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Free Press: Some Cautionary Notes What are the conditions of law and human organization that are the foundations for a free press? There’s a general feeling that in matters of press as well as economics, shock therapy—as free a press as quickly as possible—is a good thing, but some commentators are more cautionary. Frances Foster has written about this subject in a lengthy article entitled “Ivzvestiia as a Mirror of Russian Legal Reform: Press, Law and Crisis in the Post-Soviet Era” published in volume 26 of the Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 91993). We have adapted a short and relevant excerpt of the article, though without footnotes. Professor Foster is at the Washington University School of Law in St. Louis, Missouri. The initial Russian justifications for freedom of the press were strikingly similar to their United States counterparts. Proponents argued that an independent Fourth Estate would expose and check potential abuses and “mistakes” by executive, legislative, and judicial branches; provide the citizenry with the “full and objective” information essential for democratic self-governance; assist in the spiritual liberation of the populace from the shackles of socialism; offer a forum for introduction, comparison, and debate of reform proposals; and “consolidate” Russian citizens in support of their embattled government during “a time of most difficult sociopolitical changes and economic trials.” Russian leaders have promised unswerving defense of the Fourth Estate and even recognized it as an essential prerequisite for establishment of a democratic, law-based state. Yet, reality has diverged markedly from these high-sound phrases. There has been a pattern of increasing leadership attempts to influence and to subordinate the Russian mass media by direct and indirect, political and economic means. The post-Soviet era has witnessed a rapid implementation of prior restraints on publication, restrictions on press access to information, numerous criminal and civil actions against media organs and personnel, and introduction of draft legislation to expand liability for disclosure of state secrets, insulting of top officials, attacks on constitutional organs of power, and violations of Russian Federation “integrity.” Some Russian commentators have detected an ominous correspondence between recent proposals and the most repressive, “antidemocratic” provisions of the Soviet-era criminal code. Foreign and domestic observers generally attribute this backlash to the Russian leadership’s unfamiliarity with, sensitivity to, and, ultimately, intolerance of Fourth Estate criticism and opposition. The Izvestiia experience provides strong support for this argument. After all, the original catalyst for the dramatic events that followed was Izvestiia’s open, direct challenge to the authority, legitimacy, and public image of the Russian parliament and its chairman. Interestingly, in the midst of the Izvestiia case when Yeltsin too received unfavorable press coverage, there was immediate speculation that president as well as parliament would turn against the media. A closer look, however, suggests an additional, less obvious explanation. The recent moves against the media may reflect not only the early success of the Russian press as an embryonic Fourth Estate, but also its fundamental failure as a force for societal consolidation and moderation during a period of profound national crisis. One of the most compelling but least cited United States defenses for freedom of the expression relates precisely to the issue of crisis management that confronts Russia today. In the words of Thomas Emerson, “freedom of expression . . . is an essential mechanism for maintaining the balance between stability and change.” In the United States context, the press has traditionally promoted this equilibrium in two main ways. It has acted as a “safety valve” for the release and “domestication” of popular discontent and frustration. Equally importantly, it has communicated to and persuaded the United States citizenry that established political and legal institutions and processes are both predictable and flexible enough to accommodate change. In post-Soviet Russia, enhanced press independence has led to very different results. The Russian press has played a destabilizing, not moderating, role. Its debate of competing strategies and objectives has contributed to public dissention and disunity. Its unrelenting criticism and exposure of personal and systematic failings has eroded rather than fostered public confidence in the post-socialist Russian leadership and evolving norms, rules, institutions, and procedures. Thus, the press has demystified and delegitimized the present as well as the past. A central tenet of the United States rationale for broad expressive rights is that “an open society will be the stronger and more cohesive one.” The early experience in post-Soviet Russia, however, suggests the opposite conclusion. In his examination of United States freedom of expression, Thomas Emerson identified two limitations that may help explain this apparent contradiction between general theory and Russian practice: (1) “society must be committed to democratic procedures or rather in the process of committing itself,” and (2) “men [must] have learned to function within the law.” The Izvestiia experience provides ample evidence that Russia has thus far failed to satisfy either of these requirements. The case casts serious doubts on the level of current commitment to democratic procedure and indicates grave problems in enforcement and observance of law. This prompts a perplexing question that has far-reaching implications for the reform process in Russia and other former socialist states. Is conventional wisdom correct that press freedom is a precondition for the democratic, law-based state? Or is the democratic, law-based state a precondition for press freedom? |
Last Updated: 11/20/99 |
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© 1999 Post-Soviet Media Law &
Policy Newsletter |
