedule and in some cases are unable to maintain even that given the difficulty of obtaining paper. Each oblast has two newspapers, one in Russian and one in Tajik (sometimes with part in Uzbek), which to some extent share information but are in fact separate.
The one area of the country in slightly better shape is Khojent in the north, where the oblast paper is holding the line at three issues per week, and there is also a city-govern ment-sponsored weekly, as well as an occasional small semi-private paper sponsored by the Saffar-ali Ken dzhaev Foundation. The print run of the oblast papers is indicative of their lack of strengthusually 10,000 to 20,000 copies for oblasts with populations of over 500,000. City papers, where they exist, are smaller, at from 1000 to 5000 copies. A typical city paper is the one in Kuliab, which had 50 employees in 1988 and now has about 10.
Most raion-level newspapers have ceased publication. Even in the larger cities of Khojent (150,000) or Kuliab (70,000) the resources to sustain an independent paper are simply not therepaper, ink, journalists, and readers willing to purchase news are all insufficient. Oblast-government-supported newspapers themselves have a hard time staying afloat.
Tajiki stan’s most powerful enterprises, however, in many cases continue to publish their own local weekly paper, known as a “mnogo tirazhka,” often in print runs of thousands; this is true for instance at the silk factory in Khojent, the carpet factory in Kairak kum, the aluminum plant in Tursun-zade, and the cotton-processing factory in Vos’e. For the employees of such mega-enterprises and the surrounding areas, these newspaper are their primary and sometimes only source of information besides television. And in many cases it is these same enterprises which support local efforts at independent television.
In the 1980s, most newspapers were distributed by subscription, but subscriptions have been reduced dramatically in the last year for several reasons. In the first place, the price newspapers (state or private) must pay to the governmental distribution service is very high, usually about 40 percent of the total cost of a newspaper, and subscribers can’t afford the extra cost; this is in large part a reflection of transportation expenses, particularly gasoline.
Equally important, inflation is completely unpredictable, so collecting 5000 soms or 112 tenge for a year’s worth of newspapers does not cover the actual costs of printing a newspaper six months later.
Finally, the volatile financial situation in the media in general means that a newspaper cannot predict, at subscription time, whether they will be able to continue coming out on a daily or every-other-day basis, and the newspapermen are unsure what to promise subscribers when the chances are good they will have to cut back to weekly or even less-regular delivery. It is still possible to subscribe to local newspapers, but the publications find it is not in their interest and discourage subscriptions. Correspondingly, independent papers and for the most part governmental ones as well are sold almost entirely through newsstands; the independent papers also often use hawkers on the streets. If the sales price of a newspaper is not enough to cover all of its costs, it is still considered a substantial source of income; as in other republics, Tajiki stan’s papers reported that employees of the printing press es regularly printed thousands of unreported copies of their newspapers on paper they acquired (probably written off of government inventories as worthless “scrap”) and sold them on the street for additional income.
Of a newspaper’s total costs, another 30 percent is the price of paper, another 15 percent the cost of printing the newspaper, and the remaining 15 percent is used to cover salaries. Such a breakdown is fairly typical for a newspaper in Central Asia. Most well-run newspapers earn enough to cover their costs if paper is excluded, i.e. about 70 percent of their operating expenses.
When Tajikistan declared independence on 15 September 1992, the local former arm of TASS, the Soviet Union’s official wire service, became the Tajikistan State News Service, Khovar. Khovar remains the only news agency in the country. It appears to serve only Gostel and a couple of the state-run papers, since none of the non-governmental press subscribes to it.
The Ministry of Press and Information has two chief duties; the first is to register and monitor all media in the country (for instance, they create weekly summaries for the country’s leadership of what is prin ted where), while the second and larger task is to run all the government-owned printing presses in the country as well as the publishers of books and journals. As of 1 June the Ministry reports that there are 58 newspapers and five journals registered with them. Of five pending applications to register private printing presses, one has been granted.
This report is the result of a two-week visit to Tajikistan in late May and early June, 1994, by Eric Johnson, researcher for Internews. The Soros Foundation provided funding for the investigation. Part I of this report appeared in the previous issue of this newsletter.
These are excerpts from a conference, December 1,
1994 with the chairman of the russian press committee.
[Q] NTV. My question is connected with Chechnya,
but even more so with your agency. It has been suggested that if information
coming from Chechnya will be treated selectively, you will be charged with
coordinating these actions. If so, what actions could these be?
[Gryzunov] Such a form of work is in the cards,
but we are not going to control and select information. We will probably
be charged with expressing the official point of view on developments in
Chechnya.I think that we have a law and in the zone, if, God forbid, the
political means of resolving this disputed situation are exhausted, then
censorship will be in effect in the zone. Military censors will work just
as they are working in situations envisaged by the law. I hope that
here, in Moscow, nobody will be standing next to the printing machine and
engage in this.
[Q] Radio Liberty. It is rumored that the newspaper
Al-Kods has been shut down at your initiative. But according to other rumors
the newspaper Al-Kods will continue to be published. What authorization
do you have to monitor the execution of the decision concerning that newspaper?
[A] The most sensible reaction in a healthy
society would be not to notice what is published and what claims to be
a paper. But the evaluation will be given by a competent law court. But
we have the Constitution of the Russian Federation and we have involved
a corresponding article of the Constitution which forbids foreign citizens
to be founders and publishers of mass media. In full conformity with the
law we have filed a law suit to recall the registration certificate on
the basis of this article of the Constitution.
Soon after that the following incident occurred.
The Izvestia publishing house, which has published the above periodical,
received our letter of instruction with some delay, according to the head
of the publishing house. As a result, one more issue came out after that.
It ran an article, “Minister Gryzunov Must be Put in the Dock”. Let’s leave
it on the conscience of the editorial staff. I think that after all
this the Izvestia publishing house will not print this newspaper. We have
also told law enforcement bodies about our decision. What can happen next?
If the publishers stand their ground, the law allows us to confiscate the
entire issue and fine people who sell the newspaper.
As to newspapers similar to Al-Kods. You have already
heard the number and it was given again at a meeting between the President
of the Russian Federation and a group of leaders of the Russian intelligentsia.
From our data, more than 100 publications of a national patriotic and chauvinistic
and neo-fascist persuasion come out in Russia. These data are not final
and I think they are understated because I think many more newspapers are
published in the country, underground papers and the law-enforcement bodies
do not interfere. In general, I think justified doubts have been expressed
about the position of the law-enforcement in a number of Russian regions
which shut their eyes to the fact that in a country which defeated fascism
50 years ago pro-fascist views are being propagated openly and fearlessly.
I feel that this should be stopped. This is my personal view and, thank
God, this is the position of the new leadership of the Russian Federation
Press Committee. We are setting up a number of flexible structures within
the committee to carry out short-and long-term tasks. One of them deals
with such publications. Unfortunately, not always we are confident that
the law will allow us to act in the interests of the people to meet them.
That is why we were very anxious to hear the President’s pledges to facilitate
changes in the legislation. As soon as this happens, our work will become
easier.
[Q] In what way will your activities differ
from those of your predecessor?
[A] I have already said, but let me repeat.
I think that the government organization called the State Committee of
the Russian Federation for the Press should change its policy, give up
command and administrative functions and become an analytical and information
organization which would allow citizens of the exercise their right
to receive information and distribute this information.
We want to offer the state the concept of state
policy in the field of mass media. I dare to state that so far no such
thing as a state concept has been elaborated in this institution. Its crux
is to precisely determine the relationships between society, the mass media
and the authorities. I deliberately listed them in such an order because
so far this order, unfortunately, has been a different one. The authorities,
by force of habit, believe that through the mass media they will be able
to convince society that all of their decisions are impeccable. I believe
we are living in a different time and such methods can no longer be used.
What will be the structural basis of such a program? A group of professionals
is working in the Committee. They are journalists, analysts, scientists
who are working.
We have an instruction from the President of the
Russian Federation and the deadline for fulfilling it is approaching very
soon. We must place on the President’s table the elaboration of the idea
of information and publishing and, perhaps, broadcasting concerns which
will serve as a prototype of the structural change of the Russian mass
media throughout the territory of the Russian Federation.
What is its essence? These are independent. At the
end of the road we envisage that this will be an independent from the state,
first of all financially, corporation, let us call it a joint-stock company
of the closed type, that will consist of several periodical publications,
differing in character, aims, circulation, and also broadcasting organizations.
These corporations will live on a mixed capital, both totally independent
capital and joint capital. The state will invest in such concerns at the
beginning in the form of real estate, in the form of long-term credit and,
probably, also in the form of means of production. That is what journalists
now do not own.
I can tell you that leaders of Russian financial-industrial
groups come to us and we hold negotiations with them. This is an enlightened
capital which understands very well that if it invests money in such a
sacred concept that is called freedom of the press, and freedom of the
press, in turn, is the basis of building a free society, in such a society
capital will be able to develop and to make profits freely. This
is putting it in brief.
[Q] Komsomolskaya Pravda. Do you expect the
government to take any action in respect of the administration of the Maritime
Territory where virtually all newspapers have been closed down? Thank you.
[A] We have a mechanism for conducting such
work. You probably know that instead of the State Inspectorate which has
been disbanded, territorial bodies have become part of the Committee, 300
people across the country, who will monitor compliance with the press freedoms
and protect journalists and their rights, the rights of newspapers.
Together with the Law Court on Information Disputes, headed by
Professor Vengerov, we are setting up a joint group which will have a meeting
in December with the parties to the Far Eastern dispute. And I think
we will present our views on the matter, and government actions will follow
with regard to Dalpress and related matters.
[Q] Obshchaya Gazeta. Could you comment
on the decision of the chief editors in support of the so-called “Poltoranin
law,” the law on the state support of mass media?
[A] As regards the meeting of the club of chief
editors, it was actually a meeting of deputy chief editors or persons representing
chief editors because as far as I know there were few chief editors at
that meeting. I was told about such a proposed meeting last week, but I
was unable to attend it because I was busy and I told the President of
the Journalists’ Union, Mr. Bogdanov, about it. But apparently he had other
thoughts and he convened the meeting although I said that I couldn’t take
part physically and besides our attitude to the Duma draft law was clear
over the past three months. We took a critical attitude with regard to
that law. We believe that this is a fresh attempt at monopolization, at
concentrating control in the hands of one agency. We are not against the
draft law itself, we are in favor inasmuch as it speaks about privileges
and easing of the regime, that has to be done. But the idea of a so-called
National Fund is designed to mislead journalists. So, the statement
of Russian Press Committee published on the same day as the opinion of
the President of the Russian Federation, and he said in no uncertain terms
that he saw this as an attack on press freedom.
[Q] Segodnya. I have two questions. The first.
Tell us, please, a little more about the publishing and, perhaps, broadcasting
concerns you mentioned. Will one of their tasks be to compete with Mr.
Poltoranin’s national foundation?
[A] There is only an idea on which we are working.
No doubt about it, in some form this is a contraposition. Because we are
approaching the idea from an absolutely different end. There -the accumulation
of all money, state and non-state, in single hands and a new handing out
to “ours” and “theirs,” to those who are “liked” and to those who are “not
liked”. Here it is totally different. Here this will be dealt with by a
joint-stock company which has some relationship to the state only at the
beginning. But afterwards it returns its debt to the state and works freely.
[Q] Journalist magazine. I will give you a
concrete example and would like to know what the model of the behavior
of the Russian press in such cases should be. Alexander Sokolov is an editor
of a newspaper, the Volnodumets, in Samara. He is a former People’s Deputy
of the USSR and a real former democrat. At present he is the authorized
person of the newspaper Russkiy Poryadok (Russian Order) in the Volga area.
We were sent by fax excerpts from this newspaper where everything, beginning
with the biography of Barkashov and ending with a review of his book “The
ABC of a Russian Nationalist”, reflects exactly what you were saying today.
The newspaper was printed only recently and it is now on its way here by
mail or plane together with a statement by the Samara union of journalists
declaring that they do not intend to tolerate this. So what should the
model of behavior be in this concrete case?
[A] Unfortunately, I have only one model of
behavior set for me by the law. First warning, second warning, then on
the basis of repeated warnings we apply for the closure of this newspaper.
The newspaper, naturally, if it is called Zavtra (Tomorrow), will come
out under a new name like Poslezavtra (Day After Tomorrow), and so on.
The same, evidently, will happen with the newspaper Volnodumets. It will
come out under some new name like Super Volnodumets. We are working
to improve the legislation. We want to replace the package of laws which
do not satisfy the public, I mean the law-making activity of the Duma Committee,
someone has got to do this. We have a very strange situation. The Duma
is mass producing laws. But as far as I understand the Duma should discuss
the laws and only then adopt them, while other organizations, like ours,
should work them out. The government should offer a draft law and
the Duma should discuss it and decide whether or not it should be passed.
Therefore we are working out amendments to the law on the mass media to
prevent such incidents in the future.
The perils of journalism became a focus of widespread attention last month, pinpointed by the dramatic death in Moscow of the young investigative reporter for Moskovkiy Komsomolets (MK) , Dmitriy Kholodov. Kholodov, twenty-seven-year-old, who was investigating corruption in the upper echelons of the Russian Army, was killed on October 17 when he opened a briefcase containing a bomb that had been given to him by a source within the Federal Counter-Intelligence Services (formerly the KGB).
There is no question that Kholodov had made enemies in high places. Kholodov was scheduled to testify in parliament a few days later about corruption in the Western Army Group, which withdrew from Germany this summer, and had also published stories revealing massive corruption in the army. One story accused Defense Minister Pavel Grachev of embezzling funds earmarked to provide housing for units returning from Germany in order to buy two Mercedes-Benz cars. Another accused the commander of the Russian troops in Germany, General Burlakov, of involvement in arms smuggling and black-marketeering while in Germany. Kholodov also may have uncovered information that Russian mafia hitmen were being trained at a Russian army training camp.
The murder led to a flurry of accusations and counter-accusations on the part of journalists and government officials. The editor of MK, Pavel Gusev, accused Defense Minister Pavel Grachev of being behind the murder, pointing the finger as well at the Federal Counter-Intelligence Service and the command of the Western Army Group. Grachev, in turn, called accusations by the media against himself and the Defense Ministry “monstrous and widespread political provocations.” He also instituted libel proceedings and called on the Procurator-General to prosecute MK under Article 131, proscribing “the abuse of the honor and dignity of an individual, expressed in an improper manner in the media.”
Kholodov’s funeral service was attended by more than 7,000 people, including such prominent figures as Yegor Gaidar, Galina Staravoitova, Ella Pamfilova, Gary Kasparov, Andrei Vosnesensky and Grigory Yavlinsky. At the service, one speaker after another bitterly denounced the rampant corruption in the Yeltsin government and the widespread intimidation of journalists. Pavel Gusev called for the resignation of Grachev and Yeltsin’s entire cabinet. However, aside from Yeltsin’s press secretary, Vyacheslav Kostikov, who was booed by members of the crowd, no member of the government attended the service.
While Yeltsin called for an investigation of the murder, he immediately came to the defense of Marshal Grachev, saying that Grachev “[was] not involved and [was] not connected with the tragic death of . . . Kholodov” and calling on the media to “stop slinging mud” at Grachev. Yeltsin said that those calling for Grachev’s resignation were seeking revenge against Grachev because of his involvement in the shelling of the Russian parliament building last fall, even though many of those condemning Grachev and the Ministry of Defense had actually supported the offensive against the White House. Yeltsin’s strong support for Grachev provoked an angry open letter from Colonel Serafim Yushkov, from the “Vlast” Division of the Russian Army, telling Yeltsin that he had “not heard one good word about P. Grachev from a single military serviceman in Russia or the ‘near abroad,’” and condemning Yeltsin for failing to heed the condemnation of Grachev by “simple honest people [like] Dmitriy Kholodov.”
Boris Yeltsin used Kholodov’s death to propose the introduction of a system for licensing journalists, whereby journalists would be issued cards guaranteeing their safety (although it is unclear how this would be accomplished). Particularly disturbing is Yeltsin’s statement that “journalists have an obligation to work within a specific ethical framework. If they go beyond that, they could be deprived of the card.” The suggestion that journalists would be deprived of their right to personal safety because of the content of their material raises the ironic possibility that an event which has galvanized the Russian journalistic community could actually be used to introduce controls that will make their situation even worse.
Melissa Dawson
University of California, Berkeley
Box: The Violence Continues
Violence against journalists in Russia continues. Lev Frolov, a journalist with Itar-Tass, was physically assaulted on October 15 in St. Petersburg. On September 24, Bela Khourkova, the well-known head of St. Petersburg’s public television channel was assaulted on the street. Viatcheslav Netchaev, news director there, was beaten and hospitalized on November 28.
In Tajikstan, the terrible state of press freedom
continues. On November 17, Khamidjon Khakimov, 30, editor at the
Uzbek-0language newspaper Khaksuz was shot in the head in Dushanbe and
died overnight. According to the Committee to Protect Journalists,
Tajikistan is now the most dangerous country in the world for journalists.
Almost thirty have been killed in the last two and a half years.
CFJ reports that a paramilitary organization, the People’s Front, may be
responsible for many of these deaths. Their report states that “almost
all of the murders of journalists have been carried out by groups closely
linked to the current government which is maintained in power by Russian
military and economic support.”