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Censorship as an International Obligation? Russia’s obligations under international law have emerged as a new government rationale—in the absence of a state of emergency—for closing papers and bypassing procedural safeguards of the Russian Media Law. On October 20 and again in mid-November, the Ministry of Press and Information invoked the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights to justify summary closures, and the Nuremberg trial precedents and the Human Rights Declaration have also been rolled out to justify the President’s actions. According to a TASS report, the Ministry blasted those “advocates of nazism and fascism” who “deliberately overlook” the fact that the Ministry acted in strict accordance with the Covenant. Specifically, the Ministry cited Article 20(2), which imposes on member states the duty of insuring that “any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law.” The facts may well support the Ministry’s assertion that Russia is obligated under Article 20(2) of the Covenant to prosecute the closed newspapers. But, far from excusing the avoidance of procedural safeguards and a fair process, the Covenant requires them. Article 20(2) must be read in conjunction with Articles 19 and 14 of the Covenant. Article 19 guarantees the right to freedom of expression, subject to certain restrictions “such as are provided by law.” The key to the government’s powers to restrict free expression under Articles 19 and 20 is in Article 14(1), which guarantees “a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law” whenever the rights and obligations are being determined. The Yeltsin government continues to seek admission to the Council of Europe, the organization of 32 member states (Romania was invited to become number 32 on October 4, 1993) that promotes the development of democracy and the rule of law. So far, the Council has resisted issuing such an invitation, apparently because Russia lacks a democratic constitution. In a message to a Council summit meeting in early October, President Yeltsin reiterated Russia’s desire to join the Council, citing Russia’s “irrevocable choice of reforms” and inviting the Council to send observers to the December 12th elections. A promise to ratify the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) is one of the conditions for entry to the Council of Europe. Article 10 of the ECHR, which guarantees the right to freedom of expression to all persons within the jurisdiction of the member states, has been the subject of numerous decisions by the judicial organs established under the ECHR—the European Court and Commission of Human Rights. If the Russian Federation is successful in its quest for admission to the Council of Europe, its mass media regulation will be subject to Article 10 and the European Commission and Court of Human Rights. Currently before the Court is a case—Jersild v. Denmark—which may be relevant to the Russian Federation’s application of Article 4 of the Russian mass media law. In Jersild, the Danish government successfully prosecuted a television journalist for producing and broadcasting an interview with three youths who spoke in abusive terms about immigrants and ethnic groups in Denmark. He was convicted of violating a statute that prohibits contributing to the expression and dissemination of communications which threaten, insult, or degrade persons on account of their race, color, national or ethnic origin or religion. The journalist’s subsequent petition to the ECHR judicial organs, alleging that his conviction violated Article 10, was deemed admissible by the European Commission of Human Rights in September, 1992. Peter Krug |
Last Updated: 11/20/99 |
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© 1999 Post-Soviet Media Law &
Policy Newsletter |
