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Belarus: New Principles, New Broadcasting Bill Belarus—one of the few ex-Soviet republics where the mass media are still regulated in accordance with the USSR Press and Other Mass Media Law of 1990—may yet gain its own legislation prepared the Ministry of Information together with the State TV and Radio Company. The draft broadcasting bill provides the state is responsible not just for “support,” but also for the “realization of direct leadership,” “determination of the general foundations in the sphere of TV and radio over the whole territory of the republic,” “approval and realization of the TV and radio development programs,” “financing of TV and radio bodies,” “control over implementation of broadcasting legislation,” “conduct of the uniform scientific and technological policy,” “rational siting and effective development of the technical facilities of TV and radio broadcasting”—the list goes on. The government “protection” would not extend to state broadcasting organizations. Article 2 of the Broadcasting Bill affirms that its legal effect applies to “all types of television and radio entities independent of their proprietor.” It is the independent stations, less obedient than state broadcasters to the “traditional” forms of regulation, such as departmental instructions, “telephone law,” and political subordination, that have been of particular concern to the government. The law as a system of norms and procedures for their implementation has never been the basic instrument of social regulation Belarus; rather, it has been viewed as a mechanism of indirect, and less efficient, action. Direct actions—cadres policy, financing, and provision of benefits, etc.—have always been preferred and more efficient. Take, for example, a remark by the conservative Prime Minister Vyacheslav Kebich: “The government provides credits to the newspapers and magazines that take the correct positions. Why provide a credit to a newspaper that tries to undermine stability in our country? I shall support all the press with the exception of those publications that stand against the government.” [Belarusskaya niva. June 9, 1992.] The situation is changing, however, with the achievement of independence by Belarus, the growth of social and political activity in the republic, and the development of institutions of civil society, including independent mass media. The Ministry of Information created an expert group to establish “Principles for the Development of an Information Space in the Republic of Belarus,” subsequently approved and published in the government newspaper. [Zvyazda, April 9, 1993] Although the preamble of the Principles states that “at [their] basis lies the idea of the free mass media as a major guarantor of human freedom and the democratic development of society,” the document views such freedom as in fact established by state protection of the loyal press. The state protection is understood as the “material, technical, and financial support of the mass media.” It shall be realized through “creation of a privileged regime of taxation, state subsidization and credits, . . . preservation of the state order, and state provision of the major material and technical resources for mass media entities.” The necessity of such protection is explained with the new lexicon: “The state protects the press from the heavy pressure of market relations so it may achieve economic and political independence.” The criteria for the mass media to obtain these state protection benefits are clearly stated: the media should “cover current public, political, social, economic and scientific-technological issues from the perspective of state interests, and pursue a policy of strengthening public consent, avoiding extremist articles and abstaining from utterances that harm the spiritual and moral health of the masses.” Legal Changes When discussing regulation of the mass media, one should not forget the role of the third branch of the government—the judiciary. At its December, 1992 session, the Supreme Court of Belarus established the legal standards to govern defamation claims by citizens and organizations. Under those standards, a retraction of a previously published statement by a publication does not relieve it of legal responsibility. Previously, if a plaintiff lost a case, he was required to pay ten percent of the claimed damages as taxes. Now, however, he is relieved from this burden and is not constrained from claiming huge sums as damages. Moreover, the types of statements that the Supreme Court declared are capable of harming the honor of plaintiffs are articulated so broadly that almost anything can be brought to a court’s attention. Article 154 (“Disgrace”) of the new Criminal Code provides that a large fine may be imposed for the dissemination of truthful information that may disgrace a person. Thus, a journalist is now under a threat of prosecution for any critical story, even if it is entirely true. In 1993, there were at least a dozen such trials, and all of them were lost by the journalists. Last December, the Supreme Soviet deputies declined to put into the Constitutional text a provision that “citizens of Belarus have the right to freely collect and disseminate information” on the grounds, in the words of the then-Chairman of the Constitutional Committee (now the Attorney General) who declared at the parliamentary session that it “gives too much freedom.” When the Constitution was adopted on March 15th, it did not contain the provision. It might seem paradoxical, but the government’s views on freedom of the press are to some extend shared by the opposition. In 1993, the Independent Institute of Socio-Economic and Political Studies interviewed about 50 leaders of major political parties and public movements. In reply to the question “What would be the optimal relations between your political organization and its publication?,” most of those polled answered “The publication should be our organ [instrument].” More than 40 percent of those polled declared that the purpose of creating such “organs” was the “establishment of the organization by means of publishing a newspaper.” This answer is an exact rendering of Lenin’s classic characterization of the press as “first and foremost, the center and the basis of a political organization.” And these are not mere words: nearly 30 percent of such organizations publish their own newspapers and magazines. Thus, liberal dreams of a radical reform of the Belarussian mass media with a change of the political elite remain dreams. Such views on the role of the press—however paradoxical that might sound—are also close to the opinions of journalists themselves, especially those from the state-owned publications. About two-thirds of the leading journalists and editors whom we polled in 1993 answered that the state should “protect national interests in the sphere of mass communications.” Three out of four said the government should continue subsidizing the mass media. The evolving system of free enterprise may create new perspectives among the public on the role of the mass media. Evidence of this may be found in the reply that business people who own mass media outlets gave to the question “What are the national interests of Belarus in the sphere of mass media?”: “They are in the free exchange of full and objective information.” (In comparison, the same question to state officials and journalists generally brought this reply: “In the education of the public in the nationalist spirit.”) The question “What should be regulated by the mass media law?” was answered by the business people: “The right of citizens to information.” “Who should define national interests in the sphere of mass communications?” was answered: “Law and the courts.” Of the business people surveyed, 36 percent opposed state subsidies for the mass media. Therefore, I conclude that the most effective mechanism for real change in the role of the press and in mass media regulation in a transitional society (not as a form of control, but as a guarantee of the new role of the mass media) lies in the development of free enterprise, including privatization. Those who experience a taste of choice and a taste of profit under a system of pluralistic and independent press—competing newspapers and broadcasters—will never forget it. Oleg Manaev |
Last Updated: 11/20/99 |
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© 1999 Post-Soviet Media Law &
Policy Newsletter |
