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Yakovlev to Head Ostankino, Media Institutions Reshuffled Fingers Point and Heads Roll: Notes on a Grim Russian Election President Boris Yeltin, on December 22, just ten days after the elections and referendum on the constitution, issued sweeping decrees altering the regulation of the mass media in Russia. The Federal Information Center and the Ministry of the Press and Information will be abolished, effective February 15, with the current Minister, Vladimir Shumeiko, “in charge of the process of liquidation.” “The mass media will have a more precisely defined structure,” Yeltsin said at a news conference, a result to be accomplished by placing more of the machinery of regulation directly under the President. A senior official said that the news agencies ITAR-TASS and RIA (Novostri) would be “state-run and, at the same time, absolutely independent—two notions which are difficult, if not impossible to combine.” According to Shumeiko, there will be two structures, a Federal Television and Radio Broadcasting Service, responsible for both federal and regional broadcasting systems, and a Committee for the Press, which will deal with periodicals, publishing houses and the state inspectorate. Yeltsin named Aleksandr Yakovlev, commonly referred to as the septuagenarian former advisor to Mikhail Gorbachev and the progenitor of modern glasnost, head of Ostankino, replacing the ousted Vyacheslav Bragin. Yakoviev will also be the head of the Federal Television and Radio Broadcasting Service. The Press Committee will be headed by Boris Mironov, director of a major publishing house. We shall track these important developments. Other notes: 1. A new private channel The decree also included important news that a frequency will be allocated to NTV, a private entity headed by Igor Malashenko and financed by the Most group of banks, to begin, on an experimental basis, the broadcasting of a television service. This is significant on several scores: the fact that the frequency was awarded without using the Temporary Commission to review competitive bids; the fact that the entity seems to be wholly Russian, i.e., without foreign investors; and the recognition of the talent and skill of Malashenko and his group, consisting of some of the best reporters and producers from Ostankino. 2. Ave Bragin Symbolic gestures tell a lot about the relationship between government and television: Victor Chernomyrdin personally went to Ostankino to introduce Yakovlev as the new director. He pointed out the “sad experience of the director’s three predecessors” but saw stability and promise under Yakovlev’s leadership. Yakovlev, in his first comments, said society now understands that “television is power, the fourth power, and any power can be constructive or destructive.” He suggested that television “should be constructive when Russia is in the grip of panic-stricken statements” at a time of economic trial. His deputy will be Valentin Lazutkin who was the first deputy under Bragin. It is unclear how Yakovlev’s duties as head of the Federal Service will relate to his duties as director of Ostankino. What was striking about Bragin’s departure was the stamp of old Bolshevik ways, the notion that the leadership of the state television network must serve the pleasure of the leader. The word on the street was the Bragin had not performed his task during the election; he had given too much space and time to Vladimir Zhirinovsky, or, conversely, though he had tried to favor the reformers, he and Ostankino had failed. As TASS reported, Bragin was “accused of complete incompetence for his role in electoral campaign which gave excessive coverage of ultra-nationalist Zhirinovsky.” 3. The Hawk incident The night before the election, Ostankino showed on the First Channel a highly opinionated film about Zhirinovsky called “The Hawk.” The information Arbitration Tribunal considered the showing of the film on election eve to be unlawful under the regulations concerning the last day before voting. The general idea of the Ostankino scheduler, most commentators agree, was to embarrass Zhirinovsky, linking him to fascists. But, according to Stepan Kiselev, a deputy editor of Moskovskiye Novosti, the programs gave him credibility among the large number of undecided voters. ITAR-TASS reported that Zhirinovksy accused Ostankino of an affront to his dignity by showing the film. 4. Decisions of the Information Arbitration Tribunal The Tribunal, in Resolution No. 8, issued two days before the election, singled out Zhirinovsky for “repeatedly appearing on television and radio, in particular on 6 and 7 December 1993, on the Ostankino channel, and earlier—on 24 November—on the Russian television channel, and making announcements which stirred up national differences and incited violations of human rights.” The tribunal also found “odious” and illegal a variety of unusual practices: a candidate in the 145th constituency (Rostov) ran an announcement that if victorious, he would provide a car and an apartment for winning tickets in a voting lottery. Some newspapers violated the prohibition against printing the results of public polls ten days before the election or smearing candidates. Violations included broadcasts on December 12 containing interviews with voters who had cast their ballots and indicated whether they had voted for or against the constitution. Rossiiskaya Gazeta was cited for publishing an article called “Why I am Voting for” the constitution despite the ban on publishing material the day previous to the referendum. Finally, the Tribunal regretted that local mass media councils had not been established as provided for in the election law. The Tribunal considered that had these councils been created, much of the pressure on the federal Tribunal might have been averted. 5. A Chapter of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, Zhirinovsky’s party, warned local journalists against discourteous utterances about the party’s activities “Should Zhirinovsky’s party henceforth be called a fascist party and Novosibirsk voters who voted for him to be referred to as fools and dimwits,” the LDPR said, it will “institute criminal proceedings against the journalists and editors of the publications concerned.” 6. In a post-election interview (with Denis Molchanov), Vsevolod Vilchek, head of Ostankino’s sociological service, pointed lots of fingers Vinchek condemned the Electoral Commission and the Information Tribunal for the entire structure of the public debate. “In conditions of a crisis,” he said, where people are justly embittered by government mistakes, then simply to rent out airtime, turning television in to a renting center where all say what they want without challenge or critical commentary, without clashes between viewpoints, is extremely dangerous. “This arrangement creates a situation inimical to democratic and reformist forces who cannot make irresponsible promises. A situation is created which is most favorable for demagogues of any kind.” 7. Some additional conclusions All in all, this election was tragic Russian theater—dramatic moments, artistic cunning, sturm and drang. It was an election which started with high officials of Ostankino running for office (until they were discouraged from doing so) and in which Press and Information Minister Vladinmir Shumeiko (also a candidate) sough unsuccessfully to ban two parties from the ballot, an election in which polls showed a surprising amount of apathy and distrust of the official media, and an election in which the President, Boris Yeltsin, vacillated between intense and immediate interest and disdain and absence. Aleksandr Nevzorov, a famous television personality in St. Petersburg who was shut down by Yeltsin supporters last fall for an alleged appeal to “armed insurrection,” was elected to the Duma. The equal time provisions for blocs and candidates probably made a difference, though not necessarily the kind of difference that the forces of reform contemplated. For the reformers, the ban on press reporting of polling information may have backfired. Studies of a rise in nationalist sentiment could not be reported publicly as a means of rousing reformist support. Despite equal time provisions, the influence of the government on the news was fairly evident: if not at the ballot box, on the nightly news, at least, the advantage of incumbency and the hand of government were clear to those who watched carefully. The information Arbitration Tribunal seems to have rendered an important service and there is a strong possibility it will find a permanent home among Russian institutions. The Financial Post pointed out that “ not a single reformist leader held a television debate with Zhirinovsky to point out to voters the flaws in his arguments.” The President’s press secretary, Vyacheslav Kostikov, complained, mid-way in the campaign, that the democratic innovations (such as the set-asides for blocs and candidates on television) were being used “not to present programmes, but for crude attacks on the president, government and opponents.” Kostikov opposed those who “wafted not he spirit of national consensus which society so badly needs, but a dangerous wind of civil war.” TV screens, he complained, were showering voters “with a stream of lies, juggling of facts, social demagogy and plain abuse.” 8. Renewing the Media Wars The most important point, however, is that this election means a serious and bitter replay of the media wars of the last year. The opposition will seek some say in control of the management of state television and radio. Neutral-sounding efforts to “privatize” will be seen as ways of turning the instruments of mass information to the business or reform class, to those with Western support and funds, to joint ventures with foreign investors. The struggle for control will range over assignment of licenses, the appointment process, the selection of anchors, all the areas flagged during the sitting of the last Parliament. |
Last Updated: 11/20/99 |
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© 1999 Post-Soviet Media Law &
Policy Newsletter |
