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Founders and Emergencies: It’s a little tricky to dignify censorship within the rule of law, or bring legal analysis to moments of revolution, but here’s how we understand the statutory justifications for the fairly draconian actions after the dissolution of the Parliament and the violent events of October 3. Recall that on September 23, after suspension of the Parliament, the Council of Ministers also ordered the suspension of newspapers, magazines and radio and broadcast programs of the Supreme Soviet. And on October 4, the government suspended a group of “extreme” newspapers, including Pravda, Sovetskaya Rossiia, and Den, on the grounds that their founders were organizations that participated in the Moscow uprising. The government also asserted prior censorship for two days over other publications including Nevasimaia Gazeta and Segdodnia. A St. Petersburg daily, Chas pik (Rush Hour), published a report by Pavel Gutiontov, Chair of the Committee on Defense of Freedom of Speech and Rights of Journalists. He reported that one censored item was a short report on the suspension of a number of newspapers founded by the organizations responsible for the “events in Moscow.” What the censors found condemnatory was not the report itself, but “the lack of exaltation” about the decision. “It is hard to call these actions a brave step towards democracy,” Gutiontov concluded. A complicated, and interesting explanation for the September 23 action resides in the murky area of Russian law concerning the power of “the founder” of newspapers and other instruments of mass information. Remember that only publications for which the Supreme Soviet was the founder were closed in late September. In a sense, the Council of Ministers’ resolution declared that, with the Parliament suspended, a new “founder” for its publications was needed, and the successor would be the government itself. Under Article 16 of the Mass Media Law, a founder may, under certain circumstances, close its publications down without having to seek a court order (as otherwise required by statute). Those circumstances are limited to authorizations found either in the editorial charter or an agreement between the founder and the editor-in-chief of the publication. The October 4 terminations and suspensions were based on the President’s emergency powers, but even there, the interpretation of these powers seemed to relate to the prohibitions of Article 4 of the Mass Media Law (authorizing censorship if a publication engages in appeals for seizure of power, for violent change in the constitutional order or integrity of the state, or incitements to national, class, social, or religious prejudice or intolerance). In an October 5th interview, the chief of the State Inspectorate for the Protection of the Press, Yuri Luchinskii, justified the closure of Pravda, Den, and other newspapers by equating their communism with fascism and their common relationship to Article 4 criteria. Earlier, on September 22nd, Luchinskii had warned that all publications calling for abolition of the Presidency or the removal of the President would be regarded as contravening Article 4, with “all the implications” that entailed. St. Petersburg’s Vedomosti (The Record) published details on the suspension of the Aleksandr Nevzorov’s virulently anti-Yeltsin television program, 600 Seconds. The order received, on October 5, by Bella Kurkova, chair of the television company, was signed by Deputy Minister of Press and Information O. Yusitkov and chief of the State Inspectorate for Protection of the Press Yuri Luchinksii. The full text of the order (implemented by Kurkova) was as follows:
The authority of the “founder” or the existence of an emergency become important analytical tools. In normal circumstances, the law requires government to follow certain extremely important procedural requirements if it seeks to enforce Article 4.1 These procedural safeguards stipulate that a mass media outlet may be terminated or suspended but only upon judicial review and only after proof of repeated violations during the prior twelve months and the prior issuance of written warnings. For example, as mentioned above, the government had taken Den to court earlier, and had negotiated a settlement in which the government dropped its civil action and Den promised not to violate Article 4. But, and this is the magic of law, these procedural safeguards do not apply if the action is taken by the “founder” as the Council asserted in its September action or pursuant to emergency powers, as the President argued in October. The powers and problems of asserting foundership can be found in the takeover and reorientation of the newspaper Rossiiskaia Gazeta, a paper for which the Parliament had been the founder. Shortly after the September 23 Council of Ministers’ action, the government installed a new editor-in-chief, Natalia Ivanovna Polezhaeva, who initiated radical changes in personnel and editorial directions. These actions brought her into conflict with the journalists of the paper who, in a September 27th meeting, voiced their unanimous objection to the takeover and claimed that the substitution of founders had been illegal. Peter Krug Note: 1. Regarding its obligations under international agreements, Russia is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which, in Article 19, guarantees the right to receive and impart information. However, Article 19(3)(b), not often cited, permits restrictions—provided by domestic law—deemed necessary for “the protection of national security or of public order.” The Covenant also permits parties to derogate from their Article 19 responsibilities in times of public emergency which threaten the life of the nation and the existence of which is officially proclaimed.” Article 4 (1) of the Covenant. |
Last Updated: 11/20/99 |
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© 1999 Post-Soviet Media Law &
Policy Newsletter |
