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Report
of the Working Group on
Broadcaster Autonomy and the State
Commission
on Radio and Television Policy of Duke University
and The Carter Center of Emory University
(This document includes only
excerpts from a May 7 meeting convened in conjunction
with the Aspen Institute Program on Communications and
Society. The full report, which is quite extensive,
can be obtained by calling the Aspen Institute at
202-736-5818. The full report contains pros and
cons for each option and for areas not covered in this
excerpt.)
Television’s influence over the public
makes it a tempting target for those in government who
would seek to control public opinion—to devalue
democratic processes and eliminate the public voice as a
factor in official decisionmaking. In the United
States, the recognition of the media’s importance to
democracy is embodied in the First Amendment to the
Constitution, which instructs government to make no law
abridging the freedom of speech or the press.
Yet even in the U.S. the tradition of
press independence has occasionally come under attack
from government, and in the New Independent States, press
independence may lack deep constitutional or cultural
roots. The Working Group therefore met this year to
consider ways of protecting television autonomy, as a way
to maintain the health of democratic institutions and
processes. Though our initial focus was solely on
the autonomy of the television and radio broadcaster, it
soon became apparent that it was equally important to
consider the participation of the community—its
autonomy. For without the participation of citizens
the highest forms of public discourse cannot take place
and the concerns of the public may not reach the
political agenda. The Working Group is also mindful
of the economic problems attendant on reconstitution of
the national broadcast systems in the New Independent
States. It recognizes the difficulties of operating
a nascent, largely unregulated commercial television and
radio system alongside a more established, state-owned
broadcast system.
Autonomy (or freedom, or independence)
is about the discharge of power. In the case of the
NIS, the state may seem to be the principal or only
player from which protection needs to be
guaranteed. They are surely not alone in that
experience. In fact, however, there are three
players which affect the freedoms enjoyed in an open
society.
A legal structure against which to
plan and measure the establishment of democratic
processes and institutions must respond to all of
them. The state is often the most powerful and
self-serving in denying autonomy. As free societies
evolve, however, the press itself accrues power that can
be inimical to free expression and accurate communication
with the public, and between the government and the
people. Equally, the public and individual
citizens—though perhaps least powerful and
organized—can, when aroused, run roughshod over the
rights of institutions and individuals, including
government, the press, educational institutions, and
business.
Balance among these centers of power,
1) the government, 2) the press, and 3) the people, is as
desirable, and as problematic, in the United States as in
the NIS. Though current agendas may differ, the
goal of legal constraints and protections, and of
operational standards and expectations for all three
players—state, press, and public—seems
fundamental to civic life in all societies striving
toward the full expression of democratic principles.
I. GOALS AND FUNDAMENTALS
The Working Group discussed
several goals for autonomy of broadcasting. This
list is an inclusive one and its components are not
mutually exclusive.
- Ferreting out truth
without fear or favor; countering untruthful
ideas while uncovering facts the public needs to
know.
- Empowering ordinary
members of the public in the democratic process,
activating their interest and involvement in
civic life.
- Credibility for the
news media is rooted in their genuine
independence and believability; only credible
media can minimize citizen alienation from and
encourage participation in democratic processes.
- Controlling abuses of
power by government and by other centers of
power, including business corporations, through
exposing misdeeds and establishing a
countervailing center of power that works through
the influence of an informed and mobilized
public.
- Without autonomous
sources of information, ordinary people cannot
effectively press their interests upon and
command resources from powerful institutions
including but not limited to government.
- Providing access to
means of self-expression for the average
individual and for social institutions and
groups: allowing the nation to talk to itself.
The
Working Group also acknowledges the risks of unbridled
media autonomy. Radio and television can, if they
become too insulated from the rest of society, become a
center of arrogant and unresponsive power
themselves. For example, the electronic media are
sometimes perceived to display an undue cynicism,
distrust and antagonism toward government leaders.
This can damage democratic discourse, and foment citizen
alienation from politics. Media autonomy is not an
end in itself; it is a means toward a healthy
participatory democracy and society.
Members of the Working Group suggested
several definitions of media autonomy. Some of
these notions are compatible with each other; others may
conflict.
- Broadcasters should
enjoy freedom of program choice without
accountability to government for program content.
- Those who run
broadcast outlets should have maximum freedom
from all government involvement in their
decisions; they should be free to maximize their
economic profits, ideological satisfaction, or
any other goals they choose, as disciplined and
restricted by the pressures and incentives of a
competitive free economic market.
- Control over public
debate should not be exerted by self-serving,
powerful forces in society, including but not
only government: broadcast media should be free
to stimulate and channel open, diverse,
free-flowing public discourse.
- Broadcasters should
have the freedom to maintain critical distance
from all centers of political and economic
power—to establish an adversary relationship
with both government and corporate power.
- Broadcasters must
possess guarantees of access to information about
government; with few exceptions, secrecy in
government is incompatible with an independent
press and a democratic process.
II. OWNERSHIP AND
REGULATORY STRUCTURES
A. Buffer Organizations
Autonomy for broadcasters can be
greatly aided by the creation of buffer organizations to
stand between government and commercial entities on the
one hand and the broadcaster on the other. Such
buffers are useful especially if one takes the view that
neither the government nor the market can fully reflect
the public’s preferences.
Buffer organizations can take the form
of 1) Independent government regulatory agencies such as
the U.S. Federal Communications Commission; 2)
Government-appointed oversight entities, such as the
British Broadcasting Corporation; and 3) Citizens
Advisory Councils, established by joint efforts of
broadcasters and citizens or by one of the two other
forms of buffer agencies.
In the first two forms, buffer
organizations promulgate broadcast regulations; in the
latter, the councils provide less formal input to
broadcasters.
Option 1: Establish buffer
organizations to protect the broadcasting system from
government interference in programming decisions and
content.
Option 2: For initial period of
time, buffer organizations may set requirements in the
public interest, e.g., for regional or special minority
cultural programming, public affairs programming,
etc. Review requirements after such time as
competitive structure becomes more developed.
Option 3: Method of appointment
to buffer committees should ensure reasonable
representation of a range of voices in the communities
served by the broadcaster.
B. The Public Service Broadcasting System
While buffer organizations are
central to the ability of the entire broadcasting system
to carry out its ultimate goals, certain policies should
be considered that relate specifically to this type of
system.
Option 1: Create separate
regulatory bodies for individual public service
broadcasting services (if more than one) with different
sources of funding.
Option 2: If corporate or
government funding is accepted by public service
broadcasters, strictly separate the production of
programs from funding mechanisms and organizations.
In the U.S., this is the purpose of the Corporation for
Public Broadcasting; in the U.K., of the British
Broadcasting Corporation.
C. Commercial System
Option 1:
Notwithstanding Option #1 in Section A above, minimize
governmental regulation of the commercial sector of
broadcasting. Under this option, buffer
organizations exist only to protect commercial
broadcasters’ decisions from intrusion by public
officials.
III. TECHNOLOGICAL AUTONOMY
Television represents an enormous
political asset to those who are in power and those who
seek it. Therefore, governments may not willingly
give up their control of the delivery system by which
television signals reach the public. However, the
Working Group strongly asserts that without technological
autonomy, the independence of television broadcasters is
severely compromised. All the options below are
predicated on the overriding recommendation that
privately-owned transmission facilities and
telecommunications infrastructure should be developed as
soon as feasible where (as in the NIS) they are
lacking. The following options should be considered
as methods of protecting autonomy during the transition
to a privately-owned common carrier telecommunications
infrastructure.
Option 1: Government-owned
satellites, transmitters and wire line networks should
operate as common carriers made available to all
television stations for a reasonable and stable
fee. Common carrier operation means the facilities
must be open to all stations desiring to use them that
can pay the fee; the owners of a common carrier facility
have no right to censor or modify the content of any
communication.
Option 2: For initial period of
time, buffer organizations may set requirements in the
public interest, e.g., for regional or special
minority cultural programming, public affairs
programming, etc. Review requirements after such
time as competitive structure becomes more developed.
Option 3: Create as many
technological options as possible, and make sure that
there is enough overlap and redundancy to continue
broadcasting if one technology fails or is
withdrawn. Minimize costs of these alternatives.
Option 4: Autonomy for
broadcasting institutions should be paralleled by
autonomy of other organizations, such as colleges,
unions, and community groups, which should be given
low-cost production equipment and encouraged to
distribute programming via broadcasting and other means.
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