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Advil: Russia’s state broadcasting system, which guarantees the integrity of the country’s “common information space,” must remain the property of the state—so declared President Yeltsin on February 24th, as he endorsed continued subsidies for print media. These goals, however, are colliding with Russia’s economic problems, creating difficult dilemmas for policymakers. The most dramatic effects are being felt in the state television and radio broadcasting system, with its four national television channels, radio networks, and more than eighty regional broadcasting companies, where budget cuts and subsidy reductions are producing programming changes and threatening severe reductions of air time. State broadcasters, who are almost totally dependent on the national budget because their advertising revenues are insignificant and who do not receive license fee monies, were recently warned by the Finance Ministry to prepare for 50% funding cuts. The major problem is the cost of signal distribution. State broadcasters do not own or control the expensive system of satellites, transmitters, and other facilities needed to transmit signals over Russia’s vast territory and beyond to other CIS countries; instead, the system is a monopoly of the Russian Communications Ministry. It is estimated that some 70-80% of state broadcasters’ expenditures are to the Communications Ministry for signal distribution. In the past, massive government subsidies to the Communications Ministry cushioned the impact of these costs on state broadcasters. However, those subsidies have been drastically reduced in the last two years. The Communications Ministry, meanwhile, chafes under the fact that the tariff rates paid by state broadcasters have not been changed since 1981, kept artificially low by the state subsidies. The Ministry would rather make room for independent broadcasters, who are viewed as capable of paying their bills and are not protected by the freeze on state broadcasters’ tariff rates. As long ago as last July, Deputy Communications Minister Mikhail Yelizarov proposed that all state television companies—national and regional—have their air time slashed by at least 40%, stating that broadcasting should not take place during the morning, afternoon, or late evening. A successful result of this lobbying effort was the inclusion in President Yeltsin’s December 18, 1993 decree on state broadcasting [see issue number four] of a provision directing state broadcasters to submit within one month proposals to the Council of Ministers for the possible reduction of broadcasting time. To our knowledge, such proposals have not been made. Whether independent broadcasters can afford to pay higher transmission rates is questionable—last summer, the General Director of radio station Ekho Moskvy, Yurii Fedutinov, complained that tariffs for the use of transmitters in Moscow were three times higher than world standards, stating that it is three times cheaper to place a transmitter on top of the Empire State Building in New York than on the Ostankino tower in Moscow. The most recent manifestation of these problems was the February 10th job action by communications workers—the engineers and technicians who operate signal transmission facilities—who shut down one-third of the country’s transmitters for all or part of the day on February 10th in an effort to recover back wages unpaid since December. The effort, which with the exception of Moscow blacked out most state broadcasters’ programming for much of the day, may have been successful: Prime Minister Chernomyrdin quickly promised to pay off the state broadcasters’ debts (estimated at equivalent to some $43-50 million) in stages during the first quarter of 1994. Another result of the funding cutbacks is the widespread use of independent production companies’ programming on Ostankino’s channel one. According to Irena Lesnevskaya, head of independent production company REN-TV, more than 75% of the programming on Ostankino’s channel one is now produced by independent companies. Of perhaps even more ominous import to some politicians is the airing of foreign programming. During a State Duma session on February 16th, a deputy from Vladimir Zhirinovsky’s Liberal Democratic Party decried an Italian television company’s purchase of air time and called upon Mikhail Poltoranin, chairman of the Duma’s Committee on Information Policy and Communications, to explain “the consequences for the audience of the sale of broadcasting time to foreign television companies.” In responding, Poltoranin declared that the airing of “low-grade” Western films “does not improve the standards of morality in Russia” and enlarged upon this theme to denounce “privatization of our channels,” a process which he described as “destruction of the common information space” in Russia. Indeed, state broadcasters face growing competition from independent broadcasters. For example, Independent Television (NTV), with its 58 hours per week on channel four of programming which features foreign films, productions by independent domestic studios, and highly-regarded news programs, is reportedly increasing in popularity. Vladimir Gusinsky, the head of the Most banking consortium bankrolling NTV, recently predicted that NTV will be operating in the black within three to five years. In a Reuters interview, Gusinsky added that the Most group, which also owns the Sevodnya newspaper, is considering the purchase of several other newspapers and an ownership stake in a radio station (reportedly independent broadcaster Ekho Moskvy). As a result of these developments, Russian policymakers are in a quandary as they ponder whether and how to shore up state broadcasting companies. As one commentator, Sergei Dorenko of Russian TV, put it in a February 9th broadcast: “At the moment the government refuses to allow state channels to become share-holding companies but neither does it finance them itself.” The former approach is favored by Grigori Shevelev, First Deputy Chairman of Ostankino. In a January 24th ITAR-TASS interview, Shevelev pointed out that it would be impossible for Ostankino to adapt to new market conditions when the government budget could satisfy less than half the company’s financial requirements. He also rejected the idea of cutting back on air time, declaring that Ostankino is Russia’s “national asset,” and it is not possible “to lower the plank.” In his opinion, the only solution is to turn Ostankino into a joint-stock company, presumably with state entities as at least some of the participants. It is doubtful that this will be the approach taken by the State Duma, which apparently will soon be considering legislation to bolster the position of state broadcasters. Deputy Poltoranin has announced that a draft broadcasting law is being prepared and that the Information Policy Committee will hold hearings on the economic status of the mass media. Long a vocal advocate of significant state funding for Ostankino and Russian TV, Poltoranin is strongly opposed to privatization or conversion into joint-stock companies. He told the Duma on February 16th that Russia must maintain at least two state broadcasting companies, and that if local budgets were to be saddled with supporting regional broadcasters, “we would thereby edge closer to the dismemberment of Russia.” As for privatization, he criticized financial groups that want to translate their resources into political power by “brazenly” grabbing television time and channels, warning that “Russia’s fate is at stake.” Poltoranin’s views appear to be consistent with those of State Duma Chairman Ivan Rybkin. In a January 31st interview on Russian TV, Rybkin cited the independence of the mass media as an important goal, but added that they must receive financial support from the state rather than attempt to tackle their problems on their own. As an example of his thinking, he cited the BBC, which he had recently visited. Peter Krug |
Last Updated: 11/20/99 |
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© 1999 Post-Soviet Media Law &
Policy Newsletter |
