Post-Soviet Media Law & Policy Newsletter

Issue 11 Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law October 15, 1994

Internews, RAPIC to Manage $10-million
USAID Media Partnership Program
    A cooperative venture between Internews and the Russian-American Press and Information Center has been awarded the management of a $10 million, three and a half year USAID grant to increase technical assistance from U.S. to Russian media organizations. The purpose of the grant is to use partnership process to “harness the skills and resources of . . . American media organizations [to build] . . . financially competitive, self-sustaining independent media in Russia.” Internews, the prime manager, will focus on the broadcast side of grant implementation while RAPIC, part of NYU’s Center for War, Peace and the News Media, will coordinate the newspaper-related aspects of the program.

    Augmented by the expertise of the Corporation for Public Broadcasting and Management Services International (MSI), a Washington, D.C. based group, the consortium will use their accumulated expertise to recruit the Russian and American partners to be paired. The objectives are to strengthen the regional and local media, establish horizontal communications among the media, provide replicable efforts, improve financial viability and develop voluntary associations among media industry professionals. The program is directed at non-governmental Russian media organizations. The program will support fifteen to twenty partnerships, whose precise nature will depend on the needs on the Russian side.

    According to the grant proposal, “the central goal of the U.S.-Russia Media Partnership Program, through the delivery of strategically targeted technical assistance, is to facilitate the emergence of an independent media in Russia better prepared to take its rightful place as a pillar of the democratic system destined to evolve in that country.”

    This goal echoes the concerns addressed in the USAID request for applications, which noted that, in Russia, “the state continues to maintain a virtual monopoly on major media equipment and on distribution and broadcast networks. In addition, it continues to control many of the country’s major information networks.” The USAID request for proposals had identified non-governmental media as particularly in need of business training and equipment.

    Gerard Langrognat, formerly the Moscow Bureau Chief for Worldwide Television News, will be project director for Internews in Moscow. Paul Janensch, former senior Gannett official, will be associate director in Moscow with special responsibility for print press. Deborah Mendelsohn, of Internews’ Arcata, California office, will be the U.S. based project manager. Judy Weddle, associate director of the Center for War, Peace and the News Media, will be the U.S. associate manager. MSI will be involved in the implementation of training programs.

    Proposed solutions include training programs on management and business issues, exchanges of personnel, internships, development assistance, consultation help attract foreign capital, donations of equipment and dissemination of the lessons learned within the partnerships to other Russian media organizations, These activities, along with instruction in advertising and business affairs, are designed to leave the Russian media in a greater state of self-sufficiency.

    The consortium’s proposal identified financial constraints under which non-governmental Russian newspapers and broadcasting entities operate and which prevent media organizations from producing much of their own programming and, therefore, perpetuate reliance on state-controlled federal channels for news and distribution.

    The consortium expects to spend a portion of the grant monies on equipment purchases and also to pay for the transportation of equipment donated by American media organizations. Given the incompatibility of Russian and American television technology, it is expected that equipment donations will focus on newspapers and radio stations. Although the consortium cannot hope to repair or replace all of the shortfalls and defects of the Russian media infrastructure, the purchases and donations are a necessary part of the move towards self-sufficiency.

    The consortium also must contend with Russia’s volatile financial environment. Referring to the recent one day plunge of the ruble, Ms. Mendelsohn noted the difficulty of the task. “It’s like trying to build a house on an active fault,” she said.

    One significant concern is the delicate relationship between U.S. financing and avoiding the appearance or substance of interference in editorial matters. The managers of the grant must determine ways to provide U.S. support to help foster an independent press, one less reliant on government in general. At the same time, the consortium must avoid too great a Russian media dependence on U.S. support and American influence on Russia’s internal airs. Reliance on private organizations to furnish the assistance to the Russian partners is one way of dealing with problem.

    In their proposal, the Interviews-RAPIC group listed several illustrative partnerships that might be encouraged. These included linking a top independent television company in Russia with an American network or encouraging an American news syndicate to help develop a Russian counterpart. Given the dependence on state distributors for newspapers and magazines, another partnership might built an alternate and independent distribution structure.

    The project’s management team is currently assembling in Russia, based at existing Internews/RAPIC sites, and hope to announce a first group of partnerships in early 1995 and a second group next April. Project headquarters in Russia will be located in Moscow.

    Internews, founded in 1982, works with independent television entities throughout the former Soviet Union with field offices in Moscow and Kiev. The Russian American Press and Information Center in Moscow, a hub providing technical assistance and training to journalists, is managed under the supervision of Robert Karl Manoff, co-founder of NYU’s Center for War, Peace and the News Media.

Television in Tajikistan: A Report
    In the urban areas of Tajikistan, viewers usually have access to four TV channels: Ostankino and Russian TV (both from Moscow), Tashkent TV from Uzbekistan (beginning at 6 p.m.), and Dushanbe TV (the Tajik national channel) produced by the State TV & Radio Committee (Gosteleradiokomitet, or Gostel for short). Of the five administrative sections (oblasts) in the country, three have a regional division of Gostel in their administrative center, using up to one hour per day of Dushanbe TV’s air time locally for their own programming. They are in Khojent, Kurgan-Tiube, and Khorog. In many areas of the country, however, the air time provided to Ostankino and Russian TV is decreasing, both because transmitters are breaking and the country simply cannot afford to maintain the network of transmission facilities.

    The head Gostel organization in Dushanbe has about 1500 employees and produces about half of the twelve hours of programming per day that it broadcasts to the entire country, as well as several national radio channels. Most is in Tajik, with smaller amounts in Russian and Uzbek. Gostel has a few pieces of Betacam equipment and works for the most part on S-VHS in PAL, though like everywhere else in the former Soviet Union, TV broadcasting uses the SECAM standard.

    Gostel in Tajikistan is heavily political, and its chief changes as often as the political winds shift. In late 1992, Gostel Chair Murakhimov was arrested—ostensibly for taking TV equipment and tapes to Kyrgyzstan that proved wrongdoing on the part of government leaders—along with three other TV officials and journalists, and held without charge since then with little news of their disappearance.

    A proposal in 1993 from then-PM Abduladzhanov, Council of Ministers chief of staff Alimov, and the Ministers of Press and Communications to augment Gostel’s weak TV lineup with programming from Turkey, Iran, England, and possibly the US (each country under certain conditions is said to have volunteered to provide some satellite reception equipment) was reportedly turned down by Rakhmonov. But Gostel does have a dish from the Iranians and receives programming from at least the three major foreign satellites which cover the area—Asiasat I, Intelsat 505, and sometimes Arab sat I—but does not use their programs on the air.

    On 21 February 1994 Parliament Chair Rakhmonov signed a succinct “temporary” decree, number 220, which forbade the activity of any non-Gostel electronic media—closing down the several dozen independent TV stations in the republic—until the acceptance of a new “Law on TV,” which the Council of Ministers was instructed to draw up. At the same time, Rakhmonov announced that he would take direct control of Gostel, but he was unable to have himself confirmed as Gostel Chair by the parliament, and Usmonov was named. At first meeting Usmonov seems a quiet and kind-hearted man, but he spares no effort as an apologist of the current regime and has close ties with the Council of Ministers. (The chief of Gostel is not to be confused with another Usmonov with the same last name, who is the Minister of Communications.)

    Different opinions exist on why the February decree was signed, the only one like it in the NIS, but there is no doubt that the growing strength of the country’s two main independent TV stations, Somonen in Dushanbe and Temurmalik in Khojent, caused a certain amount of fear in the country’s leadership. This stems from the fact that Somonen is supported by the Dushanbe city government, and Temurmalik is a child of Khamidov, one of Khojent’s most powerful industrialists and a close friend of the powerful Abduladzhanov family; both backers are potential competitors for power in the country. It is also true that the independent TV stations compete with Gostel stations for scarce revenue in the advertising market, and are considerably more successful at it.

    Another valid but less important reason is the invasion of Western morality through films on the independent TV stations; Rakhmonov is a former collective farm chair and not an intellectual, and it is easy to imagine him reacting heavy-handedly to complaints from some of the more conservative sectors of society. In spite of his fear of Islamic fundamentalism and its potential to usurp the ruling elite’s privileges, he cannot afford to alienate the predominantly Muslim population, and the non-governmental TV stations provided a convenient and powerless scapegoat. Finally, the government cites the valid but somewhat specious justification that most of the independents’ programming fare is unlicensed, and the Tajik government could be held liable under international conventions for its inability to enforce copyright law.

    As a result of the February decree, the Council of Ministers in turn ordered Gostel to submit a proposed Law on TV within three months. It did so in May 1994, and the draft is now under consideration by the Council of Ministers. The 42-page draft law is wordy in the extreme and in essence accords to the government and Gostel total control over television in the country through such phrases as the sentence in Article 6 that asserts that Gostel shall run “city and raion studios,” which includes at least in the letter of the law almost all existing “non-governmental” TV stations in the country. (The TV Law will augment an existing Law on Communications, which governs the activity of the Ministry of Communications but does not specifically address television issues.) But the law does not prohibit independent electronic media.

    The law also asserts that any TV organizations must register and have their programming plans approved by Gostel; and that Gostel has the right to close down stations if they violate this (vaguely worded) law. However, the law contains a number of good ideas (for instance according equal air time to candidates during pre-election campaigns) and with some reworking could be a functional and democratic piece of legislation.

    As of July 1994, when this report was written, the draft TV law was still under review in the Council of Ministers, where in particular the Ministries of Communications (MinSviaz) and of Finance (MinFin) at the very least will have objections to provisions which transfer existing television transmitters from MinSviaz to Gostel and which allow Gostel to earn money from advertisements while being supported by the government budget.

    Such legislation may be passed during fall 1994, but if it is not, it will have to wait for a new parliament, which is not likely to meet until after the as-yet-un-scheduled elections. This would preclude the use of the non-governmental TV stations during the pre-elec-tion campaign, which is one of the reasons the government has banned their existence. The other reason, according to some, is the pernicious moral effect they have by showing programs which feature violence and sex. The non-governmental stations, of course, deny showing such programs, and in some cases have gone so far as to pledge not to show any foreign programming at all if allowed back on the air. All assert that when they showed foreign films, they cut out the scenes with nudity or “excessive” violence.

    The Ministry of Communications’ department responsible for licensing frequencies for broadcasting use (the GIE, or State Electrocommunications Inspectorate) has drawn up draft provisions to govern issuance of such licenses, but again these provisions are ideas from local bureaucrats who admitted to having little information on which to base their work. They have been invited by their counterparts in Russia to take part in an Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development project to aid the NIS governments in frequency management, but they do not have the money to attend the seminars offered in Moscow and Minsk, and as a result the smaller, more distant countries such as Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan tend to be forgotten by the larger central republics in such joint projects. The GIE does not even have a computer and therefore has no way reliably to track existing frequency use in Tajiki-stan, not to mention undertake necessary calculations to allow new broadcasters to go on the air; previously all such work was done at the Moscow Institute of Radio-Wave Research.

Independent TV

    In 1990, the first non-Gostel TV groups began to appear (the first known one in Ura-Tiube, in Leninabad oblast), either using government-owned transmitters, building small cable systems, or constructing their own very low-power TV transmitters. Most of the more notable broadcasters received support from city governments. These include groups in Khojent, Pendzhikent, and Kuliab. Throughout the country there are at least twenty such on-air systems, at least four of which have amateur S-VHS equipment and editing controllers, with which journalists can create programs of more acceptable quality for broadcast than the VHS home cam-corders and deck-to-deck editing used by most stations.

    With respect to the government’s claim that Western films corrupt the morality of Tajiks, it is interesting to note that almost without exception, independent stations in Tajikistan cited local police departments to bolster their claim to legitimacy. They quoted statistics that the incidence of petty crime in their respective cities (laid at the feet of restless youth, as a rule) dropped dramatically—usually by about two-thirds—when the commercial TV station and its Western programming appeared on the air, and claimed that this corresponded to more young people watching TV instead of being “hooligans.”

    In Dushanbe, the only non-Gostel TV player is Somonen, the latest in a series of metamorphoses—first Ekran, then Bakhtor—through which a small group of Gostel TV folk, beginning in 1989, exited the state TV system, desiring both profit and independence. Somonen is presently run by four people, and counts as its founders the Dushanbe City Government, the Union of Youth of Tajikistan (the former Komsomol), and the city “cultural associations” of a number of other nationalities, which give the company additional legitimacy. The station was created with a SUR 50 M credit from Somon-Bank in August 1993, and the need to repay that credit in 1994 may mean the end of the station if the moratorium on its operation continues.

    Somonen went on the air in September 1993 using the Tashkent channel’s unused transmitter time in Dushanbe, from 09.00 to 17.00 on channel 7. With up to an hour per day of their own production, they began trying to produce daily news, alternating in Uzbek, Tajik, and Russian; the quality of the news is about average for such new stations, but the effort is there.

    When the February decree closed Somonen, it had about sixty employees and worked on S-VHS with five decks, two edit controllers, two S-VHS cameras, and several VHS camcorders; one camera is broken and they have had to sell one of the S-VHS cameras to stay alive since being closed. (Like many independents, they did most of their shooting on VHS because of a lack of S-VHS cassettes.) They also had a U-matic deck provided by the Iranians, which the latter immediately reclaimed when the station closed. They have no satellite reception equipment, but such equipment is widely available at a cost of $600 to $1000 for a 2-m installation. Somonen has been visited by UNESCO’s regional media person, Martin Hadlow (based in Kuala Lumpur), who has made what Somonen claims to be a commitment to finance them with a $90,000 grant, but Somonen’s director, Mirzoev, is prone to overstatement, so this needs to be confirmed.

    In Khojent, there are two non-Gostel TV groups which have a powerful channel all to themselves. They are both sponsored by powerful organizations and therefore were successful in convincing the local transmitting station to move Russian TV to a UHF frequency, freeing up a VHF frequency and transmitter for their joint use. Dzhaikhon-oro is sponsored by the city government and works on VHS. Temurmalik is the child of a seven-million-ruble investment from a large food processing plant in Kairakkum (near Khojent) with the same name, run by Khamidov, the former head of the oblast. Temurmalik works on equipment purchased in 1991 when the ruble was still worth something provided it was converted into hard currency through official channels. Until the February decree, they had 21 employees working on two S-VHS cameras, four VHS cameras, and one S-VHS edit desk, and were on the air for four hours daily. They produced 7-10 minutes of news daily, alternating days in Uzbek, Tajik, and Russian. Both Dzhai-khon-oro and Temur-malik installed their own microwave relay equipment from their respective studios to the single broadcast tower in town, and are thus able to go on the air live. Temurmalik has a satellite dish.

    Other non-Gostel TV organizations exist in all the cities visited on this research trip to one extent or another. They varied greatly: some had satellite dishes, some were interested in news, some used government transmitters. A typical station had a 10- to 100-watt transmitter of its own, ten to twenty employees, and broadcast in the evenings for about four hours, of which about one hour was its own production. In all cases they had ceased transmitting in February, but in several locations (Vos’e, Tursun-zade, and Ura-Tiube) they reinstituted broadcasts in a limited manner in May when it became clear the federal government was not in a hurry to pass the TV law which would legitimize their operation. So far, those which have returned to the air seem to operate outside the law but without retribution. The Kuliab station has exploited its connections with the chief of the national TV station to become a “temporary regional Gostel” and thus acquire 45 minutes of air time per week on the national channel.

    In all cases, these very small independent TV stations did not operate on a footing which allow them to cover their costs with revenues. They existed either on pure enthusiasm or on subsidies from city governments, local businesses, or other commercial activities. The bulk of their broadcasts are pirated programs from either satellites or Western video-cassettes imported through Moscow. Such locally-produced programs as exist (outside of Khojent and Dushanbe) tend to be paid programming sponsored by a local collective farm or factory so that a work collective can see itself on the air.

    Cable TV also appeared in about 1989 in cities with concentrations of apartment buildings, most notably Dushanbe, Khojent, and Chkalovsk, a Russian-dominated satellite town of Khojent. These are usually minuscule operations serving several apartment buildings. At its zenith ,the cable TV movement included perhaps thirty small cable networks in the country. The two major cable stations in Dushanbe, which used to have up to 50,000 subscribers each, are said to be shut down—one because of the war and one because of the February decree—but some in the north are still operating. Like cable stations elsewhere in the NIS, they rely heavily on foreign movies and produce little or none of their own programming. In Chkalovsk the cable TV still operates but does not produce any of its own programs.

    This report is the result of a two-week visit to Tajikistan in late May and early June 1994 by Eric Johnson, researcher for Internews. The Soros Foundations provided funding for the investigation.