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Portrait of the Press Minister

        (According to our correspondent Vladimir Orlov, when Boris Mironov was appointed Chairman of the newly established RF Committee on the Press, a report published in Novoe Vremia weekly referred to him as “an obscure publisher.”  Izvestia’s Valery Vyzhutovich interview Mironov recently and Orlov has sent us the report, with his notes, because it “sheds light and heat on the personality, career, connections, and views of the man who has a degree of influence on the Russian Press.”  The account was published in Izvestia on May 28, 1994.)

        Boris Mironov started his journalist career in Siberia as a rank-and-file reporter for some raion papers.  Subsequently he was transferred to the oblast administrative center as a correspondent for the Komsomol and then the Communist Party newspapers of the oblast.  His journalist experience in the provinces helped him to move to Moscow were he worked for “Komsomolsksia Pravda” and “Pravda.”  He published feature stories in the “Pravda” column “The man and the Party.”  After 10 years at “Pravda” he entered the Academy of Social Sciences of the Central Committee of CPSU, a privileged institution of higher education where “nomenclatura” were bred.  He used the years of study to write a novel, “The Madman,” which he qualifies now as an anti-party novel.”

        Upon graduating from the Academy Mironov was assigned to the Office of the USSR Prime Minister Ryzhokov as an analyzer of the government mail.  His candid analytical report “On the authority of the Government” almost resulted in his dismissal from the government job, and only Ryzhkov’s interference that saved him.

        He found himself jobless after the Soviet Union collapsed, but a friend from the “Pravda” days came to the aid.  The pal’s name was Mikhail Poltoranin, then Minister for Press and Information.  Mironov spent some time as the Ministry’s consultant and later was pushed up to become the editor-in-chief of the newly established government newspaper, “Rossiiskaia Gazeta,” though not for long as he was discharged by Ruslan Khasbulatov who was enraged with Mironov’s criticism of Supreme Soviet deputies in an article published in the liberal weekly, “Ogoniok.”

        Again, the old buddy came to his aid, and Mironov was assigned to be director-general of the “Russkaia Kniga” (Book of Russia) Publishing House which became a springboard to his present ministerial assignment.

        Mironov’s position lets him influence the country’s print press, including publication of books, as he is in command of distribution of the government subsidies.  All requests for subsidies, summed up, come to nearly 1.000 billion rubles.  This year the government could afford only 110 billion for this purpose.  Mironov claims that through a “subsidy commission” all the print media will be supported, regardless of their political orientation.  However, his ideological record makes this pronounced intention very doubtful.  “I am neither a partocrat, nor a democrat,” says Mironov.

        But what is his ideology?  A democrat he is surely not.  After his present appointment he called for introduction of “moral censorship” in a TV interview.  He insisted on appointment of General Chernenko as his deputy.  Mironov met Chernenko when he worked for “Pravda” where the general was a KGB overseer.  Mironov’s sympathies are with the Russian National sobor (Council), a reactionary nationalist movement of Russian chauvinists.

        In practice, the pronounced impartiality of the “subsidy commission” appears to favor many publications that share the ideology of the Press Minister.  In addition to the papers that he called “our national asset”—”Pravda,” “Sovetskaia Rossiia,” “Trud”—substantial portions of the government subsidies have been already allocated to publishing houses “Russkaiia Kniga” (518 million); “Sovremennik” (216 million); “Voskresenie” (130 million) and “Patriot” (23 million).

        Who backs Mironov?—the author further asks.  Poltoranin’s protection could only harm him as the man is generally disliked in the ruling circles.  Shumeiko, whom Mironov succeeded, had never taken his temporary assignment seriously.  As to the other top decision-makers, they seemingly do not regard the post of the Press Minister a key position in the government.

        Most probably, it is the Russian National Sobor and similar movements that stake on Mironov in hope to use the budget funds concentrated in his hands, and his authority over the print press in their interests.

        Another aspect that Izvestia’s author brings to attention is Mironov’s possible involvement in commercial activity.  There are fourteen business enterprises under the roof of the RF Committee on the Press.  This suggests an idea that conflict of interests may exist.  But so far the law on civil service has not been passed in Russia that would specify the do’s and don’ts of a government bureaucrat.

 

Last Updated: 11/20/99

 

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